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Abstract

THE STRUCTURAL RESPONSE AND PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL
HOSPITALS IN A MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT
By Denise M. McCollum, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

Medical College of Virginia Campus, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1 998

Major Director: James W. Begun, Ph.D., Professor

The study purpose is to link hospital structure, represented by each hospital's
professional contingent, service mix, and inpatient capacity; and its environment,
characterized by the penetration of managed care enrollees. The secondary purpose is to
test the relationship between hospital structural change and subsequent hospital
performance.
The study employs a non-experimental panel design, with a sample of 1 882
community hospitals (service type: general medical and surgical) . Environmental
variables are measured for the base year 1 989. Hospital structural variables are measured
for 1 989 and 1 994, with change variables computed. Performance variables are

ix

measured for 1 989 and 1 995, with change computed for cost measures. Hospital
structural change is viewed as a dependent variable related to the environment, as well as
an independent variable related to performance.
Descriptive data are extracted from the American Hospital Association Annual
Survey of Hospitals. Hospital cost performance data are from the Health Care Financing
Administration Prospective Payment System Minimum Data Sets. Hospital mortality
data for 1 989 are from Medicare Hospital Mortality Information.
HMO enrollment data are extracted from the Interstudy Edge and aggregated to
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. Market competition data are from the 1 989
Area Resource File. A Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is calculated for each
hospital ' s MSA.
Analytical hypotheses are tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) technique.
Results from Part 1 suggest that where HMO penetration was relatively high, sample
hospitals tended to contain growth in their registered nurse (RN) staff between 1 989 and
1 994. Higher HMO penetration is also associated with more stabilization in occupancy
rates, preventive services, and ambulatory workload. In contrast, market competition is
associated with changes to a higher Medicare case-mix index (CMI), and increase in
ambulatory visits.
Results from Part 2 indicate positive associations between increased RN staff and
hospital cost growth between 1 989 and 1 995. Hospitals which did not experience an
increased CMI are similarly linked with cost growth. Alternatively, reduction in hospital
bedsize is associated with more controlled growth in hospital cost per patient day.

x

Several control variables display noteworthy associations with the variables of interest.
Theoretical and management implications for community hospitals are discussed.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

A recurring objective in American health care policy is adequate health services
for all citizens. This goal includes appropriate levels of access, cost, and quality care
within the medical system. Our society, rich in organizations (Scott, 1 992), has
witnessed the emergence of the general hospital as a social and economic institution, a
storehouse for sophisticated medical technology and scientific expertise. Rosemary
Stevens ( 1 989) describes American voluntary hospitals as businesses which
simultaneously carry American hopes of altruism, solidarity, and community spirit.
Additionally, the corporatization of hospitals through the emergence of profit-making
chains introduced capitalism into American medicine on a large scale (Starr, 1 982).
Recently, however, the tide of American opinion has not favored the continued
expansion of hospital facilities. Robinson ( 1 994) characterizes the hospital as challenged
by important developments in epidemiology, technology, and economics. Furthermore,
concern for the tremendous rise in medical spending has propelled public and private
purchasers to increasingly negotiate payments for hospital services for prospectively
determined amounts.
The focus of this study is the community hospital organization and its response to
a changing economic and market environment. One pivotal change came in the 1 980s
with the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). According to Eli Ginzberg

2

( 1 995), hospitals adjusted to PPS, not by reducing their expenditures, but rather by
finding new sources of revenues. In the face of declines in hospital occupancy rates from
the mid-70% level in 1 985 to about 60% in 1 995, relatively few hospitals were forced to
merge, convert, or close. In 1 988, for example, a peak year for hospital failures, only 70
closures were identified out of a sample of 1 53 5 nongovernment, short-term, acute care
hospitals (Ozcan and Lynch, 1 992). Hospital survival mechanisms included the
formation of alliances to benefit from economies of scale and increased access to capital .
Cost-shifting, or transferring the cost of care to another' s pocketbook (Eastaugh,
1 992) was also a tactical response from hospitals seeking to maintain customary revenues
without fundamentally changing their methods of internal operation.
A second pivotal factor challenging the hospital organization is the emergence of
managed care companies, which have rapidly grown to dominate specific sectors of the
inpatient market. In 1 995, 73% of U. S. workers with health insurance received their
coverage through managed care in the form of a health maintenance organization (HMO),
a preferred provider organization (PPO), or a point-of-service plan (Jensen et aI. , 1 997).
Fifty million people in the U. S . , or 20 percent of the population, were insured through
HMOs in 1 996 (Dunn, 1 996). Furthermore, both the Medicare and Medicaid programs
are developing managed care systems for their covered populations. In 1 995,
approximately 3 million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in HMOs, representing
about 8 percent of the Medicare population (Virginia Association of HMOs, 1 997).
Clearly, the managed care philosophy, with emphasis on primary care services,
disease prevention, and cost reduction, introduces several new challenges from the

hospital' s external environment. From the hospital perspective, many questions arise
regarding new economic and social incentives. Will hospital structures support
outpatient services and expanded preventive medicine missions? In the labor arena, have
hospitals retained elaborate numbers of statT, or have they "reengineered" in etTorts to
focus on core competencies and lucrative product lines? Duke ( 1 996) observes that
hospitals are struggling to rethink and reorganize what they do, who does it, and how
everything is financed. The question remains whether thought has been translated to
action
Apart from these structural issues, do hospitals operate more efficiently as a result
of their participation in managed care contracting? To what degree have cost savings
been achieved? In this new environment of market competition and managed care, have
hospitals succeeded in maintaining, or improving the quality of care rendered?
The issues of cost containment and quality in health care are particularly
important with the proj ected growth and needs of the Medicare population. As the
American "Baby Boomers" age, they will lay claim to a national health insurance
program already considered overburdened in 1 996. People over the age of 64 will total
1 7. 5 percent of the population by 2020, up from 1 2 . 5 percent in 1 990 (U. S. Census
Bureau, 1 990). Clearly, considerable demand for medical care will exist for this senior
population, which currently utilizes inpatient services at five times the rate of those under
the age of 6 5 . The challenge for hospitals will be to deliver patient services and to
remain viable under new risk-bearing reimbursement methods (Murray and Anderson,
1 996).

4

The managed care contracting model, involving capitated reimbursements and
assumption of financial risk, could eventually become the dominant payment method for
general hospital services. By examining those hospitals already immersed in managed
care delivery systems, this study examines the direction of future structural development
for the typical community hospital.
According to Robinson and Casalino ( 1 996), managed care began as a reform in
health care financing, but will culminate as a revolution in health care organization. This
study will assist in determining whether this second revolution has begun.
Historical Background

"From cash cow to cost center." This phrase typifies the feeling that the hospital
sector is due for monumental change, where the acute care hospital could move from the
center of the health care delivery system to the periphery (Brennan, 1 996; Ginzberg,
1 995; Goldsmith, 1 989; Robinson, 1 994).
Foster ( 1 989) claims that American hospitals, known in the 1 9th century as a
p lace to die, have gone from rags to riches to rags once again. Indeed, during a twentieth
century buildup, the community hospital evolved from a locally supported charity to a
complex institution, dependent on sophisticated equipment and highly differentiated
personnel (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983). A downward swing toward hospital destitution
has not been easy to detect, however. For example, the Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission (PROPAC) ( 1 996) noted record profit margins for American hospitals in
1 996.
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When the American economy took a downturn in the 1 970s, the cost of health
care did not. Federal regulation targeting cost containment was enacted in the 1 980s,
establishing Medicare' s Prospective Payment System and introducing Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs). Typical hospital response to economic pressures in the 1 980s consisted
of horizontal and/or vertical integration, diversification, and aggressive marketing (Duke,
1 996; Ginzberg, 1 995). According to Foster ( 1 989), the hospital response to DRGs was
called "restructuring," where hospitals were subsumed into systems or possibly affiliated
into confederations.
The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission ( 1 996), observing that the
hospital industry is operating in an increasingly price-competitive environment,
characterizes three hospital financial strategies: controlling costs, seeking alternative
revenue streams, and expanding market share. Alternative revenue streams are sought
through broadening the scope of services, such as offering more outpatient surgeries or
skilled nursing facilities. Strengthening market share, or securing a patient base, often
occurs through contractual arrangements with provider groups or managed care
companies.
Robinson ( 1 996b ) summarizes five forms of growth and integration in health care
organizations: increased share of a particular market for a particular product (within
market horizontal integration); expansion into a new geographic region (across-market
horizontal integration); development of new services (product diversification); entry into
new marketing and distribution niches (channel diversification); and linkages into
suppliers (vertical integration). Foster ( 1 989) interpreted the movement to systems as the
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disappearance of autonomous hospitals. External changes do not necessarily change
hospital operations, however, specifically in terms of quality and community service
(Shortell, 1 988).
Grumbach ( 1 995, p. 1 67) describes an American model of health care which
fostered the growth and financing of the modern hospital : "focused on specialization,
technology, and curative medicine, with relative inattention to basic primary care
services, including such needs as disease prevention and supportive care for patients with
chronic and incurable ailments. A pluralistic delivery system, which is often fragmented
and lacking coordination . . . " From this acute care perspective, hospitals were not
designed to meet the full spectrum of health care needs for their patient populations. Yet
the 1 990s appear to be the period when hospital services are redefined for the managed
care environment.
Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between hospital
structure, represented by each hospital ' s professional contingent, service mix, and
inpatient capacity; and the hospital environment, characterized by the penetration of
managed care health plans. On a secondary level, the study searches for a link between
change in hospital structure and associated organizational performance.
The American hospital is a fascinating subject for organizational research due to
its blend of tradition, professionalism, regulation, medical technology, human service,
politics, and economic influence, to name a few distinguishing features. According to
John Griffith ( 1 989), hospitals are the creations of the society around them. This study
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combines a familiar problem - the most desirable ways to organize - with a prominent
community element - the community hospital - in order to characterize the current
challenge of delivering acceptable inpatient care at a reasonable cost.
Although the observation and analysis of hospital trends are useful to healthcare
managers, this study primarily seeks to test organizational theory. Collection and
evaluation of available hospital data allow for empirical application of structural
contingency theory (SCT) and existing literature in organizational adaptation.
Statement of the Problem

Primarily, this study determines whether a selected group of American hospitals
made significant structural changes during a particularly turbulent period in their recent
history, from 1 989 to 1 994. Further, the study searches for the strongest environmental
influences on structural changes. Influence is measured in the following dimensions: the
degree of managed care entrenchment into the hospital ' s market, the hospital ' s
performance record a s impetus for change, and individual hospital characteristics
considered inherent to management structure.
Wherever general hospitals show significant structural changes, the secondary
study problem is to identify their performance differences after the transition; as well as
to compare performance between "adaptive" hospitals, and those hospitals which have
essentially retained their prototypical structures in spite of environmental change.
Three major assumptions are made in approaching this study. First, community
hospitals in 1 987, fresh from weathering prospective payment reform, are generally
assumed to be a poor "fit" with the values, obj ectives, and financial incentives of the
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managed care revolution. Second, community hospitals are observed in their reactive
capacity only: hospital response to the managed care movement is being studied rather
than hospital influence over the environment. Third, from a theoretical perspective, it is
assumed that the study hospitals will always seek a better fit with their environment and
that better performance will result from better fit. These assumptions will be further
developed in the review of the literature as well as the theoretical framework for the
study.
Goals and Objectives

This study is undertaken as a systematic assessment of organizational realignment
in the midst of tremendous industrial turbulence. The study is designed to :
1.

Detect prominent structural changes in hospitals participating in managed
care markets, as well as those hospitals comparatively unaffected by
managed care.

2.

Quantify specific structural changes in community hospitals observed over
the study period; and determine whether there is an association between
hospital structure, environment, and performance outcomes.

3.

Identify trends in the availability of hospital services, as well as the
utilization of medical professionals, in defining the community hospital of
the 21 st century.

The practical steps needed to progressively accomplish this project are:
1.

Formulation of a conceptual study model, where hypotheses may be
explicitly and vigorously tested.
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2.

Operationalization of study variables, based on the selected
theoretical framework of structural contingency theory.

3.

Selection of reliable sources for data.

4.

Appropriate exploratory and confirmatory analysis of hospital and
managed care data.

5.

Definitive interpretation of analytic results, i n reference t o the
hypotheses, as well as the study' s contribution to the literature and
introduction of additional research questions.
Scope of the Study

This research effort is directed toward nonfederal general medical and surgical
hospitals, where organizational survival is closely related to operating patient revenues.
Although the main study focus is upon community hospitals, a broad sample within this
base will provide comparative data for various geographic regions and hospital bedsize.
With the use of selected control variables, hospital environment and structure will be
representative of the community hospital population within the United States.
This study includes hospitals in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) only.
MSAs are defined as having a city with a popuiation of at least 50,000 or an urbanized
area with a population of at least 1 00,000 (Area Resources File, 1 996). The geographic
dispersion of rural hospitals and their long-distance trauma and emergency patient
transport systems make sparsely populated regions inappropriate for a study including
measures of hospital competition and local medical services. Furthermore, the continued
survival of a rural hospital might be determined by policy considerations rather than that
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hospital ' s economic viability. For example, in 1 99 1 the Health Care Financing
Administration funded demonstration projects to stimulate rural hospital care delivery
and grow healthcare networks in remote areas (Burke, 1 99 1 ).
A data base directed toward metropolitan statistical areas is advantageous for
analyzing hospitals in large urban areas, where market competition is potentially
powerful in shaping management strategies (Cleverly and Harvey, 1 992b).
Conceptual Framework: Contingency Theory

Perhaps Williamson stated it most succinctly when he observed that "organization
form matters" ( 1 985, p. 274). According to Pfeffer ( 1 982), the dominant approach to
explaining organizational structures in the sociological and business school literature has
been structural contingency theory (SCT), with its emphasis on efficiency. SCT argues
that the design of the organization depends on various contextual factors. Prominent
study factors include task uncertainty, size, strategy, and environment (Donaldson, 1 995).
Galbraith ( 1 973, p. 2) summarizes structural contingency in the following way:
1. There is no best way to organize.
2. Any way of organizing is not equally effective.

The first statement challenges theorists who have attempted to develop general
principles applicable to organizations in all times and places. The second statement
challenges the economic view that organizational structure is irrelevant to organizational
performance (Scott, 1 992). Scott adds a third maxim to this contingency theory:
3. The best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment to which
the organization relates.
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This study follows the consonance theory of SeT, with the premise that there is
an effectiveness or efficiency-seeking orientation on the part of organizational managers
that attempts to produce congruence between organizational designs and the contextual
factors that affect the appropriateness of those designs (Pfeffer, 1 982). As an example,
Perrow ( 1 970) states:
We must assume here that, in the interest of efficiency, organizations wittingly or
unwittingly attempt to maximize the congruence between their technology and
their structure.

Drazin and Van de Ven ( 1 985) summarize the premise that context and structure
must somehow fit together if the organization is to perform well. This research combines
two specific forms of contingency theory in the following propositions. Primarily, in the
congruency proposition, a simple unconditional association is hypothesized to exist
among variables in the model. For example, the greater the task uncertainty, the more
complex the structure. Secondly, in the contingency proposition, a conditional
association of two or more independent variables with a dependent outcome is
hypothesized and can be directly subjected to an empirical test (Fry and Schellenberg,
1 984). In an example of this proposition, the "fit" between task uncertainty and
organizational structure could be hypothesized to determine the organization' s efficiency.
Organizational Context and Structure

Organizational characteristics may be viewed as structural and contextual.
Structural dimensions describe the internal traits of the organization, while contextual
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dimensions describe the organizational setting that influences those structural dimensions
(Daft, 1 992).
In the research literature, three elements of context have been frequently
investigated: organizational size, technology, and environment (Pfeffer, 1 982). The
environment, a subset of context, includes all elements outside the boundary of the
organization, such as the industry, government, customers, and suppliers (Daft, 1 992).
Contingency research often considers the environmental dimension of
uncertainty, sometimes measured as change, and sometimes including a component of
complexity (pfeffer, 1 982). Lawrence and Dyer ( 1 983) offer two broad categories of
environmental factors: information complexity and resource scarcity. In health care, the
information domain might consist of explosions in medical knowledge, regulation, drugs
and treatments, new technologies, and competition. The domain of resource scarcity, on
the other hand, may be represented by the availability of capital and the rise of third-party
payments. Customers, competitors, government, and labor forces are all recognized as
impacting on resource availability.
As an illustration of balance between two domains, post-World War II hospitals
experienced extravagant growth in technology and services, predominantly financed by
government programs and private insurers (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983). One might see
that information complexity rose in the form of expensive technologies and product
variation, while resource scarcity was low. However, since 1969 when President Nixon
declared a "national crisis" in health care costs, resource constraints have increased in the
form of regulated health planning and utilization review (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983).
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Since 1 983, the preliminary implementation date for DRG regulation, hospitals
have been curtailing their inpatient services by shortening their average length of stay and
eliminating elaborate diagnostic procedures. Lawrence and Dyer ( 1 983) mention other
indicators of increasing resource constraint: renewed interests in hospital management,
collaborative efforts between hospitals, and medical services delivered outside of hospital
walls.
Pfeffer and Salancik ( 1 978) use a similar set of factors to characterize the
environment: degree of concentration of resources, scarcity or munificence of resources,
and degree of interconnectedness among organizations.
Once the environmental context has been adequately described, researchers
attempt to relate an organization' s structure to its context. Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967)
developed the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between the degree of
environmental uncertainty and the degree of flexibility in a unit ' s organizational form.
They described the two fundamental ingredients to organizational flexibility as
differentiation and integration (or coordination). Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967), working
at the sub-system level and the organizational level, found that differentiation and
integration are antagonistic states, resolved by more effective organizations. They argued
that each organizational subunit would develop a structure matching its own
sub environment, thereby posing more problems for integrating and coordinating the
entire system.
Pugh et at. ( 1 969) found clear relationships between organizational structure and
the contextual elements of size, technology, and location. The contingency of size refers
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to the scale of the organization, especially the number of its members (Donaldson, 1 995).
The expanding size of organizations gives rise to increasing complexities in subdivision
of responsibilities, structural differentiation, and coordination (Blau, 1 970).
Technology has been defined as the tools, techniques, and actions used to
transform organizational inputs into outputs. Technology is the organization' s
production process, and it includes machinery and work procedures (Daft, 1 992). In her
studies of manufacturing technology, Woodward ( 1 965) observed that different
technologies impose different demands on organizations, demands which must be met
through an appropriate structure.
In studying location, Blau and Scott ( 1 962) found that geographical, cultural, and
community setting can influence an organization, thereby suggesting a requirement for
study controls in these areas. These elements are developed in Scott ' s ( 1 992) ecological
level of analysis, where the organization is a collective factor functioning in a larger
system of relations. Scott expands this concept by identifying four sublevels within the
ecological level: 1 ) the organizational set, or group of roles undertaken by one
organizational unit, 2) the population of organizations, or aggregate of organizations
which are alike in some respect, 3) the areal organizational field, or collection of
organizations within a specific geographic area, and 4) the functional organizational field.
Basic Models of Organizational Structure and Performance

While determinants of structural features are interesting to students of
organizational theory and administration, a concern for the consequences of hospital
structure will be shared among providers, patients and policymakers (Flood and Scott,
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1 987). Flood and Scott ( 1 987) arrive at a synthetic model to summarize their
investigation of technology, structure, and performance in hospitals (Figure 1 ) . At the
center of their model is hospital structure, including the dimensions of size, staff
qualifications, and resources. Hospital performance is measured by service efficiency,
morbidity, and mortality rates.

Figure 1. Synthetic Model of Hospital Structure and Performance

(Source: Flood and Scott, 1 987, p. 26).
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Kimberly and Zaj ac ( 1 985) proposed a more complex model, linking
organizational environment, strategy, structure, and behavior, with all interrelationships
influencing organizational performance (Figure 2). This model, consistent with strategic
adaptation literature, focuses on the interrelationships that directly affect performance.
Going one step further, however, performance becomes a central variable; with feedback
from prior performance stimulating strategic adaptation (Kimberly and Zaj ac, 1 985).
Kimberly and Zaj ac ( 1 985) also emphasized that both macro environmental
changes and micro behavioral changes must be considered in their impact on managerial
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decisions within the health care firm. The determinist and volunteeristic perspectives
come together here to comprise the organization ' s context.

Figure 2. Model of Strategic Adaptation

(Source: Kimberly and Zajac, 1 985, p. 2 8 1 ) .
Environmental!
Strategy

The study at hand incorporates elements from the models depicted in Figures 1
and 2. Both models are specifically oriented to the health care industry. Furthermore, the
authors have considered the accumulated knowledge and contributions of prior studies.
The consummate goal is to pattern institutional response to significant environmental
shifts, allowing for a variety of conditions and contingencies.
The American hospital may be likened to an organization at the epicenter of an
unpredictable earthquake (Shortell et aI. , 1 995). Rapid and fundamental changes threaten
to push the hospital to the margins of the health care system (Robinson, 1 994). This
inquiry seeks to describe these disruptive forces, and to discover whether American
hospitals have indeed undertaken significant changes to reinvent themselves.
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Outline of the Remaining Chapters

In Chapter 2, the Literature Review, studies concerning the effects of managed
care and market competition upon the hospital industry are reviewed, along with
economic evaluations of hospital behavior under various reimbursement policies.
Methods for measuring market competition are presented and discussed. Hospital
performance in terms of efficiency and quality, the subject of a multitude of studies, is
also reviewed. All references to the literature are discussed in relation to the variables
and measures selected for this study.
Chapter 3, the Theoretical Model, presents a more detailed framework for this
study, including Donaldson' s ( 1 987) Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit (SARFIT) and
Child ' s ( 1 972) assessment of the environment' s impact on organizational
decisionmakers. The concepts of "fit" and "structure" are discussed as preludes to
model formulation. The study hypotheses are stated.
Chapter 4, Methodology, describes the research design. Methods of data
collection, variable measurement and analysis are presented and regression models are
specified according to the study hypotheses presented earlier.
Chapter 5, Results, summarizes descriptive statistics and comparisons, bivariate
analysis, and regression model estimations for the hospital sample. Part 1 evaluates
hospital change variables as dependent variables, while Part 2 considers the same change
variables as independently affecting hospital performance at a later point in time.
Chapter 6, Discussion, evaluates the results in relation to the original hypotheses
and considers whether results may be generalized to a broader population. Implications
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of the study are enumerated, and design limitations are listed and discussed. Topics and
methods for future research are identified, and overall conclusions are made.

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this review is to summarize existing commentary and research on
the managed care environment surrounding the study hospitals. Specifically, the post
PPS managed care movement is described in some detail, with emphasis on the growth of
HMOs, or health maintenance organizations, and their impact on the acute care hospital
of the mid- 1 980s. The rise of market competition among hospitals is reviewed as an
integral subset of the managed care environment confronting hospitals. Additionally,
studies are presented which investigate hospital performance issues throughout the 1 980s
and 1 990s. Literature pertinent to defining and measuring hospital contextual factors is
useful in determining an appropriate analytic model of hospital response.
Hospitals in a Managed Care Environment

In 1 994, the United States spent close to 14 percent of its gross domestic product
on health care (Reinhardt, 1 996) while all other industrialized nations had maintained a
ratio below 1 0 percent (Schieber et aI. , 1 994). The largest single element of national
health expenditures (NHE) in 1 994 was hospital care at $33 8 . 5 billion, or 3 5 . 7 percent
Eighty-eight percent of all hospital care in 1 994 was delivered in short-term, acute care
community hospitals, and 63 percent was for inpatient services alone (Levit et aI. , 1 996).
Various efforts in controlling costs generated by hospital providers have been
attempted, including the shift of economic risk from payors to physicians and hospitals
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(Horowitz and Kleiman, 1 994) and the momentous reduction of inpatient bed-days fueled
by this country' s insurance industry (Reinhardt, 1 996). Efforts in cost control do not
necessarily address issues such as access, quality, or efficiency, however. While cost
containment is the central issue for health care policy in the 90' s, the concept of
efficiency must include quality as well (Rice, 1 992).
Table 1 summarizes information on national health care spending between 1 980
and 1 994, depicting an overall decline in growth. Costs for hospital care were
particularly constrained in 1 993 and 1 994. Figure 3 represents the hospital ' s portion of
national health care expenditures in 1 994. The acute care hospital remains a relevant
object of health care study, due to its prominent position in the health service industry.
Table 1. National Health Expenditures Aggregate Amounts (in Billions of Dollars) and

Average Annual Percent Change by Type of Expenditure * Selected Years 1 9801 994.
(Source: HCF A, Office of the Actuary ( 1 997).

Type of
Ex�nditure
National Health
Expenditures
Health Services and
Supplies
Personal Health
Care
Hospital Care

1 980

1 985

1 990

1991

1 992

1 993

1 994

247.2

428.2
( 1 1 .6)
41 1.8
( 1 1 .8)
376.4
( 1 1 .6)

697.50
( 10.2)
672.9
(10.3)
6 14.7
(10.3)

76 1 .30
(9. 1)
736.3
(9.4)
676.2
( 10)

833 .60
(9.5)
806
(9.5)
739.8
(9.4)

892.30
(7)
863 . 1
(7. 1 )
786.5
(6.3)

949.40
(6.4)
9 19.2
(6.5)
83 1 . 7
(5.7)

168.3

256.4 .

282.3

305.3

324.2

338.5

235.6
2 17.0
102.7

Physician Services

45.2

Dental Services

13.3

Other Professional
Services
Home Health Care

6.4
2.4

(10.4)

(8.8)

( 10.1 )

(8. 1)

(6.2)

(4.4)

83.6
(13.1)
2 1 .7
( 10.2)
16.6
(2 1 .2)
5.6
( 1 8.9)

146.3
( 1 1 .8)
3 1 .6
(7.8)
34.7
( 15.8)
13. 1
( 18.4)

1 58.6
(8.4)
33.3
(5.6)
38.3
(10.4)
16. 1
(22.4)

1 74.7
(10. 1 )
37
' ( 1 1)
42. 1
( 10)
19.6
(22.3)

181.1
(3 7)
39.2
(6)
46.3
( 10)
23
(17.1)

1 89.4
(4 6)
42.2
(7.6)
49.6
(7. 1 )
26.2
( 1 3 . 8)

* Percent increase is average annual percent change from previous year shown
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Figure 3. The Nation' s Health Dollar: 1 994.

(Source: HeF A, Office of the Actuary, 1 997).
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Managed care may be defined as the control by organizations and institutional
arrangements of choices traditionally made within the patient-physician relationship
(Rodwin, 1 995). In other words, managed care organizations use various methods to
change the decisions of doctors and providers (Hurley and Freund, 1 993). Essentially,
managed care combines the delivery and financial dimensions of medical care in a
number of ways, such as utilization review, preadmission certification, case management
and capitation agreements (Anderson and Fox, 1 987).
A prominent form of managed care came into existence when the Medicare
prospective payment system (PPS) placed hospitals under financial risk for services
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provided to their Medicare patients. PPS basically changed the financial incentives
facing hospitals but left physicians and patients unaffected, initiating conflicts in cost
containment efforts (Glandon and Morrisey, 1 986).
As Medicare cost-plus reimbursement shifted in the mid- 1 980s to the prospective
payment system (Ginzberg, 1 995), other managed care initiatives proceeded to pressure
hospitals. First generation managed cCl:re practices relied on price discounts, while second
generation managed care incorporated stricter forms of utilization management. Third
generation managed care models utilize capitated payment that place providers at overall
financial risk for the care of enrolled populations (Shortell, et aI. , 1 995). Capitation has
been called the most rapidly growing form of managed care (Tab bush and Swanson,
1 996). With only 7 percent of the revenue of hospitals and medical groups capitated in
1 995, Bader and Matheny ( 1 994) projected growth to reach 1 7 percent by 1 996.
Zwanziger et al. ( 1 996) studied the effects of reimbursement shifts upon
California hospitals between 1 983 and 1 988. Two measures of hospital service mix were
used: specialization and differentiation. The new reimbursement mechanisms studied
were the Medicare PPS and the growth of selective contracting plans. Other hospital
data,

such as its level in the market, ownership,

and bedsize were also collected. Their

results indicated that the competition among hospitals tended to increase differentiation,
while higher financial PPS pressure was associated with increased specialization.
Additionally, they concluded that hospitals tended to adopt some high visibility services
offered by their competitors.

23

The forementioned study incorporates several elements of the intended research,
including the evaluation of hospital characteristics, in the form of service mix, amid a
drastic change in reimbursement systems. In their California study, however, hospital
response is examined throughout two concurrent financial contingencies, whose effects
may have interacted with one another.
The proposed study period takes place after hospital implementation ofPPS in
order to more fully isolate and characterize other managed care influences. Furthermore,
the intended study is on a national rather than state level; involving a broader sample, but
sacrificing the specific measurement advantage obtained in the California research.
HMO Growth

In an effort to quantify the managed care environment surrounding American
hospitals, the proposed study focuses on the growth of health maintenance organization
(HMO) enrollment within the insured patient population. Health maintenance
organizations have changed the health care market by integrating the functions of
insurance and health care provision (Christianson et aI. , 1 99 1 ). HMOs may be defined as
groups of physicians and other health care professionals who provide a wide range of
services to subscribers and their dependents on a prepaid basis (McDonnell et aI. , 1 986).
Individuals who enroll in an HMO contract for health service delivery from a
limited panel of providers for a fixed period and fee (Luft, 1 98 1 ). Because of the risk
involved in capitated premium payments, HMOs have an economic incentive to monitor
service utilization and costs. HMOs are organized in various models according to
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physician affiliation, including staff, group, network, and independent physician
association arrangements (McDonnell et aI. , 1 986).
A major competitor to the HMO has been the preferred provider organization, or
PPO, where a limited panel of physicians and hospitals also delivers health care services
to a defined group of patients. Compared to HMOs, PPOs are distinguishable by their
use of negotiated fee schedules and greater consumer choice of providers (Lissovoy et aI. ,
1 986).
According to Shelton (! 989), the more HMO and PPO plans dominate the
insurance-health plan market, the more hospitals are likely to compete on the basis of
price, assuming that HMOs and PPOs are more price-sensitive in contracting than prior
fee-for-service insurance payors. Furthermore, growth in the market share of HMOs and
PPOs limits the degree to which hospitals can cost-shift their contracted and government
business to charge-paying customers. It is highly likely that PPS implementation did not
initially bring about structural change in hospitals, specifically due to hospitals' freedom
in shifting charges to non-Medicare payors.
Shelton ( 1 989) observes that HMO market penetration, in relation to all health
insurance products and in relation to PPO market penetration, may be the most important
determinant of price competitiveness deriving from selective contracting.
Although HMOs are not a recent phenomenon, they became an important part of
federal policy with the passage of the Health Maintenance Organization Act (Dorsey,
1 975). After assisting HMO development between 1 973 and 1 983 with loans and grants,
the federal government promoted further HMO growth by supporting their enrollment of
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Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
of 1 98 1 gave states substantial flexibility to contract with HMOs for their Medicaid
programs. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1 982 redefined
HMO participation with Medicare, as well as establishing attractive new payment rates
for HMOs enrolling Medicare beneficiaries (Christianson et aI. , 1 99 1 ).
Amid these environmental changes, the number of HMOs grew rapidly, from 234
plans in December 1 98 1 to 626 plans in December 1 986; followed by a leveling off from
1 986 to 1 988 and a slight decline from 1 988 to 1 989. Total HMO enrollment climbed
steadily for the entire period between 1 978 and 1 989, however (Christianson et aI. , 1 99 1 ).
Annual rate of growth in HMO enrollment averaged 1 6.2 percent between 1 990 and 1 995
(VAHMO, 1 997). By 1 994, HMO enrollment reached 50 million (GHAA, 1 995); and
according to 1 995 surveys more than one in five Americans (58.2 million) were enrolled
in HMOs (VAHMO, 1 997).
Hospital involvement in HMO contracting will expand as HMOs enroll more
Figure 4. National Medicare HMO Growth.

(Source: VAHMO, 1 997) .
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seniors. In 1 995, approximately 3 million Medicare beneficiaries (8 percent of the
Medicare population) were enrolled in HMOs (See Figure 4).
Studies of Hospital Response to HMO Growth

Previous research has examined the relationship between hospitals and health
maintenance organizations. Feldman et al. ( 1 990) analyzed four communities and 1 02
contract forms to determine HMO strategies in hospital selection. As prepaid plans
competed for market share in the 1 980's, it was assumed that they would increasingly
attempt to reduce the cost of hospital services. Study results indicated that in HMO
contracting, hospitals were selected because of their affiliation with HMO physicians,
convenience to plan employees, and hospital reputation over service cost.
Once the HMO-hospital contract has been established, an important research
question is whether HMO affiliation will induce hospitals into price competition, or
greater efficiency. Feldman et al. ( 1 986) assessed the impact of HMOs on revenue, cost,
and net income per admission in Twin Cities hospitals from 1 979 to 1 98 1 . Some HMOs
had

obtained negotiated discounts from hospitals. The researchers found that hospitals

which gave larger discounts did not have lower costs per admission. Similarly, hospitals
with a large share of patients from HMOs or government Medicare and Medicaid
programs did not have lower costs per admission than other hospitals. Another important
observation was that neither HMO market share nor discounts had an adverse effect on
hospital profits. This study concluded that HMOs are only one agent in the market, and
that HMO-induced competition did not contain expenditures in the subject hospitals.
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Various research efforts have explored the relationship between HMO market
share and associated hospital utilization. Chernow ( 1 995) studied the impact of non-IPA
HMOs on the number of short-term general hospitals in the American Hospital
Association data base from 1 982 to 1 987. His results indicate that a 1 0-percentage point
increase in the non-IPA HMO market share will reduce the number of hospitals by 4%,
causing an approximate 5% reduction in the number of hospital beds. No statistically
significant relationship was found between non-IPA HMO penetration rates and hospital
occupancy rates.
Robinson ( 1 996a) studied HMO market penetration and hospital utilization in
private nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in California between 1 983 and 1 993 . The
growth of HMO penetration in local hospital markets was measured from patient
discharge abstract data. Outcome measures included hospital closures, changes in bed
capacity, changes in acute care admissions, length of stay, inpatient days and ambulatory
visits.
Robinson' s ( 1 996a) results indicated that during the study period, hospital
expenditures grew 44% less rapidly in markets with high HMO penetration than in
markets with low HMO penetration. Reductions in volume and service mix accounted
for 28% of reduced growth in hospital expenditures, decreased bed capacity accounted
for 6%, and changes in intensity (services per patient day) accounted for 1 0%.
Robinson' s conclusion was that managed care is shifting the acute care hospital from the
center to the periphery of the health care system.
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The intended study measures HMO penetration and resulting hospital utilization,
and some outcome measures are similar to those in Robinson' s ( l 996a) research. The
intended work has a national scope, while Robinson ' s sample was limited to California
hospitals. The intended study spans the years 1 989 to 1 995, where Robinson gathered a
decade of data through the year 1 993 . Managed care penetration, in the form onIMO
enrollment, is common to both studies, but subject to different methods of measurement
Finally, the intended study analyzes hospital outcomes in staff ratios as well as
Robinson' s variables of hospital costs and service utilization.
In a more specific analysis of hospital critical care, Angus et al. ( 1 996) studied the
effect of managed care insurance on ICU resource use in Massachusetts state hospitals in
1 992. A Massachusetts cohort was selected because Massachusetts is one of the most
highly penetrated managed care markets in the country (Zinner, 1 995). In 1 992, 1 9
managed care companies provided care for 3 5% of the population and 1 9% of the adult,
non-childbirth-related hospitalizations (Massachusetts Assoc. of HMOs, 1 996). It should
be noted, however, that enrollment figures, rather than managed care intensity, constitute
this definition of market penetration.
Angus et al. ( 1 996) compared ICU hospitalizations covered by four payer groups:
commercial fee-for-service, commercial managed care, traditional Medicare patients, and
Medicare-sponsored managed care. ICU length of stay (LOS) was the main outcome
measure selected for ICU resource utilization. It was acknowledged that this measure i s
somewhat crude, and that managed care organizations may have reduced ICU
expenditures through decreased daily resource use (Angus et aI. , 1 996).
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Findings from this study indicated that patients covered under managed care
consume fewer leu resources, primarily due to a difference in the patient-related factors
such as age, severity of principal illness, co morbidity and reason for admission. Payor
status had no independent effect on leu LOS. The conclusion was that as managed care
case mix changes in the future to include sicker and older patients, the initial advantages
of reduced resource consumption may diminish (Angus et aI. , 1 996).
Since leu services are estimated to comprise 3 0% of hospital costs in the United
States (Halpern et aI. , 1 994) this study and another leu research effort by Rapoport et al.
( 1 992) are relevant to the issue of managed care contracting and hospital utilization.
Both studies employ a broader definition of managed care penetration than the intended
study, however.
The accelerated growth of managed care organizations and arrangements has
added new dimensions to environmental turbulence surrounding hospitals, and generated
a structural revolution in the financing and delivery of health care (Brooke, 1 992). In one
example, hospitals may structurally integrate physicians into administrative activities in
an attempt to improve organizational efficiency and lower costs.
Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 988) evaluated five integrative strategies for
physicians and resultant hospital costs. The five dimensions of hospital-physician
integration included measurements in general administrative participation, participation
in hospital governance, salaried hospital-based physicians, employment of admitting
physicians, and management-oriented medical staff committees. The dependent variable
of hospital cost was measured as the total 1 982 expenditures for the hospital per adjusted
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discharge. Their findings suggested that physician involvement in the administrative
structure of the hospital, at least through administrative positions and clinical
employment, is associated with increased, rather than decreased hospital costs.
In addition to variables for hospital-physician integration, Alexander and
Morrisey ( 1 988) incorporated hospital control variables for case mix, production output
volume (in dollars), wage rate, hospital size, medical staff size, teaching/nonteaching,
hospital control, and regional location. Development of a full model including these
hospital control variables led to the conclusion that physician participation in hospital
governance did not affect hospital costs when other cost function variables were held
constant.
The intended study has several features similar to Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 988),
namely sampling from an AHA survey of hospitals, measurement of the dependent
variable of hospital cost, and inclusion of hospital control variables for case mix, size,
teaching status, hospital control, and regional location. Additionally, the intended study
includes a measure for the number of physicians employed by the hospital as a
percentage of the entire hospital statT This investigation, a form of update to the
physician integration issue, attempts to determine whether hospitals have indeed sought
to employ more physicians and thereby exert greater organizational cost control. Past
data have suggested that more than 70% of all expenditures on health care are directly
influenced, if not controlled, by the medical profession (ReIman, 1 980).
In summary, the managed care environment surrounding American hospitals is
comprised of multiple delivery systems, with primary focus on utilization and financial
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controls to affect cost (Boland, 1 993). With managed care establishing itself as a
"moving target" (Boland, 1 993), the intended study has selected an HMO-based
measurement of managed care penetration to indicate the environmental contingency
faced by the subject hospital organizations.
While hospital studies have demonstrated a change in capacity and utilization in
response to HMO presence (Robinson, 1 996a), changes in hospital staff mix and service
scope have not been thoroughly examined. Addition of these elements in the intended
study could possibly develop further insight into the nature of the managed care
contingency.
Market Competition and Hospital Efficiency Studies

Hospital behavior amid competition has been studied and measured from many
perspectives since the 1 980s. One major research question was whether procompetitive
policies promoted efficiency in individual hospital operations (McLaughlin, 1 988). A
second series of studies examined external hospital strategies, such as formation of
alliances, mergers, and even closure, in dealing with competitive change (Williams et aI. ,
1 992). Established measures o f market competition and previous studies o f hospital
response are important in formulating a foundation for the current proposal.
Competition may be defined in business as rivalry for customers or markets, with
competitors being more or less evenly matched (Webster' s Dictionary, 1 966). "Perfect
competition," a term used in economics, is a market structure in which there are ( I )
numerous buyers and sellers, (2) perfect information, (3) free entry and exit, and (4) a
homogeneous product (Folland et aI. , 1 993). When these basic assumptions are violated,
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economists generally acknowledge that the market fails to achieve an efficient outcome.
Market failure provides an opening for public interventions in the market (Johannesson,
1 996).
Many have criticized the applicability of ideal market conditions in the health care
sector (Folland et aI. , 1 993). Although procompetitive policies in health care markets
were being promoted as cost containment strategies during the 1 980s, McLaughlin ( 1 988)
observed that few of these markets were competitive or moving toward maximum
efficiency.
The concept of efficiency may be related to competitive markets through the First
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, stating that competitive markets under
certain conditions are economically efficient (Folland et aI. , 1 993). Vilfredo Pareto
defined efficiency as an economically optimal outcome in society, where it is impossible
to improve the lot of any person without hurting someone else (Folland et aI. , 1 993).
McLaughlin ( 1 988) interpreted production efficiency as choosing the optimal
combination of inputs to produce a given output in the least costly way. An expected
outcome of increased price competition in health care was production efficiency; yet
McLaughlin suggested that the response to HMOs and other changes in the financing and
delivery of health services was increased nonprice competition, or rivalry. McLaughlin
( 1 988) made the concession that in 1 988, it was possibly too early to see the cost
containment effects of increased efficiency caused by competitive pressures.
In a related study, Robinson et al. ( 1 988) hypothesized that hospitals competed
with other nearby hospitals, but on a nonprice rather than price basis. This idea was
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translated into the working hypothesis that competitive pressures encourage hospitals to
accommodate patient and physician preferences for longer lengths of stay.
I n a study o f 747 nonfederal short-term hospitals, Robinson et al. ( 1 988)
compared measures of hospital concentration and competition with length of stay for ten
surgical procedures. Competition-related percentage increases in length of stay (7% to
23%) were identified for all procedures. It was concluded that there was a strong positive
association between the number of hospital competitors in the local market and the
average length of stay in U . S . hospitals.
The notable distinction in this study is the timing of its data sources: 1 982. Prior
to the implementation ofPPS, this well-controlled study suggested that hospitals under
competitive pressure were destined to have a difficult time in adjusting to prospective
reimbursement. Physicians would have to be convinced to alter their practice styles, and
patients would have to live with shorter acute care postoperative recovery time in order to
shorten the average length of stay (Robinson et aI. , 1 988).
More recently, Jones ( 1 990) argued that 10 years of competition in the employer
based private health insurance system did not achieve appreciable containment of costs.
Specifically, policy toward competition consisted of multiple choice of health insurance
plans for employees and HMO development through the 1 980s. Jones ( 1 990) suggested
that the multiple choice in health plans must be curtailed or heavily managed for risk
selection in order to lower health care costs.
Chilingerian ( 1 992) focused these issues in health service efficiency upon the
individual hospital, and further upon the physician staff. With a prediction that in the
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1 990s, 60% of all employees and their dependents would be enrolled in some kind of
managed care indemnity plan like an HMO or PPO, Chilingerian ( 1 992) urged hospitals
to retain physicians whose experience and judgement reduce the amount of unnecessary
tests, drugs, and patient days in the hospital. Where in the past, physician judgement was
not questioned, hospital price variation was beginning to be attributed to physician
practice patterns.
Changes in reimbursement policy and resultant hospital utilization rates were
evaluated under the Medicare Competition Demonstration from 1 984 (Rossiter et aI. ,
1 988). Analysis was conducted which compared service use and cost experience o f
participating HMOs and competitive medical plans (CMPs). The measure for efficiency
in this study was hospital days per 1 000 person years. Medicare enrollees in the
demonstration experienced a median of 1 95 1 hospital days per 1 000 person years, 5 7
percent o f the median of 3432 days per 1 000 i n the local market from which the plans
drew enrollment. Independent practice associations (IPAs) experienced higher hospital
use rates than staff and group model HMOs. These comparisons were not adjusted for
various risk factors, but it was predicted that further adjustment would favor the
demonstration plans.
The National Medicare Competition Evaluation (Rossiter et aI. , 1 988) analyzed
the economic aspects of patient care in terms of cost and utilization, with results
indicating that competitive health plans in the Medicare sector could reduce health care
costs through production efficiency. One important comparison to be made, however,
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was quality o f care between demonstrations and fee-for-service providers. The intended
study includes a quality measure as an integral element of hospital performance.
Hospital cost inflation between 1 982 and 1 986 was a subject of study by
Robinson and Luft ( 1 988), where data on 5490 nonfederal, short-term general hospitals
were used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of regulatory and market-oriented cost
control policies on hospitals. AHA data was the primary source of cost, utilization, and
other individual hospital measures. The effects of various cost-control strategies among
several state programs were evaluated using a multivariate statistical approach that
controlled for hospital-specific changes in patient mix, wage rates, volume of services
provided, and other relevant factors. Additionally, the researchers examined how the
effects of various strategies differed for private nonprofit, public, or investor-owned
hospitals.
Robinson and Luft ( 1 988) found that California' s market-oriented cost-control
policy reduced inflation rates by 1 0. 1 % compared to a control group of 43 states.
Hospitals with large percentages of patients insured by Medicare' s prospective payment
system experienced cost inflation rates 1 6 . 1 % lower than hospitals with small
percentages of Medicare patients. Investor-owned hospitals experienced rates of cost
increase 1 1 . 6% higher that private nonprofit hospitals and 1 5% higher that public
hospitals. These results support the hypothesis that rate regulation in the form of
competition can yield desirable effects in controlling hospital costs.
The intended study does not review state regulatory policies; however its
emphasis on competitive mechanisms and resulting hospital expenses is similar to
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Robinson and Luft ( 1 988). It is interesting to note the following study observation,
describing the local nature of hospital services:
Hospital markets are inherently local rather than national in character,
given the unwillingness of physicians and patients to travel large
geographic distances except for the most complicated of hospital services.
Buyers can thus only exploit cost and price differences within local
markets, not among different local markets. (Robinson and Luft, 1 988, p.
268 1 )
I n their study of pro-competition policies, Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) also
concluded that such policies could indeed increase hospital cost containment and move
hospital competition to the price-based arena. Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) grouped
California' s short-term hospitals according to the level of competition within their
markets. After controlling for the effects of the Medicare prospective payment system
program, the rate of increase in cost per discharge for hospitals in highly competitive
markets was 3 . 53% lower than the rate of increase for hospitals in low competition
markets during the period from 1 983 through 1 985.
The study design presented by Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) was in three
analytical steps, with the first step using analysis of variance (ANOYA) to compare
hospital behavior before and after the introduction of selective contracting and Medicare
PPS . Selective contracting refers to the procedure whereby a third-party payer can
legally exclude providers from their list of participating providers without significant
threat of antitrust prosecution. Under the selective contracting law, both public and
private payers can negotiate terms and conditions with each specific provider whom they
will reimburse for services to their subscribers (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1 988).
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The second step used multivariate regression analysis t o test whether there were
significant differences in the behavior of hospitals, depending on the competitiveness of
the market in which they were located. Measures of hospital cost, revenue, and use were
analyzed for hospitals in high-competition and low-competition markets.
In the third step of their study, Melnick and Zwanziger ( l 988) estimated the
separate effects of the Medicare PPS program, selective contracting, and increased
competition upon hospitals. The results from previous multiple regression analyses were
used to quantify the effects of the PPS program on urban hospitals for three measures of
performance: cost per discharge, total inpatient costs, and number of inpatient discharges.
The estimated regression coefficients were multiplied by the corresponding values of the
independent variables to calculate the rates of change for hospitals under different market
conditions.
This study is important because it supports conclusions that after PPS and
selective contracting implementation, greater competition among hospitals led to reduced
hospital costs. Similarities with the intended research include a characterization and
measurement of market competition, as well as measures of hospital cost and volume,
representing hospital behavior. While the Melnick and Zwanziger (1 988) study was
concerned with PPS and selective contracting as policy issues, the intended study intends
to follow up on a time period following PPS implementation. The Melnick and
Zwanziger ( \ 988) research study collected financial data from the state of California
only; with the idea that California foreshadowed a trend due in other states. In the
intended study, data are collected on a national level.
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In the forward march of managed care, the closure of hospital beds was a central
consideration in cutting the excess hospital capacity (Cerne and Montague, 1 994).
Another hospital resource that could be reduced, discussed by Hadley et al. ( 1 996), was
hospital staff. Using data from the American Hospital Association and the Medicare
Program, researchers analyzed the effects of financial pressure and market competition
on changes in several measures of performance of 1435 acute care hospitals between
1 987 and 1 989.
It was observed that the least profitable hospitals constrained their growth in total
expenses to half that for the most profitable hospitals ( 1 3 . 3% versus 27.6%) by limiting
the growth of their staffs and their total assets. These changes were associated with a
reduction in inefficiency of 1 . 8% compared with a very slight increase in inefficiency for
the highest profit group. Additionally, hospitals in highly competitive markets appeared
to control expenses relative to those in the least competitive areas. No evidence was
found to suggest that financial pressures created by either low profits or market
competition resulted in hospitals engaging in cost-shifting.
The study by Hadley et al. ( 1 996) is similar to the intended study in its use of
AHA and Medicare data, its measurement

of hospital staff size as an indicator of hospital

response, and its focus on competitive pressures and resulting efficiency between
hospitals. There are some differences, however: Hadley' s indicators of hospital revenue
growth and profit are not included as performance variables in the intended study.
Wickizer et al. ( 1 996) estimated the impact of hospitals ' various managed care
strategies on the cost per hospital discharge. Thirty-seven member hospitals of seven

39

health systems were surveyed, with separate cross-sectional regression analyses
performed on inpatient data from 1 99 1 and 1 992. The multivariate model was estimated
with hospital cost per discharge as the dependent variable. Pooled discharge data
indicated three dimensions of hospital managed care strategy that consistently related to
lower costs per hospital discharge: the proportion of hospital revenues derived from per
case or capitation payment, the hospital' s mechanisms for sharing information on
resource consumption with clinicians, and the use of formalized, systematic care
coordination mechanisms.
This study by Wickizer et al. ( 1 996) is similar to the intended study, due to its
emphasis on managed care strategies, specifically the "fixed price" hospital incentives,
and also in measuring the efficiency variable as hospital cost per discharge. With only 3 7
hospitals surveyed, the authors limited the generalizability of their sample; however, with
over 40,000 discharges analyzed for the research period and individual hospital surveys
completed on managed care strategies, a smaller number of hospitals allowed for detailed
evaluation.
Market Competition and Hospital Quality Studies

Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) suggested that further studies look at the effect of
competition on quality in hospitals. This area was pursued by Shortell and Hughes
( 1 988) who examined the influence of regulation of hospital rates, state certificate-of
need programs, competition, and hospital ownership on mortality rates among Medicare
inpatients in 1 983 and 1 984. Their results indicated no statistically significant
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association between mortality rates among inpatients and the degree of competition,
represented by the number of hospitals located in the market area.
Shortell and Hughes ( 1 988) sought to test the hypothesis that hospitals facing
severe regulatory constraints and payment controls, operating in highly competitive
markets, would be particularly prone to lower their technical performance, resulting in
adverse patient outcomes. Their study also held an underlying assumption that hospitals
located in states where HMOs have enrolled a higher proportion of the population face
more pressure to compete with each other for patients on the basis of price. The intended
study carries a similar hypothesis: that HMO dominance will stimulate hospital
competition based on price, and that hospital quality should be examined as a result.
Methods for Measuring Market Competition

The method of measurement of market competition is crucial in evaluating the
behavior of competing hospitals. A common measure in econometric models of hospital
performance is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHl), defined as the sum of squares of
market shares, expressed as a percent, held by each firm in an industry. The maximum
value is 1 0,000 and the minimum approaches zero. The HHl has been considered a good
measure because it captures the size distribution of firms: larger firms get more weight
(Folland et aI. , 1 993).
Some criticism has also been presented regarding the HHl. White and C hirikos
( 1 988) reported statistical bias in using the HHl as an exogenous variable in hospital
regressions, with other demographic and economic hospital characteristics as possible
confounders.
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Robinson et al. ( 1 988) measured the number o f competing hospitals i n each local
market according to the latitude and longitude coordinated for each of the country ' s
nonfederal, short-term general hospitals. Next, a computer algorithm searched for all the
neighboring institutions within a 24-kilometer (km) radius of the subject hospitals.
Straight-line distances between hospitals were calculated from latitude and longitude
coordinates. Markets were defined according to whether they included 0, 1 through 4, 5
through 1 0, or more than 1 0 neighboring hospitals within a 24-km radius.
Phibbs and Robinson ( 1 993) further refined the measurement of hospital
competition in their variable-radius measure of local hospital market structure in
California. Hospital discharge abstracts from 1 983 were used to measure the radii
necessary to capture 75 percent and 90 percent of each hospital' s admissions. With radii
used to define each hospital' s service area, two measures of local market structure were
calculated: the number of other hospitals within the radius and a HHl based on the
distribution of hospital bed shares in the market.
The calculated radii were used as the dependent variables in regression models,
with corresponding hospital characteristics as the independent variables. Estimated
parameters of market radii were then used to p redict local market structure for all federal,
short-term, general hospitals in the continental United States.
Although the Phibbs-Robinson variable-radius method appears most desirable in
an extensive hospital market analysis, its 1 983 calculations of hospital competition levels
were not collected within the time period necessary for the intended research proj ect.
The intended study utilizes the HHl approach to measuring competition within a
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hospital ' s market. The HHI is well known and generally accepted in the health care
industry, it is a relatively straightforward measure, and its data sources are available for
analysis. Furthermore, the limitations of the HHI will be acknowledged and examined
within the context of this research design.
Control Variables: Measuring Hospital Strategic Behaviors

In addition to measuring market competition among hospitals, the intended
research intends to measure hospital behaviors in response to a more demanding
economic environment. From the organizational standpoint, hospitals have been studied
in several external transitions: forming alliances, merging into existing systems, or even
closing.
Alliance networks were originally formed to offer hospital members the same
buying clout available to national health care systems, as well as the opportunity to
contract on a national level (Larkin, 1 989). These objectives could be considered
reactive behaviors amidst increased market competition, offering hospitals more cost
efficiency and contracting control. Alliances studied in the 1 990s, on the other hand,
have considered changing their method of health care delivery and developing
community-based, integrated networks (S mith and Trout, 1 992). Some administrators
have been successful in voluntary collaboration: eliminating duplicative services and
technologies (Johnsson, 1 99 1 ).
One variable in the intended study will identify whether the subject hospitals are
alliance members, since alliance membership could be considered a control element in
the structural indicators measured.
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System membership is also an organizational feature which should be recognized
in a study of hospital behavior. In a study of multihospital systems (MHS), Alexander
and Morrisey ( 1 988) developed a model to explain the affiliation patterns of hospitals.
They assessed the role of a hospital ' s market, management activity, and mission
compatibility with the system as predisposing conditions of MHS affiliation. The model
was tested on a sample of 3 06 affiliated and 9 1 8 nonaffiliated hospitals under conditions
of market equilibrium and disequilibrium, and for hospital entry into both non-profit and
investor-owned multihospital systems. Results on the study factors suggested variable
impact on MHS entry, according to the hospital ' s market and the type of system with
which the hospital affiliated.
The intended study contains research elements similar to the model from
Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 988), including variables classifying the subject hospitals as a
system member, non-profit, or investor-owned. Although market measurements are not
the same between studies, both analyses seek to characterize the market surrounding the
hospitals. The main topic under consideration for Alexander and Morrisey, however, is
what kind of market conditions cause hospitals to affiliate, while the intended study
compares the structural behavior of system versus non-system hospitals in varying
competitive markets.
A survey by Bogue et at. ( 1 995) evaluated the postmerger uses of 60 AHA
hospitals between 1 983 and 1 988. Survey topics included the premerger competition
between hospitals, competition in their environment, and what happened to the hospitals
after their merger. Mergers often served to convert acute, inpatient capacity to other
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functions, with less than half of the acquired hospitals continuing acute services after
merger. Bogue et aI. ( 1 995) concluded that mergers may reflect two general strategies:
elimination of direct acute competitors or expansion of acute care networks.
The intended study is primarily directed toward the acute, inpatient capacity and
staffing of the study hospitals in response to a competitive environment. Hospital
mergers represent an organizational response not specifically being studied, yet they are a
common form of hospital reorganization which must be considered in researching
structural change.
A well documented hospital response to the managed care payment environment
is closure. Williams et aI. ( 1 992) investigated hospital closures occurring in 1 985
through 1 988, after the implementation of Medicare' s PPS . They found that a hospital ' s
financial status and mission or community standing were determinants o f hospital
closure. Closed hospitals were much less likely to be publicly owned, but more likely to
offer fewer facilities and services, and have fewer cases. Competition appeared to affect
the odds of closure through its effects on the number of cases. Additionally, hospitals in
areas with small or declining population were more at risk than other hospitals in both
urban and rural areas.
The intended research will track the hospitals closed in the study period, in order
determine whether their loss could introduce bias into the study sample.
In summary, procompetitive policies from government and other third party
payors have caused various strategic hospital responses, both internal and external to
each organization, and stimulated studies in hospital efficiency and quality. Among the
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analytic challenges are the measures which characterize the hospital ' s market, as well as
hospital behavior.
Hospital Performance Studies in Efficiency

According to this study's model of organizational structure, poor economic
performance places pressure on the organization ' s rulers, the dominant coalition, to
reorganize (Donaldson, 1 987). Therefore, in addition to environmental factors impacting
on hospital structure, individual organizational performance should be considered as an
exogenous factor in a hospital ' s structural changes. The intended study considers two
dimensions of performance as instrumental in promoting hospital change strategies:
financial success and quality care.
In the evaluation of hospital financial success, the literature provides various
research concepts and study methods which aid in the development of the current
proposal. Scott and Shortell ( 1 988), for example, defined efficiency as the ratio of
outputs to inputs: the number of products andlor services provided by a given supply of
resources. Capital, labor, and equipment are three categories of inputs, and they are
generally measured in dollar value. "Productivity" refers to a special subclass of
efficiency measures that emphasize outputs as related to labor inputs (Scott and Shortell,
1 988).
The intended study measures productivity with hospital labor inputs as indicators
of structural change. Additionally, the measurement of cost- per patient day serves to
represent hospital efficiency in a more comprehensive manner.
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Gooding and Wagner ( 1 985) defined organizational performance in input-output
terms in their meta-analysis of 3 1 published field studies. Their purpose was to review
the relationship between organizational size and performance, with productivity and
efficiency representing the performance dimension. Productivity measures were defined
as those measuring absolute output, while efficiency measures involved the calculation of
a ratio of outputs to inputs.
Although initial meta-analysis failed to substantiate an overall size-performance
relationship in the 3 1 studies, Gooding and Wagner ( 1 985) identified three moderating
variables in subgroup meta-analyses. First, level of analysis differences (organizational
versus subunit analysis), second, differences in operationalizing the "size" variable
(employees, log of employees assets, transactions, etc.), and third, differences in
operationalizing the "performance" variable (productivity versus efficiency).
These measurement moderators served to clarify relationships between
organizational size and performance. For example, a positive relationship was found
between organizational size and productivity, but no positive relationship was found
between organizational size and efficiency, suggesting the absence of net economy of
scale effects (Gooding and Wagner, 1 985).
These findings are significant to the current proposal because they emphasize the
critical operationalization of organizational structure and performance. Even the
straightforward construct of organizational size may be considered as multidimensional
(Kimberly, 1 976). Additionally, organizational and subunit studies have yielded different
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results, according to the level of analysis employed. The intended study utilizes variables
for size and performance exclusively at the organizational level.
In their study of 1 60 hospitals in eight states, Watt et al. ( 1 986) sought to compare
how hospital operating strategies might affect their relative success in a price-conscious
market. Their research question was whether significant differences existed between the
economic performance of investor-owned chain and not-for-profit hospitals. Data were
obtained from the AHA survey, Medicare cost reports, and Medicare case-mix indexes
for 1 980.
This study employed an interesting sampling method by matching 80 investor
owned chain general hospitals with similar not-for-profit general hospitals. Matches
were made on the basis of location, scale of operation, services offered, and average
length of stay.
Indicators of economic performance in this study included gross inpatient
charges, total costs for inpatient services, hospital revenues (costs to patients and third
party payers), productivity in use of personnel and physical assets, charge-to-cost
markups, and capital-structure financial ratios, such as net fixed assets per adjusted bed.
Of particular

interest to the

intended study, Watt et al. (1 986) recorded hospital

efficiency under the category "Use of Personnel and Physical Assets." Measures
included FTE per adjusted average daily census, salary and benefits per adjusted day, and
patient care square feet per adjusted bed.
The intended research similarly utilizes AHA and Medicare data sources, as well
as measures in FTE utilization and facility cost per adjusted patient day. Watt et al.
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( 1 986) sampled hospitals from only eight states; however their sample was carefully
selected to represent 70% of the nation's for-profit hospitals. The i ntended study i s more
limited in its definition of successful hospital performance, yet broader in its sampling
method.
The measurement of hospital cost per adjusted patient day does not capture some
important aspects of hospital cost structure, according to Grannemann and Brown ( 1 986).
In their nationwide study of 867 non-federal, short-term U S . hospitals, they specified a
multiple-output cost function, with separate measures of inpatient days and discharges,
emergency department visits, and outpatient visits. Case-mix measures for both inpatient
and outpatient care were also deemed important.
With data from the AHA' s 1 982 Ambulatory Care Survey, supplemented by
AHA's Annual Survey and the Area Resources File, Granneman and Brown ( 1 986)
performed basic regression with ordinary least squares analysis for the cost function.
They recommended separating the cost of a discharge from the cost of a patient day,
primarily in order to avoid distortions that could arise across hospitals in average length
of stay. A hospital stay was viewed as ( 1 ) a quantity of medical services associated with
the admission or discharge (such as lab tests and other ancillary supp ort), p lu s (2) daily
services (including routine nursing and hotel services) associated with the time spent in
the hospital (Grannemann and Brown, 1 986).
Because of this important distinction, the intended study will include variables for
cost per adjusted patient day and also average cost per discharge as indicators of hospital
performance.
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In studying the financial performance of hospitals, Friedman and Shortell ( 1 988)
built their cost equation on one dependent variable: patient care expense per adjusted
admission, divided by the area wage index. Financial performance was measured in two
ways: net operating margin before taxes as a portion of patient care revenue, and net
income margin after estimated federal income taxes as a proportion of total income.
Beyond the measurement of hospital costs, the hospital industry does not carry a
standard definition of financial success. Up until 1 987, the literature that covers financial
performance measures as independent variables generally focuses on hospital failure as a
relevant outcome (Glandon et al. , 1 987). Unlike firms in other industries, hospital
performance is not easily compared through financial ratios. Hospitals experience
multiple, competing obj ectives, they often lack the profit goal, they have a clear
separation of ownership and management of assets, and they have no organized market
for the equity of the firm (Glandon et aI. , 1 987).
Valdmanis ( 1 990) acknowledged difficulty in comparing public and nonprofit
hospitals from lack of an accurate performance gauge. She applied nonparametric
analysis to hospital production data, using Farrell' s ( 1 957) measure of technical
efficiency. In Farrell ' s fram ework, a firm is con sidered technically efficient if it is
operating on the best practice production frontier. The efficiency measure of each
hospital is assessed as to what is the minimal input necessary to still produce the given
output level (Valdmanis, 1 990).
Data were obtained from the 1 982 AHA Survey of Hospitals, with the sample
limited to acute-care general hospitals (of 200 or more beds) located in Michigan
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(metropolitan areas of 500,000 or more). Outputs were defined as the number of acute
inpatient days and intensive care unit days, number of surgeries, and number of
ambulatory plus emergency room visits. Inputs consisted of the number of active and
associate physicians, number of medical residents, number of FTE nonphysician labor
and nurses, and capital defined as net plant assets (i.e., capital value after asset
depreciation).
Findings from Valdmanis' nonparametric analysis ( 1 990) indicated that sample
public hospitals were more efficient relative to the sample not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals.
Upon further investigation, the NFP hospitals appeared to offer more specialized surgical
services, such as open-heart surgery, requiring more sophisticated labor and capital than
public hospitals.
Although the intended study does not use a nonparametric methodology, its
design is influenced by the inputs and outputs selected in Valmanis' ( 1 990) measures of
technical efficiency. Specifically, variables representing the professional contingent in a
hospital are similar to labor inputs, while the number of adjusted patient days and
discharges could be interpreted as outputs. The intended study includes a measure for
hospital bedsize; however the bedsize variable is used to indicate change in hospital

capacity rather than formulate a capital input in an efficiency model.
Vita ( 1 990) evaluated the behavior of hospital costs, using a translog function and
data from a sample of 296 short-term, general care hospitals in California. The
dependent variable was a cost variable, defined as the total operating expenses of the
hospital. Outputs consisted of medicaVsurgical discharges, obstetric discharges, pediatric
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discharges, outpatient and emergency room discharges, all other discharges, and
corresponding length-of-stay variables. Payroll data were used to compute five input
prices: management and supervisory wage rates, nursing wage rates, non-physician
medical practitioners and technicians wage rates, auxiliary personnel wage rates, wage
rates for all other personnel, and the number of beds (a fixed input). Control variables
included an index of casemix complexity, as well as indicators for system membership
and for-profit/not for profit organization.
Vita ( 1 990) found that the translog function was useful for assessing the degree of
overall scale economies at the sample mean. The "overall scale economies" refer to the
proportional increase in all outputs that would result from a proportional increase in all
inputs. Vita ( 1 990) was testing a cost function for determining optimal size in hospitals.
The intended research utilizes similar concepts in cost and outputs, however there is no
emphasis on detailed price inputs or scale economies.
The intended study will consider hospital financial performance, in the form of
cost, as both an exogenous variable and an endogenous variable, for the purpose of
tracing the relationship between hospital performance and structural change.
Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) sought to examine the linkage between executive
strategies and hospital performance amid 1 025 U . S . hospitals in large urban areas in
1 988. With the idea that competitive forces are shaping the management strategies in the
health care industry, they compared and contrasted performance indicators of a large
group of successful versus unsuccessful hospitals. Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) found
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that cost control was the most important factor influencing financial performance. Other
factors of importance included market share, diversification, and financing policy.
The data were obtained from the Healthcare Financial Management Association' s
(HFMA) Medicare Cost Report, which provided information on virtually every U . S .
hospital operating i n a large urban area during 1 988. T o summarize the analysis, a highperformance group and a low-performance group of hospitals were identified, and their
composite financial average financial ratios were compared. Next, a multiple regression
equation was fitted to the entire data set of 1 025 hospitals, using Return On Asset
Investment (ROI) as the dependent variable, and other strategy variables as the
independent variables.
Cleverley and Harvey' s ( 1 992b) definitions of market share and successful
performance hold particular significance in formulating the intended hospital study.
Primarily, market share was defined as the percentage of total net patient revenue, both
inpatient and outpatient, to total net patient revenue in the county in which the hospital
was located. This method of measuring market share appears to be a step toward
calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, an indicator of market competition,
assuming that one could substitute hospital bed s for net patient revenue in determining
percentages. Secondly, Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) used a financial criterion for
defining a successful hospital. Return on Asset Investment (ROI), the hospital
performance measure, was defined as follows:
Net Income + Interest
Total Assets

53

Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) found cost control to be highly influential in
hospital financial performance, and they named four strategies that seemed particularly
effective in improving hospital ROI: relatively low length of patient stay, often achieved
through physician profiling, high labor productivity, represented by FTEs per adjusted
patient day, overhead cost control, and high capital expense ratios, possibly due to labor
saving equipment.
The intended study, influenced in many respects by Cleverley and Harvey
( 1 992b), defines successful hospital performance as cost control and examines the
strategies of length of stay and labor productivity. The intended research in hospital
competition, structural change, and hospital performance shares other issues with
Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b), such as hospital diversification, or service scope, and
patient selection, or case-mix.
Molinari et al. ( 1 993) studied the relationships between "insider" board
participation and hospital viability. In their research, financial ratio analysis was chosen
for measuring hospital financial performance. Major dimensions of performance included
hospital operating margin, net income to patient revenues, return on total assets, hospital
occupancy rate, and net plant, property, and equipment per bed. "Insiders" were defined
as medical staff members or the CEO of each hospital. Relationships were studied cross
sectionally. Measures included the presence or absence of insiders on the board, and
financial viability (with controls for the organizational factors of system affiliation,
ownership, size, region, and corporate restructuring). Through multiple regression
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analysis, the authors found significant relationships between insider participation and all
outcomes, with the exception of occupancy rate.
Molinari et al. ( 1 993) set out to compare the theories of agency and
managerialism in hospital governance, which is clearly distinguished from the intended
research; however, their use of financial performance measures and their study design
provide a standard for further empirical evaluation of organizational structure in
hospitals.
The major data sources for Molinari et aI. ( 1 993) consisted of the California
Health Facilities Commission Financial Disclosure data set and the AHA governance
survey, a total of 1 90 respondents out of 426 short-term general non-Kaiser hospitals.
Results were limited in generalizability to the state of California. The intended research
samples a much broader national spectrum of hospitals, lending strength to the
generalizability of its results.
Wan ( 1 995) utilized linear structural relations (LISREL) to analyze the
relationships between hospital efficiency, hospital financial viability, and hospital
characteristics, such as bed size, staff mix, HCFA case-mix index, and number of hospital
competitors. The sample consisted of 85 short-term acute care hospitals in Virginia. In
this study, data were drawn from the AHA' s 1 986 and 1 987 files, the Federal Register,
and the 1 987 Health Services Cost Review Council .
Wan ( 1 995) defined hospital efficiency a s the cost o f inputs used in production of
outputs, a concept closely related to productivity. "When a procedure minimizes the cost
for producing a specific output, efficiency is achieved (Wan, 1 995)." In his study, Wan
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further delineated three efficiency variables: cost efficiency, represented by average cost
per patient discharge, process efficiency, measured by average length of stay (ALOS),
and technical efficiency, calculated through data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA
calculation was made using a relative ratio of patient care outputs to labor inputs.
Wan ( 1 995) found that hospital efficiency was linked to hospital size, severity of
patient treated, and metropolitan size. Hospitals with a large bed size, with more severe
patients in special units, located in large metropolitan areas, tended to be less efficient.
Although the sample size was limited, the study emphasized the importance in contextual
factors, such as market forces and population size, as organizational factors affecting
variation in hospital performance. The intended study has adopted a similar focus on the
determinants of hospital structure, with resultant hospital efficiency.
To summarize this collection of hospital performance studies, financial success
may be considered a result of strategic behaviors exhibited by individual hospitals in
response to their environment, market conditions, and control features. The intended
study seeks to evaluate hospital financial performance at two different times, in order to
test the influence which past financial performance has upon hospital structural strategies.
Variables including operating costs, labor inputs, and bedsize indicate the resources
dedicated to patient stays, presenting a cost view of efficiency in the measurement of
successful hospital performance.
Hospital Performance in Quality

In addition to cost containment, data on patient outcomes have increasingly been
considered in judging hospital performance. This trend, coupled with the move toward
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more capitated arrangements, places greater emphasis on providers' efficiency and
outcomes (Baskin and Shortell, 1 995). The literature provides many insights into
defining and measuring hospital quality; however the analysis of quality in health care
continues to present substantial methodological challenges.
Scott and Shortell ( 1 988) viewed hospital quality as individual institutional
effectiveness in the provision of health services in the short run. Although the type and
amount of health services provided to the patient were also seen as important for long
term health, the manager and the institution were judged to have little control over these
factors. After reviewing several studies on tradeoffs between efficiency and
effectiveness, Scott and Shortell ( 1 988) concluded that a higher quality of care, on the
average, is not associated with higher costs, although the cost/quality relationship may
differ for specific situations.
Donabedian ( 1 966) categorized indicators of quality care into three groups :
structure, process, and outcome. Structural indicators refer t o the characteristics o f
providers, their tools and resources, and the physical and organizational setting in which
they work. Process indicators refer to the set of activities that go on between the
providers and the patient, such as patient histories or physical exams. Outcomes indicate
the changes in a patient' s health status that can be attributed to receiving health care, such
as postsurgical infections, death, and satisfaction with the care process itself
Various studies have associated hospital characteristics with quality outcomes. In
relating hospital quality to teaching status, Flood and Scott ( 1 978) reported no or mixed
evidence that teaching status was associated with lower mortality. Flood et al. ( 1 984b)
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also found strong and consistent support between volume of cases treated and lower
mortality for a variety of surgical and medical patient types.
Further developing the question of volume and quality, Kelly and Hellinger
( 1 985) studied four surgical procedures in 373 nonfederal hospitals in 1 977. They tested
whether individual surgeon volume or hospital volume was more closely associated with
better outcomes. They concluded that the relationship between volume and mortality is
held at the institutional level, supporting the argument that organizational factors, not
physician factors, are involved.
In their study of a single special procedure, Freeland et al. ( 1 987) observed that
selective contracting in local areas can potentially decrease duplication of services,
reduce cost to purchasers, and lower expected mortality and morbidity for some patient
groups. However, the argument can be made that these gains must be evaluated against
reductions in continuity of care and access to care. They collected data from 3 7
California hospitals that performed coronary artery by-pass graft surgery (CABG). They
found that in the study region, 1 9/3 7, or half, of the hospitals had an annual volume of
less than 1 50 CABG operations per year.
In relating the qualifications of physicians and quality of hospital care, Rhee

( 1 977) analyzed data from 454 physicians and their 2500 patients in 22 short-term
general hospitals, utilizing the Physician Performance Index to measure quality in the
physician process. He found that hospitals, variable in their degree of structured control
over practice, were more predictive of quality than were the physicians' qualifications.
In support of these results, Flood et al. ( 1 982) analyzed data on 500 surgeons treating
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8000 patients in

15

hospitals and utilized adjusted measures of morbidity at seven days

following surgery and mortality at forty days following surgery for quality care
indicators. They found no relation between physicians' qualifications and quality
outcomes.
Quality in nursing care was investigated by Wan and Shukla ( 1 987), who studied
60 community hospitals in 1 98 1 . They utilized hospital incident rates (reports
concerning errors in medication, intravenous line administration, patient falls and
injuries, inappropriate diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, etc.) as indicators for
hospital quality. Independent variables were contextual factors, such as poverty level,
education level, and age of the patients; and organizational characteristics, such as size,
efficiency of support systems, nursing staff skill mix, staffing levels, case-mix index, and
patient acuity index. Multiple regression analysis was performed for each type of incident
rate, using the contextual and organizational variables as explanatory factors. Data was
collected from the Health Area Resources File, hospital surveys, and the Federal
Register.
Wan and Shukla ( 1 987) observed that contextual variables are attributes of the
hospital ' s region and community, which vary by location, and are largely beyond the
hospital ' s control. Organizational variables were further classified into structural and
design variables. Structural variables, such as type of hospital, number of beds, and case
mix, were viewed as relatively outside the control of operational managers. Design
variables, such as nursing structure, staffing patterns, and management systems, were
seen as individual hospital developments and well within operational control.
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The most notable findings from Wan and Shukla ( 1 987) were threefold. First,
hospitals located in areas with high bed/population ratios had significantly lower rates of
medication errors, suggesting that competitive forces have a positive effect on quality of
care. Second, hospitals located in areas where a higher percentage of the population was
over 65 years old had significantly higher rates of patient falls and patient injuries. Third,
and perhaps most striking, is that nursing skill mix (registered nurse hours and licensed
practical nurse hours per patient day), nursing model, and nursing resource consumption
were not significantly related to any of the incident rates. The conclusion was that
nursing competence is more important than nursing staff skill mix in affecting the quality
of nursing care.
The intended study incorporates several predictor variables from Wan and Shukla
( 1 987), including the factors of hospital competition, hospital size, case-mix index, and
nursing staff ratios. The intended study gathers data from a broad institutional base, but
does not offer measures calculated from separate survey, such as patient acuity level,
nursing hours per patient day, or support system efficiency. The most prominent
difference between Wan and Shukla' s study ( 1 987) and the intended research is their
choice of hospital incidence rates versus the mortality measures to indicate hosp ital
quality. Both measures have inherent weaknesses for the purpose of gauging institutional
performance, yet neither should be rejected without acceptable substitutes.
Keeler et aI. ( 1 992) employed three sets of criteria fOT comparing quality in
hospitals: explicit criteria, implicit review, and sickness-adjusted outcomes (mortality
within 30 days of admission). A total of 1 4,008 elderly patients with one of five diseases
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(congestive heart failure, acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, stroke, or hip fracture)
were randomly sampled from 297 hospitals in five states. Two time periods were used
for sampling: 1 98 1 to 1 982 and 1 985 to 1 986. Hospital types were defined according to
the structural characteristics of size, ownership, urban or rural setting, state, size of
training programs, city-county hospitals, and proportion of Medicaid and Medicare
patients seen.
Explicit criteria for measuring hospital quality were developed from process
measures, reviewed by experts and developed into five process scales: physician
cognitive diagnostic, nurse cognitive diagnostic, technical diagnostic, technical
therapeutic, and monitoring with the intensive care unit or telemetry. The five scales
were then combined into one explicit process scale. A stratified random sample of 1 0%
of the included medical records were selected to undergo implicit review, which was
reweighted to match the explicit review sample in demographic and hospital
characteristics. Five physician reviewers were trained in review and they used a
structured form to rate medical records.
With the aid of a computerized recursive partitioning algorithm, hospital quality
regression trees were constructed to analyze the data. Results consisted of comparisons
across measures of quality care, as well as measures across types of hospitals. For
virtually all 19 listed hospital characteristics, there was agreement among the three
measures of quality. Poor explicit and implicit process was consistently associated with
excess mortality. In terms of hospital type, hospitals in bigger cities and certain states
showed better average quality. Better quality was also associated with more teaching,

61

private ownership, and bigger hospitals. Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals were reported
to provide similar quality.
The importance of this study is its ability to link clinically detailed data on
process and outcomes, with remarkable consistency across hospital categories (Keeler et
aI. , 1 992). The results clearly lend validity to the researchers' formulation of hospital
"excess mortality," that is, the difference between their predicted mortality rate and the
observed mortality at each hospital. The intended study utilizes HCF A data of predicted
and observed hospital mortality in order to establish its performance measure of quality.
The relationship between hospital cost and quality has been explored, with
inconsistent results (Fleming, 1 990). Burstin et al. ( 1 993) studied the link between
hospital financial characteristics, patient payer mix, and the incidence of negligent
medical injuries. They performed a retrospective medical record review of 30, 1 9 5
records in 5 1 acute care hospitals i n New York i n 1 984. Negligence was reported a s the
percentage of adverse events due to negligence, thereby using adverse events as a control
for the intensity of patient care. Adverse events were interpreted as injuries caused by
medical management, as opposed to the underlying disease process.
Hospital financial information was obtained from 1 984 cost reports, and hospital
operating information was collected from the 1 985 AHA Guide to the Health Care Field.
Financial data were presented per discharge. Hospitals were grouped into quartiles
according to inpatient operating costs per hospital discharge. Through regression
analysis, it was found that the likelihood of negligent medical injury was highest in those
hospitals with the lowest inpatient operating costs per hospital discharge. Further
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analysis indicated that financially distressed hospitals (those with fund balances or assets
in the lowest quartile) had a higher mean negligence rate than the other hospitals.
In measuring hospital negligent medical injuries, the study by Burstin et ai. ( 1 993)
incorporated an interesting measure for hospital quality, avoiding bias from patient risk
factors. Record review for over 30,000 patients was thorough, yet sampling from acute
care hospitals in New York State in 1 984 places definite limitations on the
generalizability of results. The variable for hospital financial performance, inpatient
operating costs per discharge, is utilized in the intended study, as well as several
multivariate methods selected to analyze hospital data.
Harkey and Vraciu ( 1 992) investigated the link between hospital profitability
(defined as net operating income divided by net operating revenues) and quality
(perceptions of quality by patients, physicians, community residents, and employees).
They analyzed the financial data for 82 small and medium-sized hospitals in 2 1 states.
Factor analysis was used to identify a broad quality factor as an independent variable,
which was then related to hospital operating margin in regression equations.
In the quality factor analysis, variables that loaded on the quality factor included
items from the patient, employee, and physician surveys, suggesting that all three

perspectives shared similar definitions of quality. In the regression analysis, significant
predictors were the quality factor, percent Medicare and percent managed care, together
accounting for 29 percent of variance in operating margin. Other environmental and
reimbursement-linked variables were tested but did not prove significant: population size,
hospital bed size, population income, and competitive environment.
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Although Harkey and Vraciu ( 1 992) focused on hospital profitability and the
intended study measures hospital cost versus quality, the inclusion of an independent
reimbursement variable appears to be appropriate for both models. The literature clearly
suggests that percent Medicare volume is as important as HMO penetration data in the
influence of hospital structure and performance.
Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992a) studied a small sample of eight HCFA high
mortality hospitals and found that these "poor quality" hospitals were also less profitable.
In testing the association between quality and profitability, two measures of profitability
were used: operating margin and return on total assets. All eight hospitals had operating
margins that were lower than the median value for their regionlbedsize peergroup.
Carrying their analysis one step further in economic investigation, the authors
found that poor quality hospitals had prices and costs-per-discharge which were lower
than the norm. On the other hand, their occupancy rates were comparatively high,
defying the hypothesis that only high -perceived quality will generate greater patient
demand and subsequent increased volume.
The study reported by Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992a) spurred Levitt ( 1 994) to
explore the relationship between hospital investment in property, plant, and equipment

(PPE) and quality of patient care. In Levitt' s research, quality was measured by hospital
specific confirmed failure rates from Peer Review Organization (PRO) Generic Quality
Screens (GQS), including 26 screens of medical care.
The advantage to measuring cash investment in PPE is that hospital cash flows
are evaluated over multiple years, providing a robust measure of financial activity (Kane,
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1 99 1 ). Financial variables were taken from the Massachusetts hospitals audited financial
statements spanning fiscal years 1 984 through 1 989.

Hospital-specific GQS confirmed

failure rates were calculated from the Massachusetts PRO "review abstracts" of patients
discharged between 1 April 1 989 and 30 September 1 990, including 65,523 reviews at 8 7
hospitals.
Multivariate models were used to test for possible confounders, such as
Herfindahl index, Medicare and Medicaid payer mix, case-mix severity, bed size,
occupancy, and teaching hospital status. For comparison, hospitals were divided into two
groups: those with higher versus those with lower median confirmed failure rates. Next,
multivariate analyses were performed, using weighted least squares regression models.
Results indicated that those hospitals that invested more money per bed over the six-year
period had lower confirmed failure rates.
The intended study is similarly concerned with cost and quality, although
different measures are used. The intended study also attempts to capture hospital
performance over a period longer than one year, although a six-year financial measure is
not available, and emphasis is generally on hospital labor costs rather than capital
investment.
In conclusion, ample literature is available in the topics of managed care
penetration, health care market competition and hospital performance. Past research has
linked these concepts with some success, generally limited to specific timeframes
(immediately post-PPS, for example) and regions (California, Massachusetts). The
intended study is designed to build on prior techniques and discoveries and investigate
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the association between economic context, structural change and performance in
American hospitals.

CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL MODEL

Introduction

This chapter provides more detail to the theoretical framework of the study,
beginning with contingency theory in general and describing Donaldson' s SARFIT
(Strategic Adjustment to Regain Fit) model. The theoretical dimensions of environment,
fit, and structure are discussed in relation to the study model; and hypotheses relating
these constructs are introduced. In further hypotheses, hospital performance is related to
the organization ' s environment as well as its ability to change.
This research effort is based on previous works in contingency theory, directed
toward the relationships between environment, organizational structure, and
organizational performance. Thompson ( 1 967) proposed that the organization is shaped
by the environment. This foundational concept has been further developed into the
following observation: the environment of each organization poses a particular challenge
to that organization, which in tum must determine a response. The organization can be
seen as dependent upon the environment to surVive or grow (Donaldson, 1 995).
Th is expanded concept of dep e ndency is consistent with Scott' s open systems

perspective. Scott ( 1 992) stresses that "reciprocal ties . . . bind and relate the organization
with those elements that surround and penetrate it ( 1 992, p.93)." Buckley ( 1 967) further
defines an open system as one where environmental interchange is an essential and
underlying factor to system viability.
66
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Donaldson ( 1 995) considers three mechanisms by which the organization deals
with its environment. The first method is for the organization to be an effective
competitor through superior organizational performance. The second method is to
influence the environment through co-opting powerful environmental organizations. The
third method is to alter the environment through merger between organizations. This
research project focuses on the first mechanism, taking into account the internal structure
of the subject organization and its success in framing superior performance.
Organizational research in environmental selection does not typically study the
failure of an entire organization. Rather, organizations often adapt to their environments
by means of structural or behavioral modifications. Organizational change must
therefore be examined for selection at the population level (between competing firms),
and also at the organizational level (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1 976).
The main prevailing theories of structural change are contingency determinism
and strategic choice (Donaldson, 1 987). In contingency determinism (Figure 5), a
specific change in contingency promptly leads to structural change in the organization.
As an example, Blau ( 1 9 70) generalized that increased organizational size generates
structural differentiation, resulting in greater sized administrative components for
coordination. Burns and Stalker ( 1 96 1 ), Chandler ( 1 962), Woodward ( 1 965), and
Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967) are other prominent contingency theorists in organization
structure.
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Figure 5. Contingency Determinism

(source: Donaldson, 1 967, p.274).
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The strategic choice model, associated with Child ( 1 972), also portrays the
organization in its attempt to match structure with contingency; except with added
complexity. Child introduces the concept of political process within the organization,
whereby the "dominant coalition" re-establishes structural forms, but also manipulates
environmental features in order to achieve fit.
To improve upon these contingency approaches to organization structure,
Donaldson ( 1 987) presents a model based on structural-functional theory. This type of
theory assumes that a state of equilibrium is disturbed by an exogenous force, leading to
disequilibria, ineffectiveness, and eventual restitution through the adoption of a different
structure. Donaldson' s SARFIT model, or structural adjustment to regain fit ( 1 987),
properly validated, is offered as a refinement of the contingency idea and a more accurate
model of structural functional logic. In contrast to contingency determinism, the
S ARFIT model is a more elongated set of processes which occur over time.
The conceptualization of variables in contingency theory has been criticized. For
example, analysts say that the theoretical concepts are not clear (Tosi and Slocum,
1 984). Furthermore, the relationships between concepts are not seen as adequately
specified (Schoonhoven, 1 98 1 ). Tosi and Slocum ( 1 984) name three key dimensions that
must be sharpened in order to discover empirical relationships in contingency:
effectiveness, environment, and congruency. The intended research seeks to clarify these
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dimensions through the use of the SARFIT model. SARFIT has addressed contingency
theory weaknesses in conceptual clarification and specification.
Under SARFIT (Figure 6), the need for structural change in the organization
arises from the substandard performance, coming from a mismatch between structure and
contingency. "Mismatch" is further defined as the misfit between the new value of the
contingency variable and the old structure (Donaldson, 1 987). Mismatch produces a
range of dysfunctional behaviors in the organization, leading to low economic
performance. Poor performance places pressure on organizational leaders (the dominant
coalition) to reorganize. However, low performance only leads to structural change if the
environment is adverse, or "illiberal" (Child, 1 972).
Figure 6. Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit (SARFIT) General Model. (Source:

Donaldson, 1 987, p.4).
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In comparison to the SARFIT model, the intended study model incorporates the
concepts of contingency and organizational performance as precursors to organizational
change. According to the intended study, the arrival of the managed care era was a
tremendous change in contingency to community hospitals. Unlike Donaldson' s
SARFIT example, however, structural misfits are not directly identified among the
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subject units. In the intended study, substandard hospital performance is presumed to be
a consequence of poor fit with the managed care contingency. Performance is measured
and related to structural adjustments made by each hospital at a later point in time.
Measures for managed care infiltration and past hospital performance therefore
assume the role of major independent variables; and changes in hospital structure are
dependent variables. To account for SARFIT's condition of environmental illiberality, a
variable for market competition is included as a possible moderator to one or both of the
independent variables.
Theoretical Dimensions

Environment
The studies of Burns and Stalker ( 1 96 1 ) and Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967)
analyzed how the characteristics of market and technological environments affected the
internal structure of an organization. Later research described environmental factors in
more general terms, such as certainty -or complexity; without reference to specific sector
source, such as the market or the government (Tosi and Slocum, 1 984).
Tosi and Slocum ( 1 984), seeking to frame the environment in a more precise way,
specify environmental sectors as (a) users of output, (b) input sources, and (c) external
regulators. Examples are customers, capital sources, raw product supplies, and
technology and science.
In health care organizational research, the focus has often been on how
organizations react to a complex and uncertain regulatory environment, or to a new
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competitive environment. The environment is perceived as a force which restricts the
range of organizational action (Kimberly and Zajac, 1 985).
More recently, researchers have suggested perspectives which reach beyond
traditional structural contingency theory. For example, the firm has been interpreted to
adapt its environment to the organization, rather than make internal structural changes
(Child, 1 972). Or an adaptive firm has been interpreted as reactive to its individual
model of the environment, a perceptual bias which is not necessarily appropriate for
successful adaptation. Other relatively new theoretical approaches in structural
contingency include the change in organizational boundaries to gain environmental
control, and the interactive environmental dimensions of uncertainty and resource
dependence (Grandori, 1 987).
This study is based on Child ' s ( 1 972) argument for the environment, which states
that the maintenance of organizations depends upon some degree of exchange with
outside parties. Three environmental conditions are highlighted as important: ( I )
environmental variability, o r the degree o f change which characterizes environmental
activities relative to an organization ' s operations, (2) environmental complexity, referring
to the range of environmental activities relevant to an organization' s operations, and, (3)
environmental illiberality, or the degree of threat that is imposed by external competition,
hostility, or even indifference.
Although Child ( 1 972) recognizes that environmental conditions can be regarded
as a source of variation in organizational structure, he also considers strategic and
political factors, whereby organizational decision-makers may define the product,
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geographic location, organizational boundaries, customers, and other environmental
limits to organizational operations. There is a proposed link between the decision
makers ' evaluation of the organization ' s position in the environment and the action they
take regarding internal structure.
In the intended research model (Figure 7), the environmental contingency is
represented by the infiltration of HMO insurance plans into the revenue streams of the
community hospitals under study. A growth in managed care plans indicates an increase
in environmental uncertainty for individual hospitals. Community hospitals in 1 986 were
facing a new paradigm in managing care, including capitated reimbursement methods,
preventive medicine, patient education, and other efforts to reduce hospitalization for
enrolled populations.
The intended study model includes a variable for market competition as an
element of the hospital' s managed care environment. With reference to environmental
illiberality in the SARFIT model, hospitals also encountered some degree of stringent
business conditions in maintaining their occupancy rates. This situation is indicative of
competitiveness (Williamson, 1 970). Thus, market competition plays a role in
moderating the effect of each hospital' s perfomiance variable. Low performance is
predicted to lead to structural change, only if the environment is competitive.
One may note that the SARFIT model is a loop of events: once a misfit has been
detected and resources found to be scarce, correction in organizational structure i s
predicted, with additional changes made until performance improves. The design for the
intended study demonstrates the cyclical nature of the original model, and further
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analysis could measure structural and performance variables over numerous time periods
for the subject organizations.
Figure 7. Study Model Describing Hospital Structural Responses to Managed Care

Penetration and Their Effects on Hospital Performance.
Hospital Control Characteristics
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Fit
Fit, or congruency, between the environment and the organization, is a basic
theme in most contingency studies. Improving congruency between the environment and
the organization is proposed to improve effectiveness (Tosi and Slocum, 1 984; Yasai
Ardekani and Nystrom, 1 996). Sophisticated theories of natural selection predict that
when firms operate in highly competitive markets in which large numbers of firms are
dependent on the same scarce resources, organizational structures that fit the environment
will outperform less fit forms (Grandori, 1 987).
Donaldson' s application of the SARFIT model ( 1 987) defines organizational
strategy as the theoretical contingency which acts upon organizational structure. Product
diversification is the strategy selected for measurement and analysis of fit with four levels
of structural decentralization: functional, functional with subsidiaries, product divisional,
and holding company. A simple matrix arrangement of various categories allows a
c1earcut decision of "match" or "mismatch" based on literature from Chandler ( 1 962),
Mintzberg ( 1 979), and others.
The intended study will adopt its analysis of fit from Drazin and Van de Ven
( 1 985), who associate good organizational performance with good structural fit. They
present three different conceptual approaches to fit: the selection, interaction, and
systems approaches. Depending on the approach, each concept refines the meaning of
contingency theory and the expected empirical results (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1 98 5 ) .
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In the first approach, the selection approach, basic fit is presumed to be a
congruence between context and structure, and is represented by correlation or regression
between singular variables.
The second approach to fit, the interaction method, considers interactions between
pairs of context-structure factors, and predicts that such interactions will affect
organizational performance. Residual analysis of context-structure relationships
indicates organizational fit, and deviations from this fit indicate low performance.
The third approach to fit is the systems approach, which seeks to avoid the other
methods' reductionism of organizational factors. Advocates argue that only by
simultaneously addressing many contingencies, structural alternatives, and performance
criteria can researchers holistically understand organizational design (Drazin and Van de
Ven, 1 985). Systems analysis focuses on differences in pattern profiles, which account
for several variables at one time. Analysis of variance, multiple analysis of variance,
formulation of ideal unit values, and correlation of unit distance scores with associated
unit performance values constitute a few methods for testing fit in the systems approach.
The intended study will utilize the selection approach for determining fit between
the managed care environment and existing hospital structures.
Structure
Three integral elements of hospital structure were selected for the study:
professionalism, service scope, and inpatient capacity. All three dimensions are
important to the hospital' s core competencies, and they are fundamentally connected with
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resource utilization in the hospital ' s production function. These dimensions act as
benchmarks in tracking hospital change and adaptation to a managed care environment.
Galbraith ( 1 973) incorporated several dimensions of structure in his contingency
theory on organizing for effectiveness: ( 1 ) rules and programs, or standardization, (2)
hierarchical referral, or centralization of decision making, (3) professionalization, (4)
creation of slack resources, (5) creation of self-contained tasks, (6) creation of vertical
information systems, and (7) creation of lateral relations.
In regard to professionalization, Galbraith suggested that organizations, in an
effort to control behavior in job-related situations, select responsible workers who have
the appropriate education, skills and attitudes. As a consequence, the work force will
make task-relevant decisions without sacrificing control over outcome quality.
In a study of acute care hospital operating room suites, Schoonhoven ( 1 98 1 )
found that greater specificity in Galbraith' s contingency arguments allowed for stronger
empirical support in relating uncertainty to professionalization. In Schoonhoven' s study,
. uncertainty was measured by variation in operating room schedules. Professionalization
was measured by the initial level of training (B. S . degree and R.N. ratio), and current
professional activities, such as membership in professional organizations and journals
read.
One major structural dimension of the intended study is professionalization within
the subj ect hospitals. Under economic pressure from a managed care environment and
directed toward greater efficiency, poor performing hospitals are predicted to change
their professional mix to suit the new conditions.
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In the intended study, the dimension of professionalism summarizes the number
of salaried physicians, dentists and nurses comprising the hospital personnel base. The
purpose of evaluating the constituency of the core hospital staff is to detect any shifts in
the professional framework over the study period. A measure for total FTEs indicates
whether hospitals are indeed "downsizing" their staff elements. It is imperative to
determine if hospitals are changing their human resource base, a major organizational
input, in response to the demands of the managed care environment.
Signifying structural change, hospitals could possibly have employed more
physicians to help control independent practitioners' utilization of hospital services.
Physicians have been estimated to control up to eighty cents of the national health care
dollar by specifying hospital services, diagnostic procedures, drugs, and therapies.
The study' S professional dimension also includes measures for RNs, LPNs, and
RN/(RN+LPN) ratios, as indicators for any professional downsizing or substitutions that
take place in bedside patient care. In Fesponse to managed care incentives, RN' s, or
registered nurses could have been cut from hospital staffs or replaced by nursing
assistants (Lumsdon, 1 995).

H I : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or
operating in a more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their
number of salaried physicians and decrease their number of registered nurses.
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The second structural dimension in the study, change in services, relates to the
ability of organizations to change their boundaries. In the case of hospitals, the transition
is predicted to move from the acute-care, inpatient settings to outpatient visits and
ambulatory services associated with preventive care.
The dimension of service change reflects specific programs in health promotion
which may have been undertaken by hospitals in order to attract managed care business.
Promotion of outpatient services signifies the hospitals' ability to change its structure,
specifically in providing outpatient visits, outpatient surgeries, patient education, fitness
promotion, women' s health programs, occupational health, and geriatric screening
programs. This change in service scope indicates yet another aspect of the hospital ' s
adaptation toward organizational survival.

H2:

Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or
operating in a more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their
ambulatory, preventive, and screening services.

The third structural dimension in this study, hospital i npatient capacity, i s related
to the concepts of organizational size and the management of slack resources. Hospital
inpatient capacity was widely publicized in the 1 980s as the number of inpatient days
steadily decreased in the United States. In terms of plant size, the average community
hospital simply maintains fewer beds than it did prior to the implementation of the
Medicare Prospective Payment system and other reimbursement changes. Hospital
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bedsize, occupancy rate, and case-mix have been reliable indicators of hospital workload
and throughput. These study measures can quantify the downsizing, or reduction in acute
care capacity, undertaken by the subj ect hospitals.

H3 : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or
operating in a more pervasive managed care environment, will reduce their
inpatient capacity.

Hospital Performance Measures

The intended study model (Figure 7) includes two performance dimensions: one
as a stimulus to structural variation, and another as a result of structure. According to
Child ( 1 972), a theory of organizational structure has to take account of performance,
with performance treated as an input as well as an outcome. In other words, structural
variables would depend upon decisions made with reference to some standard of required
performance, as well as some prediction of how structural change will affect performance
levels.
To measure organizational performance in contingency theory, researchers often
use the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. Pfeffer and Salancik ( 1 978) define
effectiveness as an organization's ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions. Tosi
and Slocum ( 1 984) offer three dimensions, or outcomes, that have been used to measure
effectiveness: efficiency, referring to the way in which resources are arranged to produce
a unit of output, some outcome preference of organizational membership such as j ob
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satisfaction or pay, and some general, socially responsible outcome. Tosi and Slocum
suggest that managers and researchers exercise their values in selecting desirable
outcomes, and that effectiveness in one area may involve a tradeoff somewhere else.
In this study, the theoretical construct of hospital performance is initially
represented by dual dimensions of facility efficiency and quality. The efficiency
dimension stems from various studies in financial performance of health care institutions
(Cohen and Dubay, 1 990; Friedman and Shortell, 1 988; Manheim et aI. , 1 989).
Efficiency is defined here as a productivity ratio, with facility expenses divided by patient
output. Two ratio measures are taken: the facility-wide expenses divided by adjusted
patient days, and the facility expenses divided by the number of adjusted inpatient
discharges.
Measures of quality are seen as helpful in formulating a balanced profile of
hospital performance. With managed care becoming a prominent influence on hospital
systems, evaluation of outcomes encourages external review, accountability and
continuous improvement in hospitals (Shortell et al., 1 995). In the interest of analyzing
available, hospital-level quality data, each unit ' s adjusted mortality rate is collected for
performance evaluation.
Hospital Performance as a Result of Structural Change

Miller and Friesen ( 1 984) suggest that organizations are complex entities, where
elements of structure, strategy and environment have a natural tendency to coalesce. The
connection between structural change and performance in hospitals is therefore an
appropriate and necessary focus of study. When sales growth and profitability (return on
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equity) were used as performance measures for a sample of 89 Canadian and Australian
firms, more successful firms changed structural variables in a dramatic, rather than
incremental, way (Miller and Friesen, 1 984).
The study approach by Miller and Friesen i s particularly successful i n focusing on
relationship clusters, because organizational change is evaluated over time (Kimberly and
Zajac, 1 985). The intended study intends to create a similar effect by incorporating
variables of change over a period of five years.
Child ( 1 972) raises two questions for a theory in organizational structure.
Primarily, he asks how performance standards and their achievement may act as a
stimulus to structural variation. Secondly, he considers how that structural variation will
affect later performance levels. In the second case, Child suggests that organizational
decision-makers do believe that structural design has some consequences for
performance. Child also names other strategic possibilities, such as choice of
environment, choice of market strategies, or selection of operating scale and technology,
as significant influences apart from structural design.
The intended study investigates the causal link between hospital structural change
and performance, with variable measurements i d e ntified earlier in this chapter.
Application of the SARFIT theory calls for collection of performance measures at a later
point in time, following hospital structural changes.

H4 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community
hospitals which increase their number of physician staff and decrease their
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proportion of registered nurses will demonstrate better performance than
those hospitals which do not make such changes.
H5 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community
hospitals which increase their ambulatory, preventive, and screening
services will demonstrate better performance than those hospitals which do
not make such changes.
H6: In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community
hospitals which reduce their inpatient capacity will demonstrate better
performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes.

Hospital Characteristics as Controls

An underlying dimension in determining the organization ' s structure is added to
the SARFIT model: basic characteristics of hospital size, location, Medicare
reimbursement, Medicaid reimbursement, and administrative control. These conditions
are often included in studies of hospital environmental response. Selected hospital
characteristics, depending on their strength and magnitude, could possibly be viable
forces in promoting or impeding any structural innovations.
Hospital administrative control characteristics include strategic decisions which
hospitals had made prior to 1 989 or 1 995, such as system membership, alliance
participation, physician liaison contracting and management contracting. The influence
of contextual elements over corresponding organizational structure and performance have
been estimated elsewhere (Astley, 1 985; Flood and Scott, 1 987; Pugh et aI. , 1 969).
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For the purpose of this study, the individual hospital unit is seen as appropriate for
analysis. Despite the recent prominence of hospital mergers and alliances, individual
hospital units, unlike those in other industries, must accommodate the unique needs of the
surrounding community. Hospitals are relatively site-bound, and they must answer to
local conditions (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983). Even though organizational design may be
evaluated as a means of satisfying those who in charge, the reconciliation of economic
and social criteria is foremost (Child, 1 972).
Together, the dimensions of managed care environment, hospital structure, and
hospital performance constitute this inquiry into strategic contingency and the response
pattern of successful hospitals. A summary of the study hypotheses is given in Table 2 .
Table 2 . Summary o f Study Hypotheses.
HI

Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition o r operating i n a more
pervasive managed care environment, will increase their number of salaried physicians and
decrease their number of registered nurses.

H2

Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a more
pervasive managed care environment, will increase their ambulatory, preventive, and screening
servIces.

H3

Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a more
pervasive managed care environment, will reduce their capacity.

H4

In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals which
increase their physician staff and decrease their registered nurses will demonstrate better
performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes.

H5

In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals which
increase their ambulatory, preventive, and screening services will demonstrate better
performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes.

H6

In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals which
reduce their inpatient capacity will demonstrate better performance than those hospitals which
do not make such changes.

CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the study' s research design, data sources, sampling
approach, variable measurements and methods of analysis. Variable definitions provide a
detailed description of the model components to be tested.
Research Design

The study employs a non-experimental panel design in determining whether a
managed care environment could significantly influence change in hospital structure. The
study design could be described as correlational, involving data collection on multiple
variables and exploring the relationships between them. An advantage of the
correlational design is the ability to investigate complex relationships between several
variables in a single study (Grady and Wallston, 1 988). Competing hypotheses about
variable relationships may be tested at once, allowing foi- future studies in causality.
A major disadvantage to correlational designs is that causality may not be
assumed from demonstrated relationships. However, if findings from correlational
studies can be replicated and supplemented with other data, a convincing argument for
causality can be made. Such an argument would include covariance between key
variables, predictor variables preceding the criterion, or dependent variable, in time, and
the absence of alternative explanations of the relationship (Grady and Wallston, 1 988).
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The study incorporates a longitudinal approach. Longitudinal surveys collect data
on more than one occasion from sample members of the population of interest. The
purpose of this collection method is to measure change, and to insure data accuracy.
Longitudinal data, also known as panel designs, often describe variations in population
characteristics that are sensitive to changes in time (Cox and Cohen, 1 985). Longitudinal
designs can establish a temporal relationship between variables, in which one variable
precedes and predicts some other variable (Grady and Wallston, 1 988). The design
provides potential for causal conclusions, because predictor variables are measured in a
time period prior to the criterion, or dependent variable.
Specifically, variables constituting the hospital ' s environment are measured in the
base year 1 989. Variables for hospital response indicate the degree of structural change
demonstrated over a five-year period, from 1 989 to 1 994. Hospital performance
following structural change is measured in 1 995. This design places structural change as
a central focus, both dependent and independent in its relationship with other hospital
factors and other places in time.
The base year of 1 989 assumes that the study hospitals had fully implemented
PPS

rules, and their PP S transition period was ended. 1 989 was a peak year for hosp ital

spending, as well as continued growth in HMO memberships. Both factors are important
in determining the sensitivity of hospital response behaviors. From that base year of
1 989, the following five years register structural transition and associated significant
change. A five-year period is also limited so as to avoid the widespread mortality of
community hospital organizations from the original study sample.
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According to contingency theory, some lag time between observations in
structural change and organizational performance is desirable. To establish this effect in
study design, hospital performance is measured in the survey year 1 995 and related to
structural changes from 1 989 to 1 994.
Data Sources

Data are collected from three sources: the American Hospital Association Annual
Survey of Hospitals Data Base, Health Care Financing Administration Datasets
(Minimum Cost Data), and the Area Resources File (ARF).
The American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals Data
Base is a derivative of the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals. This survey has been
conducted annually since 1 946, and it is widely utilized by researchers as a
comprehensive source of individual hospital data. AHA surveys from 1 989, 1 994, and
1 995 are utilized in this study.
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) constructed its Prospective
Payment System (PPS) VI Minimum Data Set from HCFA Form 2552-85, utilized for
hospital cost reporting and utilization data from 1 October, 1 988 through 1 October,
1 989. Similarly,

PPS XII Minimum Data Set is available for the reporting period I

October 1 994 through 1 October 1 995. Both data sets are offered for public use.
HCFA' s mortality files are compiled from Medicare Hospital Mortality
Information and from the MedicarelMedicaid Accreditation System (MMACS). This
administrative data is available for public use. HCFA' s 1 989 mortality files are used in
the study.
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The Area Resources File (ARF) maintains regional census data and health
resource information from 1 976 to the present. This study utilizes the ARF for HMO
membership statistics, population data and market data on a countywide basis for the year
1 989.
Data on HMO membership were reported in the ARF and collected by the
Interstudy Edge census for 1 989, with data as of 1 July 1 989. HMO membership i s
calculated t o include Pure Members (renamed i n 1 992 a s Traditional HM O Enrollment)
and Open-ended Enrollment. Supplemental Medicare and Other HMO Enrollment
figures are not included.
In this study, market data collected from the ARF are aggregated to the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level established by the Office of Management and
Budget in 1 994. These metropolitan areas are a revision of previous standards, and they
use demographic data drawn from the 1 990 Decennial Census. An area is defined as an
MSA if there is a city with a population of at least 50,000, or if there is an urbanized area
of at least 50,000 population with a total metropolitan population of at least 1 00,000. In
addition to a central city, an MSA may include other counties having close economic or
social ties to the central county (ARF, 1996).
Study Sample

The selection of a study sample defines the relevant product and geographical
markets for the hospitals of interest. Although some hospitals produce specialized
services such as psychiatric or orthopedic programs, most hospitals may be viewed as
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multi-product firms offering a multitude of diagnostic and therapeutic services (Santerre
and Neun, 1 996).
With the American Hospital Association providing the study frame from its 1 989
Annual Survey of Hospitals, this study' s unit of analysis is the community hospital with
service type described as general medical and surgical. The community hospitals under
study include local government, not-for-profit, and for-profit institutions. By definition,
community hospitals are not units within other institutions (American Hospital
Association, 1 990). Moreover, the sample hospitals did not provide nursing home
services in the base year 1 989. Such restrictions allow for homogeneity in the type of
hospital services provided, although a few hospitals added nursing home units over the 6year study period. This development is utilized as a control in 1 995 financial
performance measures.
The study' s exclusion of federal hospitals is a method of selecting those units
with revenues closely linked to the volume of patients served; however teaching hospitals
are included in the sample if they meet other sample criteria. Patient stays within the
study hospitals are defined as short-term, but hospital bedsize is not restricted. Only
those hospitals reported as operational for the entire

1 2-month survey period are included

in the original 1 989 sample.
Once the relevant product market, or cluster of inpatient services, has been
defined, a logical step is to determine the relevant geographical market (RGM). An
appropriate geographical area reflects both the travel costs involved and the ability of
patients to switch to alternative suppliers when price or quality is variable. Many
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researchers have based the RGM on boundaries such as counties, metropolitan areas, or
cities, due to data availability and practical concerns (Santerre and Neun, 1 996). In this
study, major emphasis is upon market competition between hospitals; therefore only
those units in areas classified as MSAs (metropolitan statistical areas) are sampled.
The timeframe for hospital structural change is taken from AHA survey years
1 989 and 1 994. Hospitals which are deleted from the AHA Summary of Hospitals for the
years between 1 989 and 1 994 are also deleted from the study sample. Reasons for AHA
deletion include hospital closure, change to an outpatient facility, or merger into another
hospital (American Hospital Association, 1 990). Similarly, those hospitals added to the
AHA Summary after 1 989 are not included in the study sample. Additions are usually
due to demergers, mergers, and new survey participants. The study sample retains
additions to the AHA's registered and unregistered files when subject hospitals were
merely moved between those two categories and were present in the 1 989 group.
Other deletions to the study sample are due to two or more hospitals sharing one
Medicare Provider Number, as some systems will report; and specific hospitals which
changed their service type during the study period.
By selecting a group of integral hospital units and following their internal changes
over a period of five years, the study provides some control in maintaining consistent
organizational identities. Despite the exclusion of federal and rural hospitals, the national
study sample is extensive, varied, and largely representative of the target population:
acute-care, general-purpose community hospitals. Operational definitions and sources of
variable measurements are listed in Table 3 .
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables.
Variable

Definition

Treaunent in Anal:[sis

Sources of Data

HMOPEN89

Percent HMO enrollees
(traditional and openended) in the MSA
population

Continuous variable

HHIDC89
HHIPD89

Market competition:
Herfindahl lndex
measures, calculated
from the number of
admissions and IP days
for nonfederal
medicaVsurgical
hospitals in MSA
Market competition:
Sum of short-tenn
general hospitals in MSA

Continuous variable

ARF 1 988, 1 990 (for
population);
ARFlInterstudy Edge
1 989 (for HMO
enrollment)
AHA 1 989

Continuous variable

ARF 1 989

HCFA 1 989 PPS VI,
10/1/88- 10/1/89 (for
expenses); HCFA Wage
Index Survey 88;
HCFA Case-mix Index
89
HCFA 1 989 PPS VI,
10/1/88- 10/1/89 (for
expenses); HCFA Wage
Index Survey 88;
HCFA Case-mix Index
89
HCFA Mortality files,
1 989 (Also see
Appendix A, "HCFA
Diagnostic and
Procedure Codes")

Environment
Managed Care
Environment

MSASTGH9
Past Performance

CSTDAY9

Expenses per adjusted
patient day, corrected for
wage index and case-mix

Continuous variable

CSTDISC9

Expenses per adjusted
patient admission,
corrected for wage index
and case-mix

Continuous variable

MORT30

Observed mortality rate
divided by expected
mortality rate, within 30
days of admission, for all
HCFA diagnostic and
procedure codes
Hospital specific excess
in mean survival over
1 80 da:[s

Continuous variable

CUMDIFF

Continuous variable

HCFA Mortality files,
1 989
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables (cont.)
Definition

Treaunent in Anallsis

Sources of Data

DIFITE

Difference in the total
FIEs between 1 989 and

Continuous variable

AHA

1 989, 1994

DIFMD

Difference in physician
and dentist FIE totals
between 1 989 and 1 994
Difference in RN FIE's
between 1 989 and 1 994
Difference in LPN FIE's
between 1 989 and 1 994
Difference in
RN/(RN+LPN) ratios
between 1 989 and 1 994

Continuous variable

AHA

1 989, 1 994

Continuous variable

AHA

1 989, 1 994

Continuous variable

AHA

1 989, 1994

Continuous variable

AHA 1 989, 1994

Continuous variable

AHA

1 989, 1994

Continuous variable

AHA

1 989, 1994

Continuous variable

AHA 1 989, 1994
(Also see Appendix E,
"Scoring for
Preventive Services")

Continuous variable

AHA 1 989, 1994

Continuous variable

AHA 1 989, 1994

Continuous variable

HCFA Case-mix index
files, 1 989, 1994

Variable
Hospital
Response
Professionalism

1 994

DIFRN
DIFLPN
DIFNURS
Services

DIFAMB
DIFSURG
DIFPREV

Difference in OP visits
between 1 989 and 1 994
Difference in OP
surgeries between 1 989
and 1 994
Difference in scores
reflecting hospital
services in patient
education, fitness
centers, women's health
programs, occupational
health programs and
geriatric assessment
programs, 1 989- 1 994

Inpatient Capacity

DIFBED
DIFOCCRT

DIFCMI

Difference in number of
staffed beds between
1989 and 1 994
Difference in the ratio of
average daily census to
staffed beds between
1 989 and 1 994
Difference in Medicare
case-mix between 1 989
and 1 994
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables (cont.)
Definition

Treatment in Anal�sis

Sources of Data

CSTDAY5

Expenses per adjusted
patient day, corrected for
wage index and case-mix

Continuous variable

CSTDISC5

Expenses per adjusted
patient admission,
corrected for wage index
and case-mix

Continuous variable

HCF A PPS XII,
10/1/94-10/1/95 (for
expenses); HCFA
Wage Index
SurveyAug.95; HCFA
Case-mix Index 94
HCFA PPS XII,
10/1/94- 10/1/95 (for
expenses); HCF A
Wage Index Survey
Aug.95; HCFA Casemix Index 94

DIFCSTDY

Difference in cost per
patient day, 1 989- 1 995

Continuous variable

DIFCSTDS

Difference in cost per
admission, 1 989- 1 995

Continuous variable

Average daily census
System member
Alliance member

Continuous variable
Dichotomous, 1 =yes O=no
Dichotomous, 1 =yes O=no

Contract with physician

Dichotomous, l=yes O=no

AHA 1 989 only

Dichotomous, I =yes O=no
Dichotomous, 1 =yes O=no

AHA

Dichotomous, I =yes O=no

AHA

Continuous

HCFAPPSVI 1 989,
HCFA PPXII 1 995

Continuous

HCFA PPSVI 1 989,
HCFA PPXII 1 995

Variable
Later
Performance

HCFA PPS XII,
10/1/94-10/1/95 (for
expenses); HCFA
Wage Index Survey
Aug.95; HCFA Casemix Index 94
HCFA PPS XII,
10/1/94-10/1/95 (for
expenses); HCF A
Wage Index Survey
Aug.95; HCFA Casemix Index 94

Control
Variables

ADC
MHSMEM
ALL
CONPHY

MNGT
LOCSYS
MAPP8
HMCR
HMCD

to liaison with staff
Contract managed
Belongs to system shared
by at least one other
hospital in MSA
Member of Council of
Teaching Hospitals
Medicare
discharges/Hospital total
discharges.
Medicaid discharges!
Hosl!ital total discharses

AHA 1 989, 1995
AHA
AHA

1 989, 1995
1 989, 1995

AHA 1 989, 1995
1 989, 1 994
1 989, 1 995
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables (cont.)

Variable

Definition

SUNITS

Maintains a separate
nursing-home unit

Dichotomous, I =yes O=no

AHA

PUB

Public hospitals (RCFA
Control codes 8-13)

Dichotomous, l =yes,O=no

HCFA PPS VI
HCFA PPSXII

For-profit hospitals
( HCFA Control codes
3-6)

Dichotomous, l =yes,O=no

HCFA PPS VI 1 989
RCFA PPSXII 1 995

REGION

Region/state code

I -New England
2-Mid Atlantic
3 -South Atlantic
4-East North Central
5-East South Central
6-West North Central
7-West South Central
8-Mountain
9-Pacific

AHA 1 989 (See
Appendix C, "AHA
Region Codes, 1989")

CNTRL

HCFA code for
ownership/control

I -Voluntary, NP, Church
2-Voluntary, NP, Other
3-Proprietary, Individual
4-Proprietary, Corporate
5-Proprietary, Partnership
6-Proprietary, Other
8-Government, City-County
9-Government, .County
IO-Government, State
I I -Government, Hospital
D.istrict
12-Government, City
13-Government, Other

HCFA PPS VI 1 989
HCFA PPSXII 1 9 9 5

FP

Treatment in Analysis

Sources of Data
1 989, 1 9 9 5

1 989
1 995

ANO VA Variables

With the stated restrictions in mind, the original 1 989 sample consists of 2 1 88
observations. Hospital changes due to closure or merger are responsible for 2 5 5
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observations lost between 1 989 and 1 995. Other sample adjustments as mentioned
earlier (-5 1 ) bring the final population size to 1 882 community hospitals.
Variable Measurements

Independent Variables
In the study model, the hospital environment is represented by variables for
managed care penetration and past performance, both moderated by market competition.
Managed care penetration is measured by percentage of HMO enrollees in the hospital ' s
MSA population during 1 989. The variable for past performance i s represented b y three
measures: cost per patient day (1989), average cost per discharge (1989), and RCF A
mortality ratio (1989).
The standardized mortality ratio is frequently used to measure hospital
performance (Knaus et aI. , 1 986). Information for the RCFA mortality rate was collected
from Medicare beneficiaries discharged from over 5000 acute care hospitals in the United
States (RCFA, 1 993). Seventeen diagnoses were included in mortality statistics (see
Appendix A). For these diagnoses, each hospital ' s standardized mortality ratio was
calculated by dividing the observed mortality rate by its predicted rate. Predicted
mortality rates were determined from multivariate RCF A models based on age, gender,
prior hospitalizations, reason for admission, and the presence of specific comorbid
illnesses identified by ICD-9-CM (International Classification of Diseases Clinical
Modification) codes (RCFA, 1 993). Mortality ratios less than 1 .0 indicate better than
expected performance, while ratios higher than 1 indicate performance below the
expected level.
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In accordance with the SARFIT model, the effects of past performance upon
hospital structural response is modified by environmental illiberality, which is
represented by a variable for market competition or concentration within a market area.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is the most commonly used method of measuring
the degree of concentration in the market. The HHI is derived by summing the squared
market shares, expressed as percentages, of all hospitals in the defined market, or
N

HHI

=

2

L Si
;=1

where O<HHI ::; 1 0,000 and S; stands for the percentage market share produced by the
ith hospital. When a market area is dominated by one hospital, the HHI value is 1 0,000.
As the value ofHHI approaches zero, the industry is considered to be less structurally
concentrated, or more competitive (Santerre and Neun, 1 996).
In this study, two hospital output indicators are used in calculating the market
share and establishing HHI values: number of admissions and number of inpatient days.
For scaling purposes, HHI variables are divided by a factor of 1 0,000 so O<X< l . For this
study, hospital admissions and inpatient days, indicators of utilization, are considered
more appropriate measures of market share than hospital bed-size, also commonly used
in the Herfindahl formula. A third measure for market competition is the sum of all
short-term general hospitals in each hospital' s MSA.
Dependent Variables
Hospital response, or the structural changes made by each hospital in response to
the managed care environment, is represented by three dimensions and a number of
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variables. Change in professional contingent is measured by the difference in total FTEs
(full-time equivalents) employed between 1 989 and 1 994 . Hospital physician and dentist
FTEs from the 1 989 AHA survey are compared with 1 994 figures. Similar data are
collected and change is computed for RN FTEs (registered nurses), LPN FTEs (licensed
practical nurses) and nurse ratio RN/(RN+LPN) measures from 1 989 and 1 994.
In capturing hospital changes in services, hospital workload volume is collected
for outpatient visits and outpatient surgeries between 1 989 and 1 994. The differences in
these two measures over the study period indicate hospital shift from inpatient to
ambulatory care. Other preventive services in patient education, fitness, women' s health,
occupational health, and geriatric assessment are combined into an overall preventive
score, indicating the change in hospital provision of those services between 1 989 and
1 994. Preventive service scoring is described in Appendix B .
While expanding ambulatory services, hospitals are viewed a s reducing their
inpatient capacity in response to their managed care environment. Measures in bed size
and occupancy rate indicate the changes made in downsizing the inpatient capability
between 1 989 and 1 994. The HCFA case-mix index is also measured over the structural
change period, for determining any shift in case intensity.
Since structural change in hospitals is predicted to affect performance, the later
performance measures are patterned after initial measures of hospital efficiency.
Unfortunately, HCF A mortality measures for hospitals were no longer reported by 1 99 5 .
Hospital performance in 1 995 is therefore defined a s the cost per patient day and cost per
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patient discharge between 1 989 and 1 995, as well as the difference between the 1 989 and
1 995 costs, adjusting for case-mix and wage index differences between hospitals.
Data Analysis
Preliminary analysis includes a descriptive statistical summary of all indicators
and a check for their normality in distribution, using the SAS Univariate Procedure.
Observations with very extreme values are deleted. For those continuous variables which
are not normal and are retained in the research model, appropriate transformation is
considered to correct for skewness and kurtosis in distributions. A chi-square analysis is
used to compare the original 1 933 study hospitals (those which retained their identity
over the entire study period) with the 255 hospitals which were attritions in the form of
mergers, de mergers, or closures. The z-test for proportions (Wassertheil-Smoller, 1 990)
is performed to determine whether ownership/control is similar between the sample
group and the attrition group.
The dependent variables from Part I are tested to see if there is a significant
. change in these measures between 1 989 and 1 994. Once this inquiry has been answered,
the effects of hospital region and ownership are separately evaluated with all dependent
variables, through analysis of variance (ANOVA). The purpose is to determine whether
the categorical variables of hospital location and ownership/control are significant in the
study models for hospital change and subsequent hospital performance.
Correlation analysis is employed to indicate univariate relationships between
independent and dependent variables. Specifically, significant correlations between
independent and dependent variables are desirable. In contrast, independent variables are
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evaluated for collinearity with one another, which will only provide duplicate information
and interfere with accurate regression estimates. Decisions are made to eliminate those
independent variables which demonstrate collinearity. Such variables threaten to hinder
the interpretation of regression model coefficients (Canavos and Miller, 1 995).
The analytical hypotheses are tested using ordinary least squares (OLS)
technique. After controlling for several organizational characteristics, this multivariate
technique measures the impact of the managed care environment on hospital structure.
Analysis is performed twice for each dependent structural variable. First, the
independent effects of market competition are measured along with all other independent
variables. Second, the theoretical interactions between hospital performance variables
and market competition are tested as independent variables. The general linear regression
model (Neter & Wasserman, 1 974) for these relationships follows:

where:

/3o , /3p . . . /3P _I are parameters
XI . . , X, p - I

are known constants

&i

are independent

i

=

1 ,.

.

N(O, a2 ) .

.n
The OLS model is applied to study hypotheses as follows:

H I : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a
more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their number of salaried
physicians and decrease their number of registered nurses.
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Where:
Y I = change in salaried physicians
Y2 = change in RN s

Xl = HMO penetration
X2 = past performance
X3 = market competition

H2 : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a
more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their ambulatory, preventive,
and screening services.
Where
YI = change in outpatient visits
Y2 = change in ambulatory surgeries
Y3 = service scale, 0-6, 0= no new services
6= all new services

Xl

HMO penetration
= past performance
X3 market competition
=

X2

=

H3 : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a
more pervasive managed care environment, will reduce their capacity.
Where
Y I change in bedsize
Y2 = change in occupancy rate
Y3 change in case-mix index

Xl = HMO penetration
= past performance
X3 = Market competition

=

X2

=

Analysis follows Drazin and Van de Ven's selection approach to fit ( 1 985), where
regression is used to test the congruence relationship between specific variables.
Additional estimation equations for interaction in hypotheses H I through H3
introduce the variable of market competition as a moderator to the effects of HMO
penetration and past performance, so that X l

and X2

=

=

(HMO penetration * market competition),

(past performance * market competition).

For hypotheses H4 through H6, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used
to test hospital change measures and their independent effects upon hospital performance.
H4 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals
which increase their physician staff and decrease their registered nurses will demonstrate
better performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes.
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H5 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals
which increase their ambulatory, preventive and screening services will demonstrate
better performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes.
H6 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals
which reduce their inpatient capacity will demonstrate better performance than those
hospitals which do not make such changes.
Where:
Y1
XI
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

change in performance, 1 989- 1 995
HMO penetration
past performance
market competition
change in salaried physicians
change in registered nurses
change in outpatient visits

X7 change in ambulatory surgeries
X8 change in service scale
X9 change in bedsize
X I O change in occupancy rate
X I I change in case-mix
=

=

=

=

=

In addition to the variables of interest, control variables representing hospital
characteristics are included in regression equations. These controls include measures in
hospital size, local system membership, alliance membership, physician liaison
contracting, management contracting, percent Medicare discharges and percent Medicaid
discharges.
Limitations in Study Design

The study is necessarily limited by the reliability of its data, most notably in
measuring managed care penetration and hospital market competition. In general, all
measures appear to be available and reasonably reliable for the target population.
HeF A's 1 989 mortality indicator for hospital performance appears to provide sufficient
variability in support of analysis within the target sample. Hospital mortality data are not
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available from 1 995, however, and a satisfactory substitute measure in hospital quality
was not found.
Analytic results may b e somewhat limited b y the heterogeneity o f the sample
hospitals in regard to size. Generally, larger hospitals tend to treat more complex cases
and provide a much broader spectrum of care, while a patient day in a small hospital is
very different (Eastaugh, 1 992). In order to partially compensate for this condition,
hospital performance measures are adjusted according to their associated ReF A case-mix
index. Nonetheless, the overall diversity of the sample contributes to extensive ranges
displayed within the dependent variables of change.

CHAPTER v. RESULTS

This chapter summarizes analytic results of the study, including various
assessments of the hospital sample, descriptive statistics of the study variables, bivariate
correlations of all variables, and OLS model-building estimates. An analytic test for fit
between context and structure is also constructed, using measures from 1 989. The
regression models in Part 1 evaluate hospital change variables as dependent variables;
while regression models in Part 2 consider the independent effects of structural change
upon hospital performance.
Comparison of Final Sample Observations with Attritions

The original study population of nonfederal, community hospitals was comprised
of 2 1 88 observations in AHA survey year 1 989. From this group, 255 hospitals did not
maintain their 1 989 AHA identification throughout the survey year 1 99 5 . In Table 4, a
chi-square analysis compares the retained sample and the attrition sample in terms of
region, AHA ownership/control, and bedsize.
Prominent regional differences are shown in New England, where 28 hospitals
dropped out of the sample instead of an expected 1 6 . State hospitals ( l loss observed, 5
expected) and county hospitals (5 losses observed, 1 0 expected) did not experience
proportionate attrition. For-profit corporate hospitals experienced an excessive attrition
during the study period (64 lost, 43 expected). In reference to bedsize, where the chi-
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square value was highest, those hospitals with less than 200 beds were overrepresented in
the attrition group, while larger hospitals of 300 or more beds were underrepresented.

Table 4. Comparison of Sample Hospitals ( N= 1 93 3 ) With Attritions ( N=255)

Occurring between 1 989 and 1 995.
Region
(AHA Categories)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

New England
Mid- Atlantic
South Atlantic
East N . Central
East S. Central
West N. Central
West S . Central
Mountain
Pacific

Sample
Frequency
Observed/
Expected
1 08 / 1 20
320 / 3 1 2
327 / 332
346 / 339
1 26 / 1 22
95 / 94. 5
252 / 254
78 / 75. 1
28 1 / 284

Sample
Cell
ChiSquare
1 .23
.212
. 08 1
. 1 34
. 1 37
.002
.023
. 1 12
.024

Attritions
Frequency
Observed/
Expected
28 / 1 5 . 8
33 / 4 1 . 1
49 / 43 . 8
3 8 / 44.8
1 2 / 1 6. 1
12 / 12.5
36 / 3 3 . 6
7 / 9. 9 1
40 / 37.4

Attritions
Cell
ChiSquare
9.3 1
1 .6 1
.612
1 . 02
1 . 04
.018
. 1 77
.853
. 1 79

Chi-Sguare
Value
(p-value)

1 6. 7 7 ( . 0 3 3 )
Ownership/Control
(AHA Categories)

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
21.
23 .

state
county
city
city/county
hospital district
church
other NFP
3 1 . FP individual
3 2 . FP partnership
3 3 . FP Corporation

45 /40.6
77 172.4
46 /44.2
10 110.6
1 1 2 1 1 09
3 0 1 /296
1016 /1014
2 /2.6
1 8 /16.8
3 06 /327

.468
.287
.076
.034
. 1 02
.086
. 003
. 1 60
.088
1 .3 3

1 /5 . 3 6
5 /9.56
4 /5 . 83
2 11 .40
1 1 /14.3
34 /39.0
132 /134
1 . 0 1. 349
1 .0 /2. 2 1
64 /43 . 1

3 . 54
2. 1 7
. 573
.259
. 776
.65 1
.024
1 .2 1
. 666
2.93
22. 62 (. 007)

Bedsize
(AHA Categories)

6-24
25-49
50-99

10 1 1 5
99 1 1 04
257 /263

1 .67
.264
. 1 49

7 /2.0
19 /13.7
4 1 /34 . 7

12.7
2 . 00
1.13

1 04

Table 4. Comparison of Sample Hospitals ( N= 1 93 3 ) With Attritions ( N=255)

Occurring between 1 989 and 1 995.(cont.)
Region
(AHA Categories)

Sample
Frequency
Observed/
Expected

Sample
Cell
ChiSquare

502 /5 1 8
430 /430
283 /266
1 55 1 1 47
1 97 1 1 88

.53 1
.000
1 . 10
.378
.414

Attritions
Frequency
Observed/
Expected

Attritions
Cell
ChiSquare

85 /68.4
5 7 /56. 7
1 8 /3 5 . 1
12 /19.5
1 6 /24. 8

4.02
.001
8.32
2 . 86
3.13

Chi-Sguare
Value
(p-value)

Bedsize
(AHA Catelwries)

1 00- 1 99
200-299
3 00-399
400-499
500+

3 8 . 69 ( . 00 l )

General Description of Sample Hospitals

The final study sample consisted of 1 882 observations, with the greatest
frequency (3 39) in the East North Central Region, the second highest frequency (3 22) in
the South Atlantic Region, and the third highest frequency (3 1 1 ) in the Mid-Atlantic
Region. The remaining observations (48% of the total) were dominated by the Pacific
and West South Central Regions. Table 5 presents the frequency and percentage
breakdown for each of the regions. The states included in these AHA regions are listed
in Appendix C.

105

Table 5. Distribution of Final Sample Hospitals (N= 1 882) According to AHA Region

Region
I . New England
2 . Mid-Atlantic
3 . South Atlantic
4 . East N. Central
5 . East S . Central
6. West N. Central
7. West S. Central
8 . Mountain
9 . Pacific

Frequency
1 06
311
322
339
1 20
94
24 1
74
275

Percentage
5.6
1 6. 5
1 7. 1
1 8.0
6.4
5.0
12.8
3.9
14.6

The final sample o f hospital observations varies i n ownership/control between the
years 1 989 and 1 995. Table 6 details the HCFA categories and percentages for hospital
ownership/control at the beginning and ending of the study period. The frequency of
various hospital types show some difference between hospital samples from 1 989 and
1 995; however the percentage of each hospital type remains fairly constant between the
survey years. The Z test for comparing two proportions (Wassertheil-Smoller, 1 990)
indicates that group sizes from 1 989 may be considered statistically the same as group
sizes from 1 995, with the exception of Group 6 (proprietary, Other, where Z=-2. 66).
Voluntary, nonprofit hospitals dominate the sample with 69% of the total ' 9 5
observations. Proprietary hospitals comprise 1 7%, and local government hospitals
comprise 1 4% of the total observations.

1 06

Table 6. Distribution of Final Sample Hospitals According to HCF A

Ownership/Control.
Control Code
Vol. NP , Church
Vol. NP, Other
Proprietary, Individual
Proprietary, Corporate
Proprietary,
Partnership
6. Proprietary, Other * *
8. Government, CityCounty
9. Government, County
10. Government, State
I I . Government, Hospital
District
1 2 . Government, City
1 3 . Government, other
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1 989
Frequency
(N= 1 843)
340
91 1
5
296
II

1 989
Percentage
1 8 .4
49.4
.3
1 6. 1
.6

1 995
Frequency
(N= 1 8 1 9)
308
94 1
I
288
21

1 995
Percentage
1 6. 9
5 1 .7
.1
1 5.8
1 .2

16
34

.9
1 .8

4
26

.2
1 .4

78
41
68

4.2
2.2
3.7

79
45
72

4.3
2.5
4.0

25
18

1 .4
1 .0

21
13

1 .2
.7

** Z value I S Significant at the .05 level for reJecung the hypotheSIS that the '89 Group= '95 Group

Measurement of Hospital Structural Changes

A preliminary concern in the research study is whether the sample hospitals
displayed definitive change in the selected structural measures during the time period
1 989 to 1 994. Change variables were calculated by subtracting the variable' s 1 989 value
from its 1 994 value. This difference was subjected to the Student ' s t value for testing
that the population mean is 0 (SAS Institute, 1 990). All variables indicating change in
structure were found to be statistically significant, as shown in Table 7.
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and T-Test Results for Variables of Change (Dependent
Variables, Part I ) .

Variable

1 989
Mean (SD)
N

1 994
Mean (SD)
N

Change ' 89-'94
Mean (SD)
N

1 026
(975)
1 880
12.8
(53 .9)
1 882
255
(245)
1 882
47.2
(48 . 1 )
1 882
.81 1
(0. 1 2 1 )
1 882
85,757
(95, 554)
1 880
3 1 90
(2793)
1881
2. 1 9
( 1 . 1 7)
1 882
261
(191)
1 882
. 632
(. 1 67)
1 882
1 .30
(. 1 72)
1 875

1 1 43
( 1 079)
1 880
18. 1
(57. 1 )
1 882
284
(273)
1 882
38.5
(40.0)
1 882
.853
(. 1 00)
1 882
1 1 5,743
( 1 24, 1 84)
1 880
4053
(3 527)
1 881
1 . 74
( 1 .26)
1 882
253
( 1 92)
1 882
.588
(. 1 66)
1 882
1 .38
(.2 1 9)
1 875

1 17 ***
(308)
1 880
5 .25 * * *
(5 1 . 5)
1 882
29.3 * * *
( 1 03 .4)
1 882
-8.6 ***
(26 . 8)
1 882
. 04 1 7 * * *
(. 0830)
1 882
29,986 * * *
(73, 8 5 7)
1 880
863 * * *
(2063)
1881
-.442 * * *
( 1 .26)
1 882
-7. 59 * * *
(63 .6)
1 882
-.0437 * * *
( . 1 23 )
1 882
.0832 * * *
(. 1 1 5)
1 875

FTE
(Full-time equivalents)
FTEMD
(Full-time equivalents,
Doctors and dentists)
FTERN
(Full-time equivalents,
registered nurses)
FTELPN
(Full-time equivalents,
licensed practical nurses)
NURS
Ratio of FTERNI
(FTERN+FTELPN)
AMB

(Ambulatory visits)
SURG
(Outpatient surgical
procedures)
PREV
(Preventive service score)
BED
(Staffed beds)
OCCRT
(Occupancy rate)
CM!

(Medicare Case-mix index)
* * * Student s t-test shows a p-value <

.00 1

for difference vanable of change .

lO8

Structural change statistics indicate that the mean number of hospital FTEs
increased by 1 1 7 during the five-year study period. Within the measures of
professionalism, the mean number of physician and dentist FTEs increased by 5 . 2 5 , the
mean number of RN FTEs increased by 29. 3, and the mean number of LPN FTEs
decreased by 8.6. The ratio for nursing staff, RN FTEs/(RN+LPN FTEs), reflected these
changes with a mean increase of .04 1 7.
Outpatient services were greatly increased, with the mean of ambulatory visits
raised by almost 30,000 per year, and the mean of outpatient surgical services expanded
by 863 procedures per year. Contrary to expected growth trends, however, the mean of
the overall preventive service score decreased by .44 for the study hospitals.
Inpatient capacity measures changed in their expected directions over the study
period, with the mean number of staffed beds decreasing by 7. 59, the mean of hospital
occupancy rates decreasing by . 0437, and the mean of hospital case-mix index values
increasing by .0832.
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables in Part 2

Dependent variables in Part 2 were measured as regular hospital expense ratios
for 1 995. Additionally, the changes between expense ratios from 1 989 to 1 995 were
computed. Descriptive statistics for these variables are displayed in Table 8. Most
notable is the limited growth in hospital expenses over six years, averaging 4 .4% per year
in cost per day and 1 .6% per year in cost per discharge. Differences in cost per day and

109

cost per discharge exhibit a large standard deviation, indicating broad variability in the
sample data (Zolman, 1 993).
Table 8.

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables, P art 2 .

Variable Name
CSTDAY5
(Cost per patient day, 1 995)
CSTDISC5
(Cost per discharge, 1 995)
DIFCSTDY
(Difference in cost per day
between 1 989 and 1 995)
DIFCSTDS
(Difference in cost per discharge
between 1 989 and 1 995)

N
1 793

Mean
710

Standard Deviation
247

1 793

3871

1 288

1 77 1

148

250

1 77 1

332

13 1 1

Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Table 9 summarizes descriptive statistics for independent continuous variables in
the study, including variables of interest and control variables. In the environmental
category, HMO penetration has a mean of l4. 75, which appears appropriate, considering
the exclusive use of metropolitan statistical areas in collecting the hospital sample. The
means for both types of Herfindahl index are almost identical. With a value of . 1 7, the
average Herfindahl index is associated with market conditions of oligopoly (McCue and
Ozcan, 1 992). The oligopolistic market is characterized by a few dominant firms,
presenting barriers to entry for potential competitors (Santerre and Neun, 1 996). The
third measure of market competition, the number of short-term general hospitals in each
hospital ' s MSA, has a mean value of 29. 5 .
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Continuous Variables, Parts I and 2.

Variable Name
Variables of Interest Included in Parts 1 and 2

HMOPEN89
(HMO penetration, 1 989)
HHIDC89
Herfindahl index for hospital discharges, 1 989)
HHIPD89
(Herfindahl index for hospital patient days, 1 989)
MSASTGH9
(Short-term general hospitals in MSA, 1 989)
CSTDAY9
(Cost per patient day, 1 989)
CSTDISC9
(Cost per patient discharge, 1 989)
MORT30
(Mortality index at 30 days after discharge)
CUMDIFF
(Hospital specific excess i n mean survival over 1 80
days)
Control Variables, Part 1

BDTOT89
(Total staffed beds, 1989 )
ADC89
(Average daily census, 1 989)
HMCR_89
( % o f discharges sponsored b y Medicare, 1 989)
HMCD_89
(% of discharges sponsored by Medicaid, 1 989)
Control Variables. Part 2

BDTOT95
(Total staffed beds, 1 995)
ADC95
(Average daily census, 1 995)
HMCR_95
(% discharges sponsored by Medicare, 1 995)
HMCD 95
(% discharges sponsored by Medicaid, 1 995)

N
1 882

Mean
14.75

Standard
Deviation
1 5 .65

1 882

. 1 736

. 1 705

1 882

. 1 730

. 1 702

1 882

29.5

30.3

1819

563 .

150.

1819

3548.

95 3 .

1 876

1 . 005

1 874

-.2496

. 1 826
2.86

1 882

26 1

191

1 882

181

158

1 843

.341

. 130

1 843

. 1 I7

. 1 I5

1 882

247

1 87

1 882

158

144

1819

.382

. 1 45

1819

. 1 54

. 130
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Financial variables for past performance reveal an average cost per day of $563
and average cost per discharge of $3 548 for the hospital sample in 1 989. Performance
quality is represented by the mean mortality ratio at 30 days ( 1 . 005), indicating that
observed performance was slightly better than expected. The average for hospital
specific excess in mean survival over 1 80 days is calculated at -.2496, showing slightly
negative hospital performance.
In this sample, Medicare' s portion of hospital discharges has a mean of 34% for
1 989 and 3 8% for 1 995. Medicaid's portion of discharges has a mean of 1 2% in 1 989
and 1 5% in 1 995. On the average, these payors insure approximately 50% of the patient
volume in the sample hospitals.
Table 10 summarizes descriptive statistics for categorical control variables in the
study. Hospital alliance membership was reported among 32% of the sample in 1 989 as
well as 1 995. In 1 989, 35% of the sample hospitals contracted for a physician liaison to
interface with the medical staff Figures for 1 995 were not available. Membership in
hospital systems with other local hospitals was reported by 27% of the sample in 1 989
and 34% in 1 994. System membership in general was more common, with 44% of the
sample reported

as

system

members in

1 989 and 50%

reported as system members in

1 995. Membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals was reported by 1 2% of the
sample in 1 989 and 1 1 % of the sample in 1 995. Contract management was reported by
8% of the sample hospitals in 1 989 and 5 . 6% of the sample in 1 99 5 .
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Table 1 0 . Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Control Variables, Parts I and 2

(N= 1 882, unless otherwise stated).
Variable Name
ALL89
ALL95
CONPHY89
LOCSYS89
LOCSYS94
MAPP889
MAPP895
MHSMEM89
MHSMEM95
MNGT89
MNGT95
SUNITS95

PUB89
PUB95
FP89
FP95

Description
Alliance member (89)
Alliance member (95)
Physician liaison for
medical staff (89)
Local system member (89)
Local system member (94)
Member of Council of
Teaching Hospitals 89
Member of Council of
Teaching Hospitals 95

Fre_qu ency
597
603
660

System member (89)
System member (95)
Contract managed (89)
Contract managed (95)
Maintains a separate
nursing home or long-term
care unit i95)
Public hospital (89)
N= 1 843
Public hospital (95)
N= 1 8 1 9
For-profit hospital (89)
N= 1 843
For-profit hospital (95)
N= 1 8 1 9

83 1
94 1
1 53
1 06
340

44. 2
50.0
8. 1
5.6
1 8. 1

264

14.3

256

14. 1

328

1 7. 8

3 14

1 7. 3

Percent
3 1 .7
32.0
35. 1

512
634
23 1

27.2
33.7
12.3

212

1 1 .3

I n accordance with the study frame, the original community hospitals did not contain a
nursing home or long-term care unit. However, if this type of unit were added, the host
hospital was retained in the analysis. A total of 340 hospitals, or 1 8% of the final sample,
reported a separate nursing home or long-term care unit in 1 995.
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Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate correlations between the dependent and independent variables from Part
1 are shown in Appendix D. The original study model contains 1 1 dependent variables in
Part 1 . Correlation values reported at a 0.05 level of significance were used as criteria to
screen potentially significant relationships among variable pairs.
Among the variables of interest, the most prominent correlations are shown
between HMOPEN89 (HMO penetration 89) and DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio)
(r=-0.092 and p=. OOO I ), Hlll 8 9 (Herfindahl index 89) and DIFOCCRT (difference in
occupancy rate) (r=0.096 and p=. OOO I ), CSTDISC89 (cost per discharge 89) and
DIFCMI (difference in case-mix) (r=0.208 and p=. OOO I ), CSTDAY9 (cost per patient
day 89) and DIFOCCRT (difference in occupancy rate) (r=0. 1 06 and p=.OOO I ),
C STDISC9 (cost per discharge 89) and DIFFTE (difference in FTEs) (r=0.096 and
p=. OOO I ), and MORT30 (mortality rate) and DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio)
(r=0. 1 23 and p=. OOO I ) . Other statistically significant Pearson correlations occur for
difference in RNs, difference in ambulatory visits, and difference in beds.
All of the dependent variables in Appendix D show some significant correlation
w ith continuous and dichotomous control variables, with one exception. The variable for
difference in preventive services score shows no significant relationship the other study
variables.
Appendix E summarizes correlation statistics for dependent and independent
variables in Part 2. There are four dependent variables, all of which are based on hospital
costs. The 1 1 dependent variables from Part 1 now assume the role of independent
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variables of interest. HMO data, market variables and performance variables from 1 989
are retained in the model as well as standard control variables of hospital size, affiliation,
and strategy.
The most prominent correlations among variables of interest in Part 2 occur
between the following variable pairs: DIFBED (difference in beds) and CSTDAY5 (cost
per patient day 95) (r=-0. 1 05 an p=. OOO I ), DIFBED (difference in beds) and DIFCSTDY
(difference in cost per patient day) (r=-0. 147 and p=. OOO I ), and (DIFOCCRT) (difference
in occupancy rate) and DIFCSTDY (difference in cost per day) (r=-0. 1 46 and p=. OOO I ) .
The variable DIFCMI (difference i n case-mix index) shows significant correlations with
all dependent variables with the exception of CSTDISC5 (cost per discharge 95).
Correlation statistics also show strong associations between both Herfindahl
values and CSTDAY5 (cost per day 95) (r=0.096 and p=.OOO I ), as well as the number of
general hospitals in the MSA and DIFCSTDS (difference in cost per discharge) (r=-0. 1 1 2
and p=. OOO l ) . The variables CSTDAY9 (cost per patient day 89) and CSTDISC9 (cost
per discharge 89) are significantly correlated with all dependent variables in Part 2, with
the exception of one pair: CSTDISC9 (cost per discharge 89) and CSTDAY5 (cost per
day 95) (r=0.029 and p=.220).
The most prominent correlations between control variables and the dependent
variables occur among size characteristics, system variables and nursing home indicators.
Dichotomous control variables showing significant association with dependent variables
are particularly noteworthy, since their presence is probably underreported in data
surveys.
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ANOV A Analysis for Region and Ownership/Control

Table 1 1 portrays the effects of two categorical variables upon all dependent
study variables. The variable REGION (Region 89) is an AHA category applied to the
hospital sample, both in 1 989 (Part 1) as well as 1 995 (part 2). Variables for
ownership/control, CNTRL89 and CNTRL95, were collected from HCF A for 1 989 and
1 99 5 . These variables were applied to the hospital sample in Parts 1 and 2.
Although many significant associations are found between the dependent
variables and hospital region, the most prominent involves the variable CSTDA Y5 (cost
per day 95), with an R-square of 0.084 (p=.OO I). In contrast, the variable CSTDISC5
(cost per discharge 95) carries a lower R-square of 0.025 (p=.OO I ). The variables DIFRN
(difference in RN FTEs) and DIFBED (difference in beds) also show formidable
association with hospital region, with R-square values of 0.034 (p=.OO I ) and 0.03 1
(p=.O I ), respectively. In addition to confirming that hospital cost per day is affected by
region, these results specifically link propensity for change in RN staff and bed size to
geographic location.
In tandem with these results, the effects of hospital ownership/control are found to
be strongest on the variables DIFCSTDY (difference in cost per day) (r-square=0. 04 1 ,
p=.OO I ), CSTDISC5 (cost per discharge 95) (r-square=0. 064, p=. OO I ), and DIFCSTDS
(difference in cost per discharge) (r-square=O.077, p=.OO I ).
In response to these results, dichotomous variables for public/private ownership
and profit/not-for-profit control were developed and tested in separate regression models.
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Table 1 1 . ANOVA Results for Regional and Ownership/Control.
Variable

REG89

Ownership!
Control

R-sQuare

F-value

R-Nuare

F-value

Part 1

DIFFTE
(Difference in full-time equivalents, 89-95)
DIFMD
(Difference in full-time equivalents, doctors and
dentists, 89-95)
DIFRN
(Difference in full-time equivalents, registered
nurses, 89-95)

0.020

4.75****

0.026

4.49****

0.003

0.68

0.0 16

2.67***

0.034

8.24****

0.024

4. 1 1 ****

DIFLPN

0.0 1 3

3 .07***

0.0 1 5

2.62***

0.030

7. 1 9****

0.022

3 .69****

0.010

2.3 1 **

0.020

3 . 39****

0.005

1.21

0.0 1 7

2.90****

0.0 1 4

3.22***

0.005

0.80

0.03 1

7.55***

0.010

1.71*

0.007

1 .65

0.010

1.71*

0.026

6.26***

0.028

4.88****

0.084

20.33****

0.028

4.7 1 ****

. 0.02 1

4.65****

0.04 1

6.83****

0.025

5 . 8 1 ****

0.064

1 1 . 16****

0.02 1

4.68****

0.077

1 3 .29****

(Difference in full-time equivalents, licensed
practical nurses, 89-95)
DIFNURS
Difference in ratio of FfERN!(FI'ERN+FfELPN),
89-95
DlFAMB
(Difference in ambulatory visits, 89-95)
DlFSURG
(Difference in outpatient surgical procedures, 8995)
DlFPREV
(Difference in preventive service score, 89-95)
DIFBED
(Difference in staffed beds, 89-95)
DlFOCCRT
(Difference in occupancy rate, 89-95)
DlFCMI
(Difference in Medicare case-mix index, 89-95)
Part 2

CSTDAY5
(Cost per patient day, 95)
DlFCSTDY
(Difference in cost per day, 89-95)
CSTDISC5
(Cost per discharge, 95)
DlFCSTDS
(Difference in cost per discharge, 89-95)
*Slgnificant p < . 10 level
* * Significant p < .05 level
***Significant p < . 0 1 level
* * * *Significantp < .00 1 level

I I?

ColIinearity Diagnostics

In the multiple linear regression model, collinearity can occur when two or more
predictor variables display a very high correlation. Problems arise when collinear
variables offer redundant information and cause ambiguous regression results (Canavos
and Miller, 1 995). Appendices F and G display correlation statistics for the study' s
original set o f independent variables. For study purposes, a correlation value of .45 was
used to screen for potential collinearity among independent variables. A second method
used to confirm suspected collinearity was applied from the SAS regression procedure.
When two variables were found to be collinear, they were individually evaluated for their
statistical significance in the model as well as their theoretical and conceptual importance
to the study. In more complex cases, regression analysis was performed and results
reviewed to determine whether collinearity was distorting regression coefficients.
Because of the large number of variables already included in regression models and the
potential for collinearity, variables offering redundant information were not retained.
In Part 1, the following variables were immediately eliminated due to potential
problems in collinearity: MSASTGH9 (the number of short-term general hospitals in a
hospital ' s MSA), HHIPD89 (the Herfindahl

index calculated with patient days as market

share), CUMDIFF (the hospital-specific excess in mean survival over 1 80 days), and
BDTOT89 (the hospital' s number of staffed beds reported for 1 989). These eliminations
were fairly straightforward because their correlations were relatively high, and because
other measures in the study could provide similar, if not identical, information.
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Two sets of correlations in Part I posed more of a challenge. MAPP889,
indicating whether a hospital was a member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals,
correlated with ADC89 (average daily census ' 89), with an "r" value of 0.495 and p
value of . 000 1 . Collinearity was verified in the SAS regression procedure. A reasonable
discovery is that among the sample community hospitals, larger hospitals had a tendency
to include a teaching mission in their departmental activities. Since hospital size has
proven to be critical as a control variable, both in the literature and in the preliminary
analyses of this study, ADC89 was retained as an independent variable in the regression
model and MAPP889 was eliminated.
The second problem correlation occurred between MHSMEM89 (member of a
hospital system in ' 89) and LOCSYS89 (member of a hospital system shared by at least
one other hospital in the MSA in ' 89). Logic dictates that some redundancy exists in the
variability provided by these measures. The "r" value for their correlation was 0.498
with a p-value of . 000 1 . Again, the SAS regression procedure verified collinearity in
this relationship. Since the data collected for local system membership was more specific
and considered more relevant to hospital management decisions, the LOCSYS89 variable
was retained for regression analysis instead of the MHSMEM89 variable.
In Part 2, potential collinearity arose in correlations detected between the
following variables: DIFFTE (difference in FTEs) and DIFRN (difference in RN FTEs),
DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio) and DIFLPN (difference in LPN FTEs),
BDTOT95 (total staffed beds reported in ' 95) and ADC95 (average daily census in'95),
MAPP895 (membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals, '95)and ADC95 (average

1 19

daily census in '95), and HMCR_95 (Medicare portion of hospital discharges) and
HMCD_95 (Medicaid portion of hospital discharges).
The SAS procedure for detecting collinearity did not confirm loading problems
with all these variable pairs, however. In response to this information, the regression
model for Part 2 was run several times to test specific variable effects on parameter
estimates. A revised regression model for Part 2 was developed without the variables
DIFFTE (difference in total FTEs), DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio), BDTOT95
(total staffed beds reported in 1 995), and MAPP895 (membership in the Council of
Teaching Hospitals, '95). Variables for DIFRN (difference in RN FTEs), DIFLPN
(difference in LPN FTEs), HMCR_95 (Medicare portion of hospital discharges) and
HMCD_95 (Medicaid portion of hospital discharges) were retained for analysis.
In findings similar to Part 1 , the variables MHSMEM95 (member of a hospital
system, '95) and LOCSYS94 (member of a hospital system shared by at least one other
hospital in the MSA in '95) showed some degree of correlation (r=. 3 82, r=.000 1 ). In
order to maintain consistency and avoid collinearity, MHSMEM95 was deleted as a
predictor variable and LOCSYS94 was retained in the regression model for Part 2 .
Transformation o f Variables

All study variables were analyzed using the SAS univariate procedure. Tests for
normality appeared acceptable for all variables, with the exception of DIFMD (difference
in physician and dentist FTEs). This variable was found to be deficient. Subsequent
transformation of the DIFMD variable did not improve its normality nor its regression
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results. Since it was deemed unsuitable for the regression model, the variable DIFMD
was retained for ANOVA analysis only.
Preliminary regression analyses were performed, using revised models for Part I
and Part 2 as discussed. Residuals were plotted against the corresponding X-values to
test the first assumption of the regression model : that a linear association exists between
response and predictor variables. With the regression model appropriately applied,
residuals should exhibit no pattern when graphed against any variable. Secondly,
residuals were plotted against the predicted Y-values to test the second regression
assumption: that the error variance is constant (Canavos and Miller, 1 995).
Residual plots were acceptable for the most part; however all regressions did not
generate residuals with completely random errors. Further investigation identified
individual variables exhibiting regression model deficiencies.
After several trials, it was found that transformation of selected dependent and
independent variables would remedy these apparent violations of model assumptions.
The following dependent variables from Part 1 were transformed: DIFFTE (difference in
FTEs), DIFLPN (difference in LPN FTEs), DIFBED (difference in staffed beds),
DIF AMB

(difference in ambulatory visits), and DIFSURG (difference in outpatient

surgical procedures). Regression models were also improved with the transformation of
the following independent variables: HMOPEN89 (HMO penetration, ' 89) and
HIllD C89 (Herfindahl index for hospital discharges, ' 89). The transformation method
consisted of taking the square root of each variable' s absolute value, and then putting
back in its sign.
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With transformation of selected variables, desirable residual plots (with no
discernable pattern) were obtained for all regression models in Part 1 and Part 2. At this
point, the third and fourth regression assumptions were tested for each analysis
performed. These assumptions state that random errors are independent and normally
distributed (Canavos and Miller, 1 995). Residuals were analyzed with the SAS
univariate procedure, and their normality was found to be acceptable.
Model Estimations, Part 1

Tables 1 2 through 14 summarize model estimates and their significance for the
study' s ten dependent variables of change in Part 1 . All models have statistically
significant F-values.
Table 12 describes staffing statistics. The average change in hospital FTEs was a
positive one. Among the variables of interest, the HMO penetration rate carried a
negative association with DIFFTE. In a similar observation of change, the average
difference in RN FTEs was accomplished through adding personnel. HMO penetration
rate was also negatively associated with DIFRN. Hospital mortality ratio for 1 989 was
significant in the DIFRN regression as well, showing a positive association with
increased RN staff.
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Table 12. Standardized Estimates for Change in Hospital Staff

Variable

HMOPEN89t
HHIDC89t
CSTDISC9
MORTJO
ADC89
HMCR 89
HMCD 8 9
ALL89
CONPHY89
MNGT89
LOCSYS89
PUB
Intercept
R-square
Adj . R-square

Standardized
Estimate for
DIFFTEt
N= 1 8 1 6
-0.076 * * *
0.036
0.0 1 3
0.033
0. 1 1 9 * * * *
-0.089 * * * *
-0.002
0.036
0.014
0.005
-0.067 * * *
0. 066 * * *
0.000 *
0.056
0.050

Standardized
Estimate for
DIFRN
N= 1 8 1 8
-0.077 * * *
0. 004
0.001
0.085 * * * *
0.206 * * * *
-0.059 * *
0.030
-0.0 1 5
-0. 0 1 7
'
-7. 593 x 1 0·
-4
-5 . 1 58 x 1 0
0.082 * * * *
0.000
0.073
0.067

1 1 . 865 * * * *
8. 996 * * * *
F-ratio
Notes: t Vanable I S transformed through square root.

Standardized
Estimate for
DIFLPNt
N= 1 8 1 8
0. 008
-0.049 *
0.036
-0.032
-0.227 * * * *
-0. 0 1 I
-0. 023
-0.054 * *
-0. 024
-0.008
0.002
0.062 * *
0.000
0. 064
0.058
1 0 . 265 * * * *

Standardized
Estimate for
DIFNURS
N= 1 8 1 8
-0.052 *
0.01 7
-0. 0 1 4
0. 1 22 * * * *
0.00 1
0. 060 * *
0 .074 * * *
0 . 020
0. 007
0.05 1 * *
-0. 0 3 5
-0. 0 1 0
0 . 000
0.034
0 . 027
5 .232 * * *

* Significant p < . 10 level.
**Significant p < .05 level.
***Significant p < .01 level.
**** Significant p < .00 1 level.

The difference i n LPN FTEs, which was significant as a staff reduction, was
negatively associated with HHI , indicating that increased competition promoted change
in this area. The difference in hospital nursing ratios, significantly positive in the sample,
was negatively associated with HMO penetration rates and positively associated with
mortality rates.
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Therefore, these analyses show that when HMO penetration was relatively low
and poor performance was demonstrated through slightly higher mortality rates, sample
hospitals tended to change overall staff, and specifically add RN staff, between 1 989 and
1 994. The direction of change was to increase staff members, on the average. On the
other hand, conditions of a competitive market were associated with a movement toward
change (reduction) in the number of LPNs working in the sample hospitals during the
study period.
Among the control variables, ADC89 (average daily census) and PUB (public
ownership/control) displayed significant positive association with staff changes in FTEs,
RNs and LPNs; while HMCR_89 (Medicare portion of discharges) was negatively
associated with FTE and RN staff increases. The variable for hospital membership in a
local system was also negatively associated with overall change in hospital FTEs.
In regard to hospital capacity in Table 1 3 , the difference in hospital beds reflects a
significant reduction in staffed beds over the study period. The difference in beds
between 1 989 and 1 994 is positively associated with cost per discharge in 1 989.
Difference in occupancy rate, also a negative change on the average, is not significantly
associated with the variables of interest. Case-mix index in

1 994, which shows

a

significant increase over the study period, is positively associated with hospital cost per
discharge, HHI, and mortality rates in 1 989.
To interpret these results, poor performance factors in the form of relatively high
' 89 costs and high mortality rates were associated with a hospital ' s propensity to change
its bedsize and its case-mix index. Additionally, it appears that hospitals in a less
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competitive MSA, with fewer HMO enrollees, were more prone experience change in
their occupancy rates over the study period. One may observe that reduction of beds and
reduction of occupancy rate constituted the general direction of change. Finally, low
competition (in the form of a higher HHI) was associated with a higher change in CM!,
consisting of an overall movement toward more complex cases.
Among the control variables, average daily census showed strong negative
association with hospital cuts in beds and occupancy rate, suggesting that hospitals with
smaller patient volumes were more prone to make these changes in capacity. The
proportion of Medicare and Medicaid patients carried a significant negative association
with the upward shift in hospital case-mix index, indicating that cases from other
insurance sources were becoming more complex over the study period.
Table 13. Standardized Estimates for Change in Hospital Capacity.
Variable
DIFBEDt N- 1 8 1 8
-0.043
-0.035
0.066***
0.029
-0.096****
-0.006
0.044*
-0.033
0.032
0.024
-0.036
0.046*
0.000
0.023
0.0 1 7
3. 586****

HMOPEN89t
HHIDC89t
CSTDISC9
MORT30
ADC89
HMCR 89
HMCD 89
ALL89
CONPHY89
MNGT89
LOCSYS89
PUB
Intercept
R-square
Adj. R-square
F-ratio

Notes: t Vanable

IS

transformed through square root.

* Significant p < . 10 level.
**Significant p < 05 level.
** * Significant p < .0 I level.
****Significant p < .00 1 level.
.

Standardized Estimate for
DIFOCCRT N; 1 8 1 8
-0.044**
0.046
0.0 1 8
0.0 1 1
-0.061 **
0.038
0.020
0.002
-0.040
-0.0 1 8
-0.035
-0.002
0.000**
0.020
0.0 1 3
2.990****

DIFCMIN; 1 8 1 7
0.002
0.082***
0. 1 40** * *
0.045**
0.3 14****
-0.049**
-0.047**
0.004
-0.0 1 3
-0. 0 1 8
0.005
-0.036
0.000*
0. 143
0. 1 3 8
25. 1 39****
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Table 1 4 displays the results o f regression analysis between ambulatory workload
and independent study variables. Changes in hospital preventive service scores, which
had significantly decreased between 1 989 and 1 994, are negatively associated with HMO
penetration rates. The variable measuring difference in ambulatory visits, which
generally increased over the study period, displays a positive association with HHI and a
negative association with HMO penetration. The difference in surgical procedures,
DIFSURG, increased among the sample hospitals, shows a negative association with
HMO penetration rate.
Table 14. Standardized Estimates for Change in Hospital Ambulatory Workload .
Variable
HMOPEN89t
HHlDC89t
CSTDISC9
MORT30
ADC89
HMCR 89
HMCD 89
ALL89
CONPHY89
MNGT89
LOCSYS89
FP89
Intercept
R-square
Adj. R-square
F-ratio

DIFPREV N- 1 8 1 8
-0.094···
-0.039
0.0 1 2
0.002
0.046
0.020
-0.046·
-0.0 1 3
-0.044·
-0.038
-0.032
-0.046·
0.000
0.0 1 7
0.010
2.554**

Standardized Estimate for
DIFAMBt N- 1 8 1 6
DIFSURGt N- 1 8 1 7
-0.056··
-0.060··
0.060··
0.0 1 3
0.0 1 l
-0.0 10
-0.002
-0.0 1 1
0.236····
0. 174····
-0.062··
-0. 123·· · ·
-0.042·
-0.095····
0.057··
-0.035
0.019
-0.007
0.005
-0.007
-0.017
-0.072···
-0.488*
-0.069·"
0.000···
0.000···*
0.090
0.07 1
0.084
0.065
14.896·*··
1 1 .5 1 1....

Notes : t Vanable IS transformed through square root.
·Significant p < . 10 level.
· · Significant p < .05 level.
*.·Significant p < .01 level.
• • • ·Significant p < .00 1 level.

These results indicate that hospitals in areas with less HMO penetration were
more prone to change their preventive services, often by removing some of the measured
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services. Additionally, these hospitals showed more change in their ambulatory visits
and surgical procedures during the 1 989- 1 994 interval. Furthermore, less competition in
the MSA was associated with greater increase in ambulatory visits during the study
period.
Control variables display several notable associations. Average daily census, the
variable indicator for hospital size, is positively associated with changes in ambulatory
and outpatient surgical workload. Medicare and Medicaid patient volumes are negatively
associated with expansion in ambulatory services. Results also indicate a negative
relationship between hospitals' local system membership status and their associated
increase in ambulatory workload. Additionally, for-profit ownership is negatively
associated with hospital change in ambulatory services during the study period.
Results o f Interaction Models, Part 1

Regression analysis was performed for the interaction models proposed in Part 1 .
Results from this series of analyses are listed in Appendix H. Generally, results from
regressions using interaction terms were similar to their independent variable
counterparts. One important exception was found: the interaction between cost per
discharge in 1 989 and competition (CSTDISC9*HHIDC) displays a significant positive
relationship with the dependent variable for difference in ambulatory visits
(DIFAMB(T» .
Model Estimations, Part 2 .

Table 1 5 summarizes regression results for Part 2, where dependent variables for
hospital financial performance are analyzed against independent variables of environment
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and change from Part 1. The dependent variables are DIFCSTDY (difference in cost per
patient day) and DIFCSTDS (difference in cost per discharge). Each model is run twice
in order to include dichotomous variables for ownership/control, PUB5 (public hospital)
and FP95 (for-profit ownership). All four regression models display significant results.
For interpretation purposes, low values for DIFCSTDY and DIFCSTDS are
considered good performance. The variable DIFCSTDY is significantly associated with
several independent variables. Positive associations occur with DIFRN and DIFLPN(T).
Negative associations occur between DIFCSTDY and the variables DIFBED(T),
DIFOCCRT, and DIFCMI. These relationships carry a p-value of 0.05 or lower.
These results indicate that hospitals which did not change their RN or LPN FTEs
between 1 989 and 1 994 were associated with good performance in 1 995. Additionally,
those hospitals which experienced change in bedsize, occupancy rate and case-mix index
were associated with good performance.
The independent variable for cost per discharge in 1 989 is negatively associated
with all four of the dependent financial variables, suggesting that hospitals with a history
of high costs were more likely to control their growth in spending from 1 989 to 1 99 5 .
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Table 1 5. Estimates of Hospital Performance.

Variable

DIFRN
DIFLPNt
DIFAMBt
DIFSURGt
DIFPREV
DIFBEDt
DIFOCCRT
DIFCMI
HMOPEN89t
HHIDC89t
CSTDISC9
MORTJO
ADC95
HMCR 95
HMCD 95
SUNlTS95
ALL95
MNGT95
LOCSYS94
PUB95
FP95
Intercept
R-square

Standardized
Estimate,
Difference in
Cost Per Day
N= 1 767

Standardized
Estimate,
Difference in
Cost Per Day
N= 1 767

0.074 * * *
0.055 * *
0.014
-0.0 1 3
0.020
-0.267 * * * *
-0.258 * * * *
-0. 1 27 * * * *
0.0 1 0
0.040
-0.236 * * * *
0. 024
-0. 009
0.0 1 6
0.099 * * * *
-0. 074 * * * *
0.053 * *
0.046 * *
-0. 042 *

0.069 * * *
0.05 1 * *
0.0 1 9
-0.0 1 0
0.025
-0.275 * * * *
-0.260 * * * *
-0. 1 27 * * * *

-0.095 * * * *
0. 000 * * * *
0.22 1

0. 0 1 6
0.033
-0.260 * * * *
0.02 1
0.0 1 5
0.026
0.089 * * * *
-0.080 * * * *
0.068 * * *
0.049 * *
-0.054 * *
0.060 * * *

0.000 * * * *
0.2 1 8
0.208
0.212
Adjusted R-square
24.280 * * * *
24. 826 * * * *
F value
Notes : t Vanable I S transformed through square root.

Standardized
Estimate,
Difference in
Cost Per
Discharge
N= 1 767
0.050 * *
0.0 1 2
-0.034
-0.055 * *
0.0 1 3
-0.006
0.048 * *
-0.053 * *
-0.022
0.040
-0. 3 5 3 * * * *
0.004
0.050 *
0.078 * * *
0.07 1 * * *
0.007
0.004
0.059 * * *
-0.065 * * *
-0. 1 5 5 * * * *
0.000 * * * *
0.220
0.207
24.007 * * * *

Standardized
Estimate,
Difference in
Cost Per
Discharge
N= 1 767
0.039 *
0 . 002
-0 . 026
-0.050 * *
0 . 02 1
-0. 0 1 9
0 . 043 *
-0.052 * *
-0 . 0 1 0
0 . 023
-0. 3 9 5 * * * *
-0. 005
0 . 09 1 * * * *
0 . 099 * * * *
0 . 047 *
-0. 002
0 . 026
0 . 06 1 * * *
-0.078 * * * *
0. 1 56 * * * *
0. 000 * * * *
0.2 1 9
0.2 1 0
24.462 * * * *

* Significant p < . 10 level.
**Significant p < .05 level.
***Significant p < .01 level.
**** Significant p < .00 1 level.

In Table 1 5, the variable DIFCSTDS i s positively associated with the variables
DIFRN and DIFOCCRT; and negatively associated with the variables DIFSURG(T),
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DIFCMI, and CSTDISC9. All of these variable relationships are significant to at least a
0.05 level .
To interpret these statistics, hospitals which did not change their staff RN FTEs or
occupancy patterns are associated with good performance in controlling cost per
discharge. Also, hospitals which did change their workload in the form of outpatient
surgical procedures are associated with good performance. Hospitals with smaller
change to occupancy rates over the study period are associated with lower difference in
cost per discharge in 1 995. Finally, hospitals experiencing a relatively large change in
CMI are associated with good financial performance over the study period.
When the dependent variable is difference in cost per discharge (generally
reflecting an increase between 1 989 and 1 995), hospitals showing high costs in ' 89
appear to have contained their cost growth during the study period. . In the area of poor
performance, changes to increase staff, and specifically RNs, are associated with higher
hospital cost" differences over time. Decreasing occupancy rate is associated with bad
performance, a result which differs from analysis measuring cost per patient day.
Alternatively, increasing outpatient surgical procedures and increasing case complexity
are associated with reducing operational costs.
Control variables in these regressions are particularly noteworthy. The proportion
of Medicare patients is significantly associated with growth in cost per discharge. The
proportion of Medicaid patients is positively associated with both dependent variables,
indicating poor performance outcomes in hospitals with more Medicaid patients. The
SUNITS95 variable for nursing home capability is negatively associated with
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DIFCSTDY, suggesting that those hospitals which adopted a nursing home service
controlled their costs better than those which did not.
Under the category of external affiliations, the variable ALL95 is positively
associated with DIFCSTDY, an indicator for poor financial performance. Those
hospitals which were contract managed are also positively associated with the
DIFCSTDY and DIFCSTDS variables, suggesting poor performance. In contrast,
hospitals in local systems are significantly associated with good performance through
their negative regression estimates with both financial variables.
Of particular interest among the control variables, public hospitals are
significantly associated with the dependent cost variables in a positive direction,
indicating poor cost performance. For-profit hospitals have a significant association in a
negative direction, indicating hospitals with good cost performance.
Summary of Findings in Comparison to Study Hypotheses

Tables 1 6 and 1 7 review general aspects of the hypothesized and observed
relationships between variables of interest in the study. Only associations with statistical
significance (p-value of 0. 1 0 or less) are listed. The change variables in Part 1 and Part 2
are interpreted in reference to the magnitude of their change (small to large) as well as the
direction. The variables DIFBED and DIFOCCRT were hypothesized and observed as
reductions, while DIFRN was originally hypothesized as a reduction and observed as an
increase. Other change variables were observed as increases, with the exception of
DIFPREY. This variable was expected to increase, but it was observed to decrease over
the period of study.
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Table 16. Comparison of Hypothesized and Observed Variable Relationships, Part 1 .

Dependent
Variables of
Change
DIFMD
DIFRN

HMOPEN89

HHIDC89

CSTDISC9

+
Supported, but
opposite of
the
hypothesized
direction

-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction

DIFAMB

-

Supported,
but opposite
of the
hypothesized
direction
DIFSURG

MORT3 0

+
Supported, but
opposite of the
hypothesized
direction

-

Supported,
but opposite
of the
hypothesized
direction
DIFPREV

-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction
+
Supported in
hypothesized
direction

DIFBED

DIFOCCRT

-

Supported,
but opposite
of the
hypothesized
direction
DIFCMI

+
Supported, but
opposite of the
hypothesized
direction

+
Supported in
hypothesized
direction

+
Supported in
hypothesized
direction
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Table 1 7. Comparison o f Hypothesized and Observed Variable Relationships, Part 2.

a.
Dependent
Variables
DIFCSTDY

DIFSURG

DIFRN
+

-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction
DIFCSTDS

DIFBED

Supported in
hypothesized direction

+

-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction

Supported in
hypothesized
direction

DIFOCCRT

DIFCMl

b.

Depel).dent
Variables
DIFCSTDY

-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction
DIFCSTDS

+

Supported, but
opposite of the
hypothesized
direction

C STDISC9
-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction
-

Supported in
hypothesized
direction

-

Supported in
hypothesized direction
-

Supported in
hypothesized direction

CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION
This chapter discusses the study' s hypotheses and how they compare to
significant relationships observed between selected variables. Research questions are
revisited in reference to analysis and broader study implications for health services
management. Limitations of the study are discussed. Future research projects are
suggested, based upon findings from this study.
Hypothesis Testing and Interpretation

Regression models in Part 1 indicate that HMO penetration in 1 989 was
significantly associated with sample hospitals that did not make changes. Specifically,
hospitals involved with managed care appear to have kept their RN FTEs relatively stable
and did not add ambulatory visits, outpatient surgical procedures, or additional preventive
services. This series of observations is in opposition to Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 . It was
hypothesized that HMO penetration would stimulate reduction in RNs and growth in
outpatient services.
In considering the RN staffing hypothesis, however, the observed results bear
some relation to the original hypothesis in respect to curbing growth. In other words,
hospitals located in areas of high HMO penetration did not expand their RN staff between
1 989 and 1 994, in contrast to the trend observed in other institutions. It is possible that
surveys of staff reductions after 1 990 would have supported Hypothesis 1 in terms of
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actual reductions in nursing personnel, because additional RN staff in the year 1 989 may
have offset overall reductions taken later in the study period.
In the area of hospital performance, mortality ratios have a positive association
with RN staffing changes, supporting Hypothesis 1, yet reversing the expected direction.
Since mortality is a measure of quality and cost per discharge is a measure of financial
success, it seems reasonable that these performance variables display opposite
relationships with hospital change in RN staff. Unfortunately, the financial variable is
not significant in regression testing for DIFRN.
A possible explanation for results in outpatient services is that hospitals greatly
involved in HMO contracting were not focused on expanding their outpatient utilization.
In fact, HMO contractors might seek inpatient services exclusively from hospitals, and
obtain ambulatory services elsewhere. On the other end of the spectrum, those
community hospitals which had not experienced an influx of HMO opportunities were
free to develop product lines other than acute inpatient care.
It was hypothesized that hospitals in areas of high HMO penetration would
experience a reduction in their patient occupancy rates, presumably due to more emphasis
on outpatient procedures in the managed care environment. On the contrary, study
results indicate that hospitals in areas of low HMO penetration were the most likely to
see a reduction in occupancy rates. Once again, the arrival of HMO organizations
appears to have stabilized hospital utilization rather than stimulated monumental change.
Hypotheses that market competition would promote hospital change were
supported in association with variables for difference in ambulatory services and case-
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m i x index, but the directions o f these relationships were not a s expected. According to
these results, conditions of greater competition were associated with hospitals which did
not raise their ambulatory workload over the study period. Possibly, these hospitals
responded to competition in other ways, such as emphasizing core inpatient services.
Maintaining a more sedentary case-mix index may have been another method for
competitive hospitals to "stick to what they know," instead of venturing into more
complex and extraordinary treatment regimens. With the onset of greater technological
capabilities and DRG reimbursement practices, hospitals which were somewhat
unchallenged in their MSA were more prone to produce a more complex patient episode.
The transition to a higher case-mix index was also displayed, as hypothesized, in
hospitals experiencing poor performance in 1 989. The variables for cost per discharge
and mortality ratio exhibit significant associations with change in case-mix index in Part
1 . These results are supportive of the theoretical framework linking poor performance
with organizational predilection for change in structure.
Further empirical support for structural contingency theory is found in the
positive significant relationship between hospital cost per discharge and subsequent
change in bedsize. Higher costs in 1 989 are as sociated with hospitals' reduction in bed
capacity between 1 989 and 1 994.
In Part 2, several significant associations are found between dependent variables
of cost and the independent variables of hospital change. Hospitals which changed their
staffing by adding RN FTEs were associated with higher costs, including difference in
cost per patient day and difference in cost per discharge. This finding is in support of
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Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 5 is supported with respect to outpatient surgeries only:
hospitals which succeeded in expanding their outpatient surgeries were associated with
lower costs. Changes in preventive services and ambulatory visits did not show
significant relationships to the dependent cost variables.
Hypothesis 6, regarding the association between change in hospital capacity and
good performance, is extensively supported. Signifi cant relationships are found between
bed reductions and desirable cost performance. Hospitals with greater increases in case
mix index were also associated with lower cost differences, both in cost per patient day
and cost per discharge.
In reference to Hypothesis 6, hospitals which experienced greatly reduced
occupancy rates exhibited mixed results with dependent financial variables. In these
models, reduced occupancy was associated with good performance in cost per patient day
and poor performance in cost per discharge. Although patient length of stay was not
measured, descriptive statistics indicate that average occupancy rate decreased and
average case-mix index increased over the study period. If occupancy rate was reduced
by eliminating unnecessary hospitalizations and retaining inpatients in need of more
complex services, then improved control over cost per patient day could possibly coexist
with higher cost per patient discharge.
In Part 1, 1 1 statistically significant relationships are detected among a total of 3 2
hypothesized associations. Five of these associations are in the expected direction. Of
the 14 variable relationships hypothesized in Part 2, 7 associations are confirmed in the
expected direction, and one is supported in the opposite direction from expected.
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I t i s also found that hospitals with higher cost per discharge figures i n 1 989 were
significantly associated with better cost performance, or lower cost increases, over the
study period. This result is in support of the SARFIT theory, where previous poor
performance stimulates structural response and improved performance on the part of the
organization.
Responses to Research Questions

This study presents three basic research questions. The first question is whether
community hospitals exhibited significant structural change in the years following the
implementation of Medicare prospective payment practices. Descriptive statistics for
change variables indicate that change did indeed occur: in staff size, outpatient services
and hospital capacity. The direction of change was not always as expected, however.
Instead of reducing RN FTEs, the average trend was for hospitals to add RNs to the staff.
Additionally, results indicate that community hospitals did not expand preventive
services. For the services measured, the average change was to eliminate preventive
health programs.
The second research question searches for the strongest environmental influences
on structural changes within the community hospitals. In comparing HM:O enrollment
(as an indicator of managed care penetration) with the Herfindahl index of market
competition, results suggest that managed care is a prominent force in keeping internal
hospital structure stable. It seems evident that with the establishment of managed care
insurance sources, community hospitals are being relegated to a specific acute-care
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capacity, rather than the regional health center that was envisioned by a few industry
analysts.
Consistent with the SARFIT contingency theory, variables for poor past
performance show significant positive relationships with structural variables in the study.
In other words, past performance may be considered a substantial influence in promoting
structural change in hospitals.
The third research question seeks to link organizational change with subsequent
performance. The study carries some empirical evidence that, at least from an economic
standpoint, community hospitals which conducted specific changes in ambulatory
services and inpatient capacity were found to be better performers over a defined period
of time ( 1 989- 1 995).
Theoretical Implications

The SARFIT (Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit) theory was solidly supported
with regard to the inclusion of poor past performance as a substantial factor in promoting
structural change among hospitals. However, the theoretical relationship between
interaction effects and structural change was supported in just one application. In that
test, a variable for hospital cost per discharge '89 interacted with the corresponding
Herfindahl value for market competition. Their interaction held a stronger effect upon
difference in ambulatory visits than the cost per discharge variable alone.
Of the three elements of hospital structure selected for the study, professionalism
and inpatient capacity were more consistently related to the other theoretical constructs.
Although hospital change in ambulatory and preventive services can be accurately
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measured, in this study outpatient service scope was not successfully linked with the
managed care environment.
Implications for Health Services Management

The results o f this study indicate that hospitals have indeed begun t o make
internal changes in response to the managed care revolution. However, the direction of
these changes was not always in accordance with study expectations.
In this sample of community hospitals, HMO penetration was significantly
associated with more change variables than market competition. In the hospital
environment, competition for acute care patients has been fairly stable. Recently, post
PPS challenges for various ambulatory services have appeared from other sources, such
as clinics, doctors' offices, laboratories, and home health care agencies (HCIA, 1 995).
Managed care is a relatively new phenomenon as well. A longitudinal look at both
market competition and managed care penetration could possibly reveal more about
hospital response to contingencies.
In summary, the community hospital was expected to become more things to
more people in order to survive. The reasoning was that the managed care system
deliv er s health at all levels, not just the traditional

acute care episode. In one scenario,

hospitals could be expected to expand in ambulatory and preventive services in support
of the HMO concept. In an alternative scenario, hospitals would be splintered off as
smaller pieces of an integrated network of patient care.
This study found that higher HMO penetration brought some stability in hospital
nursing staffs. Possibly, hospitals involved with managed care found that HMO contracts

140

brought more predictable workload requirements. Additionally, hospitals located in areas
with high HMO penetration almost exclusively maintained their acute-care inpatient
focus. Clearly, study results suggest that the future direction for community hospitals is
to move from the center to the periphery of the health care spectrum.
In relation to hospital performance, reduction in utilization was beneficial to
facility costs per patient day, but damaging to costs per patient discharge. Assuming that
future reimbursements will be made according to the individual admission rather than by
the patient ' s length of stay, full utilization of the facility will become desirable in the
future.
Although study models in Part 1 showed limited support for the SARFIT
suggestion of interaction in structural readjustment, independent variables representing
the contingency (HMO penetration), environmental illiberality (HHI) and past
performance (mortality at 30 days) demonstrated significant associations with the
hospitals' propensity for change. Further application of the SARFIT theory and
refinement of test models could possibly provide more insight into hospital change in
staffing patterns and capacity.
The initial sample of community hospitals was selected based on specific stand
alone properties. These hospitals were not units of larger institutions, nor did they
include nursing home services. With 568 1 general medical and surgical hospitals in the
AHA survey base for 1 989, the study sample comprised approximately 3 1 % of the total,
with specific features as stated above.
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Therefore, the generalization o f study results t o a larger population o f American
hospitals should only take place with these features in mind. Additionally, study results
confirm the dynamic nature of acquisitions and mergers among hospitals (HeIA, 1 995),
indicating a trend toward "systemness." In the future, the loss of a unique identity will
probably render the stand-alone local hospital extinct.
Study Limitations

The most prominent limitation to the study is loss of the initial 255 hospitals in
the original population. These hospitals underwent the ultimate structural change by
losing their identity between 1 989 and 1 995. This loss occurred through hospital closure,
merging with other hospitals or occasionally by demerging into smaller organizational
units. The remaining population held some bias with respect to representation in region,
ownership/control, and bedsize.
In the New England region, for example, the expected number of attritions was 1 6
hospitals, but the actual number was 28 hospitals. While 1 5 state or county hospitals
were expected to be lost to the population, only 6 actually disappeared. In the category of
size, more of the smallest hospitals (6-24 beds) were lost while larger-sized hospitals
(3 00-399 beds) were retained beyond their proportionate predictions.

Other limitations to the study are related to variable measurements and their
i mprecision as indicators in the models. A second source of error is the aggregation of
county data into MSA market areas. Thirdly, missing data necessitated reduced sample
sizes and occasional substitutions in measurement. The effects of these limitations are
variable in themselves; and in some instances they are offset by the panel study design or
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the large sample size. A fourth limiting element in the analysis is the absence of data
regarding the relationship between medical staff and their hospitals.
The study measure for HMO penetration, which was the number of HMO
enrollees per population (in 1 00s), is somewhat nonspecific to the dependent variable of
hospital change. In other words, a more ideal measure would be more directly related to
hospital issues. Examples of more accurate measures are the proportion of discharges
who were enrolled in HMOs, or the number and size of HMO contracts held by sample
hospitals.
The range of the study' S variable for HMO penetration was 0% to 1 27. 8%, rather
than 0% to 1 00. 0010. This statistical artifact is due to Interstudy reporting methods.
According to Interstudy, all membership for a particular HMO is included in the county
where the HMO address is located. HMO enrollees could actually be located in
surrounding counties (Area Resources File, 1 996). Furthermore, Interstudy data did not
report HMO addresses prior to 1 99 1 , thereby allowing for possible inaccuracy in HMO
enrollment figures.
The study' s aggregation of county HMO enrollment data to the MSA level served
to alleviate, but not eliminate, these sources of bias.

The single MSA where HMO

penetration reached the maximum value ( 1 27 . 8%) was Los Angeles, where HMO
concentration is historically dense. Other MSAs carried an HMO penetration rate of
1 00%. They were located in the San Francisco Bay Area, also highly infused with
managed care plans.
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The study variable for market competition, HHI , utilized hospital share of
admissions for nonfederal medical-surgical hospitals in every MSA. Other competitors
for ambulatory care, such as freestanding clinics, laboratories, doctors' offices, and home
health services, were not accounted for. Greater detail in the assessment of the health
services market might have allowed for more significant findings in the formulated
models of change.
The aggregation of HMO penetration and market competition data to the MSA
level had positive and negative effects upon the study' s results. Primarily, the
combination of geographic information from multiple counties eliminated the error
associated with patients who cross county lines in order to obtain medical care.
Secondly, the study was concerned with competition inside urban centers of health care
delivery, and so MSA assignments were appropriate. Problems arise, however, when
MSAs are too big to adequately represent the travel distance between potential patients
and the sample hospitals. For example, the MSA for Washington D . C. includes
Baltimore and all areas in between. Geographic measures for local hospital markets have
been developed in more detail (Phibbs and Robinson, 1 993), and would probably present
a more specific picture of the sample hospitals.
When particular data were unavailable for a target year, the closest possible data
set was substituted. Specifically, hospital cost figures from 1 995 were adjusted with their
1 994 case-mix index. The variable for each hospital' s local system membership was
collected from 1 994 survey data in place of 1 995 data. Data sources for mortality rates
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had been discontinued since 1 992, and no substitutes were found. Similarly, the control
variable for hospital contracting of a physician liaison was discontinued since 1 993 .
Although other data sets were present and appropriate for the timeframe of the
study, missing observations degraded the financial analysis to a minor extent. Out of
1 882 hospitals retained in the sample, only 1 767 were analyzed due to missing data
elements. Many of the missing observations were in HCFA' s cost data, however AHA
had some observations missing in the categorical control variables. A relatively large
sample size allows for study conclusions to be made despite these imperfections.
An interesting problem arose when the variable DIFMD was not found suitable
for regression analysis. Lack of information regarding the hospital ' s medical staff
remains an important limitation. Admittedly, the physicians and dentists who were
hospital employees could not be considered as proxies for independent medical
practitioners. However, the increase in medical FTEs was being investigated to
determine whether hospital employment was a viable option for physician-managers.
These individuals were professionals who could help manage decision-making among the
medical staff. The variable indicating a contracted position for a physician liaison is the
only measure for physician involvement in the regression models.
Study Population Compared to National Hospital Trends

Several important national trends faced hospitals just prior to 1 994. Prominent
issues included concern over health care expenditures, the steady rise of uninsured
Americans, and projected expenses from Medicare and Medicaid, where beneficiary
populations were growing as well. Concurrently, the health care industry was forming
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integrated networks, ambulatory care centers, and home-based alternatives to hospital
stays. At the local level, many hospitals went through activities with mergers, HMO
alliances, and PHO (physician-hospital organization) formation (HCIA, 1 995).
From a broad sample of more than 4000 hospitals, HCIA ( 1 995) reported that by
1 994 inpatient utilization continued to decline, with an average occupancy rate of 46%.
Hospital profitability was rising, however, and hospital staffing levels were being
curtailed. The combined portion of Medicare and Medicaid patients discharged from the
typical U . S . hospital reached 5 5 . 7%, up 7.3% from 1 990.
Some of these trends are reflected in the sample hospitals, where the occupancy
rate fell from 63% in 1 989 to 5<)010 in 1 994. A close resemblance occurs in the samp le ' s
combined Medicare and Medicaid statistic of 5 3 . 6% i n 1 995. Also a close match, the
average cost per discharge in the HCIA survey for 1 994 (wage and case-mix adj u sted)
was $3 924. Hospitals in the study sample reported an average 1 995 figure of $ 3 8 7 1 .
Unlike HCIA' s summation of hospital trends, the study at hand finds limited
evidence of reduced staffing. Across the nation and probably across the sample, the
greatest reduction in hospital FTEs occurred after 1 990, only partially offsetting increases
in 1 989 and 1 990. Since the study period includes 1989 to 1 994, some staffing changes

apparently cancel each other out. This understanding makes the prominence of staff
increases even more powerful in the study.
Future Research Projects

Since this study could best be described as an exploratory one, possibilities in
further investigations are numerous. For example, a separate analysis could examine the
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attrition set of hospitals, and determine what environmental factors caused closure or
merging behaviors. With the current study as a base, a more extensive model for hospital
fit could be developed and empirically tested. A shift in the period analyzed, to 1 99 1 1 996, could also provide more definitive results with regard to the hypothesized change
in staffing patterns.
In another direction, the elements of the current study could be applied to a larger
hospital sample, including hospital units acting as subsidiaries. Although previous
research has compared hospital performance on the basis of control and ownership, this
study' S elements are clearly applicable to hospital performance evaluation under
changing environmental pressures.
In an ideal study, the constant shifts and alliances in hospital organizations could
be controlled in order to analyze their performance over time. This study and its
references also illustrate the importance of medical insurance sources in the structural
responses of health service managers.
The economic impact of an inpatient stay cannot be denied in terms of national
health care expenditures. This study has provided interesting evidence that the presence
of managed care insurance has actuall y frozen community hospitals into their acute-care
role. Yes, hospitals are changing; and yet in this study period their approach toward
internal organization has stayed curiously the same.
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Appendix A: HCFA Diagnostic and Procedure Codes (DAPCD) *

DAPCD

NAME

OVERALL
00
01
ACUTE MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION
CONGESTIVE HEART FAILURE
02
PNEUMONIA / INFLUENZA
03
04
CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE PULMONARY DISEASE
TRANSIENT CEREBRAL ISCHEMIA
05
STROKE
06
FRACTURE OF NECK OF FEMUR
07
SEPSIS
08
ANGIOPLASTY
09
CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT
10
INITIAL PACEMAKER INSERTION
11
CAROTID ENDARTERECTOMY
12
HIP REPLACEMENT / REVISION
13
14
OPEN REDUCTION OF FRACTURED FEMUR
PROSTATECTOMY
15
CHOLECYSTECTOMY
16
HYSTERECTOMY
17
* Source: HCFA Public Use Files, MORTAL90.
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Appendix B: Scoring Method for Hospital Preventive Services, Variable DIFPREV

Survey results for five hospital services were combined into a 1 989 composite
score. These services were patient education, fitness center, women' s health
center/services, occupational health services, and comprehensive geriatric assessment. If
a service was reported as hospital-based in 1 989, then the composite score was increased
by a factor of 1 . The maximum possible score was 5 and the minimum possible score
was O.
For the survey year 1 994, similar information was collected for patient education
center, fitness center, women' s health center/services, occupational health services, and
geriatric services. If the hospital or a subsidiary provided the service, then the composite
score was again increased by 1 . Once again, the maximum possible score was 5 and the
minimum possible score was O.
The variable DIFPREV was obtained by subtracting the 1 989 composite score
from the 1 994 composite score. The maximum possible value for DIFPREV was 5 and
the minimum possible value was -5 .
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Appendix C: AHA Region Codes, 1 989

Region 1 (New England)

Region 2 (Mid-Atlantic)

Region 3 (South Atlantic)

Region 4 (East North Central)
Region 5 (East South Central)
Region 6 (West North Central)

Region 7 (West South Central)
Region 8 (Mountain)

Region 9 (Pacific)

Maine New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
District of Columbia
Virginia
West Virginia
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Kentucky
Tennessee
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
Arkansas
Louisiana
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
Washington
Oregon
California

Rhode Island
Connecticut

North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Michigan
Wisconsin
Alabama
Mississippi
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
Oklahoma
Texas
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Alaska
Hawaii

Appendix D: Correlation between Dependent and Independent Variables, Part 1
Independent
Variable
HMOPEN89
HHIDC89
HHIPD89
MSASTGH9
CSTDAY9
CSTDISC9
MORT30
CUMDIFF
BDTOT89
ADC89
HMCR_89
HMCD_89
ALL89
CONPHY
LOCSYS89
MAPP889
MHSMEM89
MNGT89

DIFFTE

DIFMD

DIFRN

DIFLPN

DIFNURS

DIFAMB

DIFSURG

DIFPREV

DIFBED

DIFOCCRT

DIFCMI

-0.027
0.02 1
0.02 1
-0.04 1
0.040
0.096
0.036
-0.032
0.248
0.262
-0. 155
0.082
0.095
0.083
-0.088
0. 1 67
-0.036
-0.039

0.05 1
-0.030
-0.030
0.022
0.002
-0.00 1
-0. 0 1 2
0.0 1 3
0.028
0.033
-0.045
0.0 1 5
0. 102
0. 1 14
-0.027
0.084
0.020
-0.033

-0.067
0.0 1 3
0.0 1 3
-0.043
0.03 1
0.056
0.076
-0.078
0.217
0.224
-0. 1 25
0. 103
0.036
0.036
.,0.043
0. 104
-0.005
-0.0 1 5

0.058
-0.038
-0.038
0.054
0.062
-0.043
0.008
-0.005
-0.266
-0.258
0.05 1
-0.034
-0. 134
-0. 1 18
0.03 1
-0.084
0.000
0.050

-0.092
0.058
0.058
-0.086
-0.0 1 3
-0.036
0. 1 2 3
-0.092
-0.026
-0.030
0.03 1
0.066
0.000
-0.0 1 2
-0.030
-0.082
-0.058
0.06 1

-0.004
0.024
0.024
-0.039
-0.052
0.055
-0.040
0.038
0.244
0.250
-0.084
0.036
0. 1 10
0. 1 4 1
-0. 1 26
0.206
-0.064
-0.058

-0.025
-0.004
-0.004
-0.00 1
-0.00 1
0.D38
-0.04 1
0.056
0.275
0.275
-0. 132
-0.026
0. 1 54
0. 1 18
-0.058
0. 153
0.033
-0.092

-0.070
0.022
0.02 1
-0.009
-0.008
0.0 14
-0.006
0.006
0.024
0.037
0.034
-0.040
0.022
-0.027
-0.047
0.02 1
-0.04 1
-0.044

-0.036
-0.006
-0.007
-0.002
0.080
0.034
0.036
-0.042
-0. 160
-0.092
0.028
0.054
-0.065
-0.000
-0.027
-0.032
-0.032
0.049

-0.073
0.096
0.096
-0.050
0. 106
-0.006
0.034
-0.022
-0.004
-0.076
0.067
0.007
-0.007
-0.038
-0.062
-0.003
-0.039
-0.006

-0.010
0.0 1 1 .
0.0 1 1
-0.044
0. 1 1 2
0.208
-0. 0 1 8
0.016
0.350
0.339
-0. 102
-0.00 1
0. 108
0.095
-0.004
0.209
0.076
-0.088

�

Appendix E: Correlation between Dependent and Independent Variables, Part 2

Independent Variable
DIFFfE
DIFMD
DIFRN
DIFLPN
DIFNURS
DIFAMB
DIFSURG
DIFPREV
DIFBED
DIFOCCRT
DIFCMI
HMOPEN89
HHIDC89
HHIPD89
MSASTGH9
CSTDAY9
CSTDISC9
MORT30
CUMDIFF
BDTOT95
ADC95
HMCR_95
HMCD-95
ALL95
LOCSYS94
MAPP895
MHSMEM95
MNGT95
SUNITS95

CSTDAY5
0.026
-0. 0 1 2
0.010
0.038
0.006
-0. 0 1 3
-0.040
-0.014
-0. 105
-0.082
-0.096
-0. 0 1 7
0.096
. 0.096
-0.084
0.283
0.029
0.085
-0.064
-0. 1 56
-0. 175
-O. 1 l9
0.084
0.037
-0. 0 1 2
0.047
-0. 0 1 3
0.080
-0. 134

CSTDISC5
0.087
-0.020
0.070
-0.023
0.023
0.049
-0.026
0.028
-0.004
0.072
0.025
-0.073
0.026
0.026
-0.043
0. 143
0.345
-0.040
0.033
0. 124
0. 144
0.055
0.058
0.086
-0. 103
0.262
-0.038
0.055
0.0 1 6

DIFCSTDY
0.00 1
-O.O I l
-0.007
-0.00 1
0.0 12
0.0 1 7
-0.043
-0.010
-0. 147
-0. 146
-0. 162
-0.004
0.04 1
0.042
-0.053
-0. 3 16
-0.295
0.054
-0.050
-0.089
-0.093
-0.023
0.064
0.097
-0. 125
-0.023
-0.058
0.077
-0. 163

DIFCSTDS
0.014
-0. 0 1 5
0.028
0.006
0.046
0.0 1 l
-0.057
0.015
-O.Q28
0.069
-0. 1 26
-0.056
0.09 1
0.09 1
-0. 1 1 2
-0.253
-0.386
0.065
-0.050
-0.088
-0.067
0.072
0.024
0.068
-0. 1 82
-0.045
-0. 132
0. 1 16
-0 045
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Appendix F: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part 1

HMOPEN89
HHIDC89
HHIPD89
MSASTGH9
CSTDAY9
CSTDISC9
MORT30
CUMDIFF
BDTOT89
ADC89
HMCR_89
HMCD_89
ALL89
CONPHY
LOCSYS89
MAPP889
MHSMEM89
MNGT89

HMOPEN89
1 .00
-0. 356
-0.357
0.395
-0.0 1 6
-0.022
-0.058
0.039
0.0 1 9
0.D28
-0. 1 40
-0.058
-0. 1 0
0.072
0. 1 74
0. 1 54
0.047
-0.029

HHIDC89
-0.356
1 .00
0.999
-0.607
0.078
-0.093
0. 1 16
-0.030
-0.093
-0. 122
0 .077
-0.005
0.022
-0.075
-0.200
-0. 160
-0.024
0.050

HHIPD89
-0.357
0.999
1 .00
-0.606
0.077
-0.093
0. 1 16
-0.030
-0.092
-0. 122
0.078
-0.004
0.02 1
-0.075 1
-0. 1 97
-0. 160
-0.023
0.05 1

MSASTGH9
0.395
-0.607
-0.606
1 .00
-0.048
0.096
-0. 1 3 3
0.025
0. 109
0. 1 3 1
0. 1 26
0.078
-0.038
0.049
0.223
0. 1 52
0.047
-0.048

CSTDAY9
-0.016
0.078
0.078
-0.048
1 .00
0.538
0.06 1
-0.038
-0. 148
-0. 178
-0. 1 58
-0.008
-0.070
-0. 128
0. 1 1 1
0.07 1
0. 1 1 8
0.027

CSTDISC9
-0.022
-0.093
-0.093
0.096
0.538
1 .00
-0. 145
0. 1 1 2
0.275
0. 274
0.003
0.022
0.052
0. 109
0.054
0.322
0. 1 27
-0.058

MORT30
-0.058
0. 1 16
0. 1 16
-0. 1 3 3
0.06 1
-0. 145
1 .00
-0.892
-0. 143
-0. 1 60
-0.089
0.078
-0.064
-0.077
0.046
-0. 1 5 1
0.053
0.024

CUMDIFF
0.039
-0.030
-0.030
0.D25
-0.038
0. 1 1 1
-0.892
1 .00
0. 103
0. 1 10
0. 149
-0. 162
0.076
0.D35
-0.04 1
0. 1 10
-0.043
-0.008

BDTOT89
0.020
-0.093
-0.092
0. 109
-0. 148
0.275
-0. 143
0. 103
1 .00
0.974
-0.24 1
0.092
0.305
0.3 10
-0.050
0.473
0.064
-0.2 1 1

�

Appendix F: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part I (cont.)
ADC 89

HMCR 89

HMCD 89

ALL89

0 . D28

-0. 1 40

-0.058

-0.0 1 0

HHIDC89

-0. 1 22

0 . 077

-0.005

lllilPD 89

-0. 1 22

0 . 078

-0.004

0.\31

-0. 1 26

0. 078

CSTDAY9

-0. 1 79

-0. 1 58

CSTDISC9

0 .274

0 . 003

-0. 1 60

HMOPEN89

MSASTGH9

CONPHY

LOCSYS89

MAPP889

MHSMEM89

MNGT89

0.072

0 . 1 74

0. 1 54

0 . 047

-0.029

0 . 022

-0.075

-0. 1 98

-0. 1 60

-0 . 024

0.050

0.021

-0 .075

-0. 1 97

-0 . 1 60

-0 .023

0.051

-0. 0 3 8

0.049

0.223

0. 1 52

0 . 047

-0. 048

-0.008

-0.070

-0. 1 28

0. 1 1 1

0.071

0. 1 18

0 . 027

0 . 022

0 .052

0 . 1 09

0.054

0. 322

0. 127

-0.058

-0.089

0 . 078

-0. 064

-0.077

0 . 046

-0. 1 5 1

0.053

0.024

CUMDIFF

0. 1 10

0 . 1 50

-0. 1 62

0 .076

0.035

-0. 04 1

0. 1 \ 0

-0 .043

-0 . 008

BDTOT89

0. 974

-0.242

0.092

0 . 305

0.3\0

-0.050

0 .473

0 . 064

-0.2 1 1

MORno

1 .00

-0.246

0. 1 1 9

0.314

0.339

-0. 067

0.495

0 . 030

-0.2 1 0

HMCR 8 9

-0.246

1 .00

-0. 3 3 2

-0. 062

-0.087

-0. 0 1 8

-0 .254

0 .0 1 8

0 . 047

HMCD 89

0. 1 19

-0.332

1 .00

0 . 028

0.089

-0. 1 0 5

0 . 1 90

-0 . 1 63

0 .070

ALL89

0.314

-0.062

0 . 028

1 .00

0 . 1 24

-0.047

0 . 145

-0.056

-0.090
-0.092

ADC89

=

CONPHY
LOCSYS89
MAPP889
MHSMEM89
MNGT89

0 . 339

-0.087

0.089

0 . 1 24

1 .00

-0.056

0. 1 80

-0 .003

-0.067

-0.0 1 8

-0. 1 0 5

-0.047

-0.056

1 .00

-0.025

0.498

0 . 04 1

0.495

-0.254

0. 1 90

0. 145

0 . 1 80

-0.025

1 .00

-0 .075

-0.076

0.030

0.01 8

-0. 1 63

-0.056

-0.003

0.498

-0.075

1 .00

-0.088

-0.2 1 0

0 . 047

0.070

-0.090

-0.092

0.041

-0.076

-0 .088

1 .00

-

�

Appendix G: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part 2

DIFFTE
Independent
DIFMD
DIFRN
DIFLPN
DIFNURS
DIFAMB
DIFSURG
DIFPREV
DIFBED
DIFOCCRT
DIFCMI
Variable
oiFF'fE
· ························· j":OO ················ O:)M ··············0:Ki'i ·············Oj·46 ·· ············ 0:0·Os ················· 0:2"M ···············Oj· 92"" · ···············0· 054·················0· 322"" · ············0:047"" · ················ OJ·4·S ······

···

0

DIFMD

0. 344

\ .00

-0.008

0.057

-0.034

O. \ 05

0 . 022

0 . 036

0 . 027

-0.004

DIFRN

0.617

-0.008

\ .00

0.041

0.234

0 . 1 38

0 . 1 74

0.060

0 . 2 52

0.056

0. 1 1 7

DIFLPN

0 . 1 46

0.057

0.041

1 .00

-0. 506

-0.024

-0 .037

-0. 0 1 7

0 . 1 69

0 . 042

-0.081

DIFNURS

0 . 004

-0 003

0 .038

0 . 005

-0. 034

0 . 2 34

-0. 506

\ .00

-0.023

-0 004

-0.004

DIFAMB

0.244

0. 1 05

0. \ 39

-0.024

-0.023

1 .00

0 . 1 34

0.046

0 . 009

0.040

0.082

DIFSURG

0 . 1 92

0.022

0. 1 74

-0.037

-0.004

0 . 1 34

\ .00

0.024

0.039

-0.008

0.094

DIFPREV

0.054

0.036

0 . 060

-0. 1 67

-0.004

0 . 046

0 . 024

\ .00

0 . 024

0 . 029

0.046

DIFBED

0 . 322

0.027

0.252

0. 1 69

0.004

0 . 009

0.039

0.024

1 .00

-0.293

-0.030

DIFOCCRT

0 . 047

-0.004

0.056

0.04::(

0 . 040

-0 .008

0.029

-0.293

\ .00

-0.055

DIFCMI

0 . 1 45

0.038

0. 1 17

-0. 0 8 1

O.o J 8

0 .082

0.094

0.046

-0.030

-0 .055

\ .00

-0.027

0.051

-0.067

0.058

-0.092

-0.004

-0.025

-0.070

-0.036

-0.073

-0. 0 1 0

HMOPEN89

-0 .00

0.018

HHIDC89

0.021

-0.030

0 .0 1 3

-0.038

0.058

0 . 024

-0.004

0.022

-0. 006

0.0%

0.0 1 1

HHIPD89

0.021

-0.030

0.013

-0.038

0.058

0 .024

-0.004

0.02 1

-0.007

0 .096

0.01 1
-0.044

MSASTGH9

-0.04 1

0.022

-0.043

0.054

-0 .086

-0.039

-0.001

-0.009

-0. 002

-0.050

CSTDAY9

0.040

0. 002

0.03 1

0.062

-0.0 1 3

-0.052

-0.00 1

-0.008

0 . 0 80

0 . 1 06

0 . 1 12

CSTDISC9

0.0%

-0. 00 1

0.056

-0.043

-0 .036

0.055

0.038

0.014

0 . 0 34

-0. 006

0.208

0 . 036

-0. 0 1 2

0 .076

0 . 008

0 . 1 23

-0.040

-0.04 1

-0.006

0 .036

0 .034

-0 .0 1 8

CUMDIFF

MORTJO

-0.032

0.013

-0.078

-0.005

-0.092

0.038

0.056

0.006

-0.042

-0 022

0.016

BDTOT95

0 . 340

0.030

0 . 2 79

-0.237

-0.0 1 9

0.253

0 . 2 85

0.034

0 .072

-0 073

0. 344

-0.226

-0.022

0 . 265

0.282

0.042

0 . 065

-0.0 1 0

0. 326

ADC95

. 0. 365

0.039

0 . 3 04

HMCR 95
HMCD 95
ALL95

-0. 1 5 9

-0. 049

-0. 1 46

0.021

0.022

-0 .072

-0. 1 22

0.020

-0 . 0 1 4

0 .082

-0 .081

0.088

0.000

0. 1 24

0. 009

0.054

0 . 027

-0 .0 1 8

-0 .03 1

0 . 060

0.044

-0 054

0 . 1 \0

-0. 1 3 1

0.022

0 . 1 64

0 . 1 24

0.069

-0. 066

0. 0 1 1

0.0 1 1

-0.059

0.068
-0.036

0.059

LOCSYS94

-0 .025

0.035

-0 .048

-0. 1 0 1

-0.050

-0.053

-0.02 1

-0 .037

0.058

0. 1 24

-0.093

-0.067

0 . 207

0.161

0.028

-0.0 1 3

0.016

0. 220

0.058

-0.039

-0.024

0 . 007

0. 056

0.042

-0 .045

-0 .04 1

0. 128

MAPP895

0. 1 87

MHSMEM95

0.002

0. 077
0.039

MNGT95

-0.056

-0.073

-0 .027

0.025

0.078

-0 .054

-0 . 1 08

-0 . 0 1 9

0 . 007

0.017

-0 052

SUNITS95

-0.005

-0.04 1

-0.023

0. 0 1 1

-0 .027

0.030

-0.007

0 . 1 \0

0 . 047

0.058

0. 057

�

Appendix G: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part 2 (cont.)

Independent
Variable
DIFFTE
DIFMD
DIFRN
DIFLPN
DIFNURS
DIFAMB
DIFSURG
DIFPREV
DIFBED
DIFOCCRT
DIFCMI
HMOPEN89
HHIDC89
HHIPD89
MSASTGH9
CSTDAY9
CSTDISC9
MORT30
CUMDIFF
BDTOT95
ADC95
HMCR_95
HMCD_95
ALL95
LOCSYS94
MAPP895
MHSMEM95
MNGT95
SUNITS95

HMOPEN89
-0.027
0.05 1
-0.067
0.058
-0.092
-0.004
-0.025
-0.070
-0.036
-0.073
-0.0 10
1 . 00
-0.356
-0.357
0.395
-0.016
-0.022
-0.058
0.039
0.010
0.013
-0. 160
-0.052
-0.053
0. 139
0. 126
0.050
-0.042
-0.007

HHIDC89
0.02 1
-0.030
0.0 1 3
-0.038
0.058
0.024
-0.004
0.022
-0.006
0.096
0.0 1 1
-0. 3 56
1 .00
0.999
-0.607
0.078
-0.093
0. 1 16
-0.030
-0.090
-0. 106
0. 1 24
-0.024
0.044
-0. 1 79
-0. 1 3 2
-0.028
0.047
-0.029

HHIPD89

MSASTGH9

CSTDAY9

CSTDISC9

MORT30

0.02 1
-0.030
0.0 1 3
-0.038
0.058
0.024
-0.004
0.02 1
-0.007
0.096
0.0 1 1
-0.357
0.999
1 .00
-0.606
0.078
-0.093
0. 1 16
-0.030
-0.090
-0. 106
0. 124
-0.024
0.043
-0. 1 77
-0. 1 3 1
-0.028
0.047
-0.027

-0.04 1
0.022
-0.043
0.054
-0.086
-0.039
-0.00 1
-0.009
-0.00 1
-0.050
0.044
0.395
-0.607
-0.606
1 .00
-0.048
0.096
-0. 1 3 3
0.025
0. 103
0. 1 20
-0. 168
0.141
-0.068
0.202
0. 128
0.024
-0.043
0.04 1

0.040
0.002
0.03 1
0.062
-0.0 1 3
-0.052
-0.00 1
-0.00 1
0.080
0. 106
0. 1 1 2
-0. 0 1 6
0.078
0.078
-0.048
1 .00
0.538
0.06 1
-0.038
-0. 1 14
-0. 1 3 8
-0. 163
0.039
-0.090
0. 162
0.090
0.055
-0.003
0.048

0.096
-0.00 1
0.056
-0.043
-0.036
0.055
0.038
0.014
0.035
-0.006
0.208
-0.022
-0.093
-0.093
0.096
0.538
1 .00
-0. 145
0. 1 12
0.280
0.280
-0. 163
0.039
0.005
0 . 1 05
0.3 1 5
0. 1 1 3
-0.076
0.080

0.036
-0.0 1 2
0.076
0.008
0. 1 23
-0.040
-0.04 1
-0.006
0.036
0.034
-0.0 1 8
-0.058
0. 1 16
0.1 16
-0. 1 3 3
0.06 1
-0. 145
1 .00
-0. 892
-0. 1 28
-0. 1 46
-0.096
0.073
-0.07 1
-0.005
-0. 1 3 8
0.001
0.025
0.046

CUMDIFF
-0.032
0.0 1 3
-0.078
-0.005
-0.092
0.038
0.056
0.006
-0.042
-0.022
0.016
0.039
-0.030
-0.030
0.025
-0.038
0. 1 12
-0.892
1 .00
0.09 1
0.098
0. 156
-0. 162
0.076
0.002
0 . 1 00
0.002
-0.016
-0.037

BDTOT95
0.339
0.030
0.279
-0.237
-0. 0 1 9
0.253
0.285
0.034
0.072
-0.073
0.344
0.0 1 0
-0.090
-0.090
0. 103
-0. 1 14
0.280
-0. 1 2 8
0.091
1 . 00
0.968
-0.249
0.060
0.246
0.0 1 8
0.452
0. 1 38
-0. 1 75
0.073

$

Appendix G: Correlation Matrix of lndependent Variables, Part 2 (cont.)

Independent
Variable
DIFITE
DIFMD
DIFRN
DIFLPN
DIFNURS
DIFAMB
DIFSURG
DIFPREV
DIFBED
DIFOCCRT
DIFCMI
HMOPEN89
HHIDC89
HHIPD89
MSASTGH9
CSTDAY9
CSTDISC9
MORT30
CUMDIFF
BDTOT95
ADC95
HMCR_95
HMCD_95
ALL95
LOCSYS94
MAPP895
MHSMEM95
MNGT95
SUNITS95

ADC95

HMCR 95

HMCD_95

ALL95

LOCSYS94

MAPP895

MHSMEM95

MNGT95

SUNITS95

0.365
0.039
0.304
-0.226
-0.022
0.265
0.282
0.042
0.065
-0.010
0.326
0.0 13
-0. 106
-0. 106
0. 120
-0. 138
0.279
-0. 146
0.098
0.968
1 .00
-0.243
0.080
0.259
-0.013
0.473
0. 1 16
-0. 1 7 1
0.054

-0. 1 5 9
-0.0 4 9
-0. 146
0.02 1
0.022
-0.072
-0. 122
0.020
-0.0 1 5
0.082
-0.08 1
-0. 1 60
0 1 24
0. 1 2 4
-0. 168
-0. 163
-0.025
-0.096
0. 156
-0.249
-0.243
1 .00
-0.446
0.0 1 8
-0.089
-0.222
-0.013
0. 120
0.040

0.088
0.000
0. 1 24
0.009
0.054
0.027
-0.0 1 8
-0.03 1
0.060
0.044
-0.054
-0.052
-0.024
-0.024
0.141
0 0 39
0.047
0.073
-0. 162
0.060
0.080
-0.446
1 .00
-0.020
-0.099
0. 1 4 1
-0. 102
0.016
-0.0 14

0. 1 10
0.068
0.059
-0. 1 3 1
0.022
0. 164
0. 1 24
0.069
-0.066
0.0 1 1
0. 1 1 5
-0.053
0.044
0.043
-0.068
-0.090
0.005
-0.07 1
0.076
0.246
0.259
0.0 1 8
-0.020
1 .00
-0.092
0. 1 84
0.063
-0.059
-0.003

-0.059
-0.036
-0.025
0.035
-0.048
-0. 1 0 1
-0.050
-0.053
-0.02 1
-0.037
0.058
0. 1 3 9
-0. 179
-0. 177
0.202
0. 162
0. 105
-0.005
0.002
0.0 1 8
-0.0 1 3
-0.089
-0.099
-0.092
1 .00
-0.037
0.382
-0.042
0.036

0. 187
0.077
0. 124
-0.092
-0.068
0.207
0. 1 6 1
0.028
-0.0 1 3
0.016
0.220
0. 126
-0. 132
-0. 132
0. 128
0.090
0.3 1 5
-0. 138
0. 100
0.452
0.473
-0.222
0. 141
0. 184
-0.037
1 .00
0.010
-0.072
-0.062

0.002
0.039
0.023
-0.039
-0.024
0.007
0.056
0.042
-0.045
-0.04 1
0. 128
0.050
-0.028
-0.028
0.024
0.055
0. 1 1 3
0.00 1
0.002
0.138
0. 1 16
-0.0 1 3
-0. 102
0.063
0.382
0.0 1 0
1 .00
-0.088
0.135

-0.056
-0.073
-0.027
0.026
0.078
-0.054
-0. 108
-0.019
0.007
0.0 1 7
-0.052
-0.042
0.047
0.047
-0.043
-0.003
-0.076
O.oz5
-0.016
-0. 175
-0. 1 7 1
0. 120
0.016
-0.060
-0.042
-0.072
-0.088
1 .00
-0.007

-0.005
-0.04 1
-0.023
0.0 1 1
-0.027
0.030
-0.007
0. 1 10
0.048
0.058
0.057
-0.008
-0.029
-0.027
0.04 1
0.048
0.080
0.046
-0.037
0.073
0.054
0.040
-0.014
-0.003
0.036
-0.062
0. 1 3 5
-0.007
1 . 00

.
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Appendix H: Parameter Estimates for Interaction Terms in Study. Standardized

Estimates of Change in Hospital Staff. Interaction model.

Variable
�OPENS9t * HlilDCS9t
CSTDISC9 * llliID CS9t
MORT30 * Ill I DCS9t
ADCS9
� C R S9

Estimate for

Estimate for

Estimate for

Estimate for

DIFFTEt

DIFRN

DIFNURS

N; I S I 6

N; I S I S

DIFLPNt
N; I S I S

N; I S I S

-0 .040

-0 .032

-0 . 0 1 4

-0 .009

0.033

0.024

0.0 1 7

-0 .053

0.063

O. I I S * * * *
-O. OS6 * * * *

�CD S 9

4 . 2 3 * 10

0. 054

0. 1 9 7 * * * *
-0.062 * *
0.03 6

-0.077
-0. 2 1 7 * * * *
-0.009
-0.023

0.135****

-0.00 7

0.054 * *
0.0 7 S * * *

ALLS9

0.036

-0 . 0 1 7

-0.055 * *

CONPHYS9

0.0 1 3

-0.020

-0 . 022

0.004

MNGTS9

0.005

-0 .002

-O .OOS

0.04 7

0.004

0 . 004

-0 .029

LOCSYSS9
PUB

-0.067 * * *
0.06S * * *

Intercept

0.000 * * * *

R-square
Adj. R-square
F value

9. 450 * * * *

0.OS7 * * * *

0.06 1 * *

O.O I S

-0.002

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.054

0.065

0.062

0.022

0 . 049

0.060

0.056

0.0 1 6

1 1 .449 * * * *

Notes: t Vanable IS transformed through square root.
* * Significant p < .05 level.
* * * Significant p < . 0 1 level.
* * * * Significant p < .00 1 level.

I O. S96 * * * *

3 . 77 9 * * * *
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Appendix I. Parameter Estimates for Interaction Terms in Study. Standardized

Estimates of Change in Hospital Capacity. Interaction model.
Variable
HMOPEN89t * HHIDC89t
C STDISC9 * HHIDC89t
MORT3 0 * HIIDC89t
ADC89
HMCR 89
HMCD 89
ALL89
C ONPHY89
MNGT89
LOCSYS89
PUB

Estimate for
DIFBEDt
N= 1 8 1 8
-0.026
0.066
-0.056
-0. 09 1 * * * *
-0.007
0.050
-0.036
0.032
0.022
-0.029
0.049 * *

Estimate for
DIFOCCRT
N= 1 8 1 8
-0. 03 1
0.04 1
0.036
-0.06 1 * *
0.040
0.020
0.002
-0.04 1
-0.0 1 8
-0.03 5
-0.00 1

Intercept

0.000

0.000 * * * *

R-square
Adj . R-square

0.020
0.014

0.012
0.0 1 3

3 . 200 * * * *
3 .278 * * * *
F-ratio (p-value)
Notes: t Van able I S transformed through square root.
* * Significant p < .05 level.
* * * Significantp < .0 1 level.
* * * * Significant p < .00 1 level.

Estimate for
DIFCMI
N= 1 8 1 7
0.0 1 9
0. 1 73 * * * *
-0.054
0.323 * * * *
-0.050 * *
-0.037
-0.00 1
-0. 0 1 4
-0.02 1
0.0 1 6
-0.030
0.000 * * *
0. 1 3 7
0. 1 3 2
26. 003 * * * *

173

Appendix J: Parameter Estimates For Interaction Terms In Study. Standardized

Estimates Of Change In Hospital Ambulatory Workload. Interaction
Model.

Variable
HMOPEN89t * HHIDC89t
C STDISC9 * HHIDC89t
MORTJO * HIIDC89t
ADC89
HMCR 89
HMCD 8 9
ALL89
CONPHY89
MNGT89
LOCSYS89
FP89

Estimate for
DIFPREV
N= 1 8 1 8
-0. 082 * * * *
0. 043
0.0 1 5
0. 046
0.023
-0.046
-0.0 1 3
-0.045
-0.037
-0.032
-0.049

Estimate for
DIFAMBt
N= 1 8 1 6
-0.03 1
0.078 * *
0. 023
0.230 * * * *
-0.060 * *
-0.04 1
-0.035
0.0 1 7
0.006
-0.072 * * *
-0.076 * * *

Intercept

0.000 * *

0.000 * * * *

R-square
Adj. R-square

0.D l 8
0.01 1

0.090
0.085

1 6.286 * * * *
2.735 * * *
F-ratio (P-value)
Notes: t Variable I S transformed through square root.
* * Significant p < .05 level.
* * * Significant p < .0 I level.
* * * * Significant p < .00 I level.

Estimate for
DIFSURGt
N= 1 8 1 7
-0. 040
0.0 1 9
0.030
0. 1 72 * * * *
-0. 1 1 9 * * * *
-0. 097 * * * *
0.058 * *
-0. 007
-0. 006
-0. 0 1 9
-0.052 * *
0.000 * * * *
0.070
0.065
1 2.423 * * * *
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